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Lessons from a Lost Constitution: The Council of




This Article explores the relationship between the Council of Revision
and the Bill of Rights. The Council of Revision, proposed at the
Constitutional Convention by James Madison and the other Virginia
delegates as part of the "Virginia Plan," would have been comprised of
the President and several prominent members of the federal judiciary. Its
task would have been to review the work of Congress and to exercise a
qualified veto over those congressional acts with which it disagreed. The
Council's qualified veto was intended to be a replacement for, rather than
an addition to, the judicial review of constitutional questions. The authors
of the Virginia Plan preferred the Council over judicial review because the
Council would have represented the combined judgment of two branches of
government and because its veto would have been subject to an override by
Congress. These features of the Council increased the likelihood that the
American people would have accepted the Council as a restraint on the
political body with which they were most likely to identify, the House of
Representatives.
The Bill of Rights must be understood in the context of Madison's
disappointment over the rejection of the Council of Revision at the
Constitutional Convention. Madison's preference for the Council of
Revision helps explain his initial aversion to judicial review and his
reluctance to support early efforts to propose a bill of rights. Madison's
subsequent decision to assume the leading role in the enactment of the Bill
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of Rights, furthermore, is attributable in large part to the ways in which he
ultimately came to view the Bill of Rights (and judicial review) as a
functional equivalent to the Council of Revision. By the Spring of 1789,
this Article argues, Madison had come to believe that a bill of rights could
help provide the work of the judiciary with the very quality he feared that it
most lacked after the Council's demise: legitimacy in the eyes of the
American people.
In addition to contributing to our historical understanding for the
origins of the Bill of Rights, Madison's commitment to the Council of
Revision is worth considering today because it invites us to re-examine our
own conceptions of judicial review and to explore the various ways in
which the work of the judiciary can be harmonized with the tenets of
representational democracy. In particular, the Council challenges us to
consider the extent to which the work of the judiciary should be
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INTRODUCTION
The Constitutional Convention of 1787 was originally scheduled to
begin on May 14.1 It did not start on time. For a variety of reasons
including the weather, the difficulties of travel, and the ambivalence many
Americans felt toward the project, a sufficient number of delegates did not
convene in Philadelphia until May 25.2 While the delay irked some of the
punctual delegates, it gave others a crucial opportunity to cultivate
alliances prior to the start of the Convention. 3 Taking full advantage of the
1 The Convention was scheduled to begin on "the second Monday in May," according to the
congressional resolution that confirmed the call for a Convention that had issued from the abortive
Annapolis "convention" of 1786. See Resolution of Congress of February 21, 1787, in 3 THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 13, 14 (Max Farrand, rev. ed., 1937) [hereinafter RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION]. Of course, that was not the only provision in the congressional
resolution that the Philadelphia Convention failed to satisfy. The congressional resolution stipulated
that the Philadelphia Convention was to meet "for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles
of Confederation ...." Id. at 14. For the relationship between the Annapolis Convention and the
Philadelphia Convention, see generally CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 54-55
(1966).
2 See RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
22-23 n.2 (2009) (discussing causes for the delegates' delay). As one indication of the ambivalence that
some felt toward the Philadelphia Convention, the state legislature of New Hampshire delayed its
delegates' arrival in Philadelphia by refusing to fund their travel. See ROSSITER, supra note 1, at 81
("[I]t seems clear that inertia, isolation, suspicion, and apathy, which were obstacles to the hopes of
nationalists in almost every state, came close to a demoralizing victory in [New Hampshire]."). New
Hampshire's two delegates, John Langdon and Nicholas Gilman, eventually arrived in Philadelphia on
July 23 at their own expense. Id.
James Madison, in particular, took advantage of the delay to confer with a variety of delegates.
He arrived in Philadelphia on May 3, 1787. See BEEMAN, supra note 2, at 22. Madison was particularly
eager to meet with the Pennsylvania delegates, such as Benjamin Franklin, Robert Morris, Gouverneur
Morris, and James Wilson, who were sympathetic to Madison's ambition to abandon, rather than
4612012]
462 Journal ofLaw & Politics [Vol.27:459
delay, for example, James Madison and his Virginian colleagues caucused
throughout the week leading up to the Constitution and formulated the
outline of a new constitutional structure for the young nation.4
The "Virginia Plan," as the work of the Virginia delegates became
known, was introduced on the first substantive day of debate at the
Convention. Although it was not the only proposal offered at the
beginning of the Convention,6 the prestige of the Virginia delegation
helped ensure that the Virginia Plan constituted the working model for the
Convention's early discussions. The Plan was instrumental in enabling the
Virginia delegates, particularly James Madison, to seize the initiative at the
revise, the Articles of Confederation. Id. at 52-56; see also RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A
BIOGRAPHY 190-95 (1971).
4 See Letter from George Mason to George Mason, Jr. (May 20, 1787), in 3 RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 23 ("The Virginia deputies (who are all here) meet and confer
together two or three hours every day, in order to form a proper correspondence of sentiments.").
George Mason was the last of the Virginia delegation to arrive, on May 17. See id. at 22-23. The timely
arrival of the Virginia delegates was probably attributable, in least in part, to Madison's desire to confer
before the Convention. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Apr. 15, 1787), in
9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 379 (William T. Hutchinson et al. eds., 1961) [hereinafter PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON] (urging Randolph to meet Madison in Philadelphia prior to the start of the
Convention). Beeman posits that some of the Pennsylvania delegates were regular participants in these
meetings among the Virginians and contributed significantly to the formulation of the Virginia Plan.
BEEMAN, supra note 2, at 54-57, 54 n.26; id. at 87 ("The [Virginia] plan was largely Madison's
handiwork, although Madison himself insisted that it was the result of a 'consultation among the
deputies,' by which he meant the collection of Virginians and Pennsylvanians who had gathered in
Philadelphia before the Convention."). Madison's correspondence, however, refers only to the Virginia
delegates. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to John Tyler (unsent), in 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 525 ("The Resolutions proposed by [Randolph], were the result of a
Consultation among the Deputies, the whole number, seven being present. The part which Virga. had
home in bringg. abt. the Convention, suggested the idea that some such initiative step might be
expected from her Deputation.").
5 The Virginia Plan was introduced at the Convention on Tuesday, May 29, 1787. 1 RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 18-23. The opening day of the Convention, Friday, May
25, 1787, was largely spent on the presentation of credentials, the election of George Washington as
President of the Convention, and the election of a committee to propose a set of rules. See ROSSITER,
supra note 1, at 161-63. On Monday, May 28, 1787, the Convention's time was consumed with the
adoption of a set of rules and procedures, perhaps the most famous of which was the strict imposition
of secrecy. Id. at 166-68; BEEMAN, supra note 2, at 79-85.
6 A plan by Charles Pinckney was also introduced on May 29. See I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 23. The original version of Pickney's Plan has never been recovered, but
its basic contents can be reconstructed from the references made to it by the other delegates. See, e.g., 3
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 595-609. The influence of Pickney's Plan on
the Convention is a matter of ongoing debate among historians. See, e.g., BEEMAN, supra note 2, at 93-
98; CHRISTOPHER COLLIER & JAMES LINCOLN COLLIER, DECISION IN PHILADELPHIA: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 87-101 (1986).
7 See, e.g., BEEMAN, supra note 2, at 99 ("When the delegates reconvened at ten o'clock on the
morning of May 30, the Virginians and Pennsylvanians made certain that it would be Randolph's
resolutions, and not Pickney's, that would form the main topic of business."). The seven Virginia
delegates were: George Washington, James Madison, Edmund Randolph, George Mason, George
Wythe, John Blair, and James McClurg. See ROSSITER, supra note 1, at 18-26 (summarizing Virginia
delegates).
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Convention and to define the initial framework of the deliberations.8
Madison's ability to influence the Convention's ideological approach,
along with his repeated defenses of the Plan's various provisions
throughout the Convention, have earned him the moniker by some as the
"father" of the Constitution.9 One indication of the Virginia Plan's
importance to the Convention's proceedings can be found in the number of
the Plan's provisions that ultimately found their way into the Constitution.
Aspects of the Virginia Plan that survived into the Constitution of 1787
include bicameralism, the direct operation of the federal government on the
people at large, age requirements for congressmen, life tenure for the
federal judiciary, and the Guarantee Clause.' 0
The Virginia Plan was not, however, an unqualified success. Several
important features of the Plan were squarely rejected at the Convention and
the Constitution itself bears the signature of only three of Virginia's seven
delegates." Madison himself, even though he signed the document, was
8 See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 59 (1996) ("Introduced by Governor Edmund Randolph on May 29, the Virginia Plan
formed the basis of the Convention's first fortnight of debate."); see also LANCE BANNING, THE
SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 138
(1995) ("[Madison] was primarily responsible for the preliminary propositions that initiated the
creation of a federal republic and served throughout the summer as the outline for reform.").
9 See, e.g., KETCHAM, supra note 3, at 229 ("In attending to every detail of this structure, and in
being sensitive at every point to the effect of blending the various parts, Madison played his most
critical role, and earned the title later bestowed upon him, Father of the Constitution.").
10 Compare Virginia Plan, Res. 3, 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 20
(bicameralism); id., Res. 4 & 5, at 20 (age requirements); id., Res. 6, at 21 (empowering Congress to
legislate directly); id., Res. 9, at 21-22 (judicial life tenure); and id., Res. 11, at 22 (Guarantee Clause),
with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (bicameralism); id, art. I, §§ 2-3 (age requirements); id., art. I, § 8
(empowering Congress to legislate directly); id, art. Ill, § 1 (judicial life tenure); id., art. IV, § 4
(Guarantee Clause). Many of these concepts, to be sure, were not invented by the Virginia delegates.
Every state except Pennsylvania and Georgia, for example, employed a bicameral legislature at the
time of the Convention. See DONALD S. LUTZ, POPULAR CONSENT AND POPULAR CONTROL 88 (1980).
Under the Articles of Confederation, however, Congress did not. See R.B. BERNSTEIN, THE FOUNDING
FATHERS RECONSIDERED 68 (2009) (explaining that each state had one vote in the Confederation
Congress). Perhaps the most unique or revolutionary aspect of the Virginia Plan was its proposal that
the national government legislate directly upon the American people, rather than upon the states and
only indirectly to the American people. See id. at 63 ("Modern students of the U.S. Constitution hail
federalism as its most creative feature - yet federalism was a byproduct of individual decisions by the
Federal Convention rather than a carefully devised system of relations between the federal government
and the states.").
" John Blair, James Madison, and George Washington were the three Virginia delegates to sign the
Constitution. See U.S. CONST. (signature page). Edmund Randolph and George Mason remained until
the end of the Convention but chose not to sign the document. See BEEMAN, supra note 2, at 355-58.
At the Virginia Ratifying Convention, Randolph decided to support the Constitution while Mason
became one of the leading Antifederalists opposing ratification. See PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION:
THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788, at 255-91 (2010). The two other Virginia
delegates who failed to sign the Constitution, James McClurg and George Wythe, were not at the
Convention on the day that the document was signed. Wythe had been called away much earlier by the
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severely disappointed with the ways in which the Constitution deviated
from the Virginia Plan.12
This article will focus on one of the important aspects of the Virginia
Plan that was discarded at the Convention. Resolution Number 8 of the
Virginia Plan provided that the new federal government was to include a
"Council of Revision" comprised of the federal executive and a select
number of the federal judiciary.13 The Plan's Council of Revision would
have been responsible for reviewing the work of Congress and would have
exercised a qualified veto over all congressional acts (including both
legislation and congressional vetoes of state legislation).1 4 Much like the
Constitution's executive veto (which was derived from the Council of
Revision), the Council's veto could have been based either on policy or
constitutional grounds and would have been subject to an override by a
supermajority of Congress.' 5
The Virginia Plan's Council of Revision remains an important subject
of study today for at least two reasons. First, from a historical perspective,
the Council of Revision is essential to our understanding of the origins of
the Bill of Rights. The Virginia Plan and the Bill of Rights are inextricably
linked together in history because they share the same principal author,
James Madison.16 James Madison was the driving force behind the first
Congress' decision to adopt amendments and it is difficult to know when
(if ever) Congress would have proposed a bill of rights without his
leadership and influence in 1789.'1 The Bill of Rights must therefore be
illness of his wife. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Sept. 6, 1787), in 10 PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 163-64 ("Mr. Wythe has never returned to us. His lady whose
illness carryed him away, died some time after he got home."). Wythe did, however, argue in favor of
ratification at the Virginia Ratifying Convention, MAIER, supra, at 293-98, leading one to believe that
he very well might have signed had he been able to remain in Philadelphia. McClurg's correspondence
with Madison during his absence suggests that he shared Madison's disappointment with the ways in
which the Convention deviated from the Virginia Plan. See Letter from James McClurg to James
Madison (Aug. 5, 1787), in 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 67; Letter from
James McClurg to James Madison (Aug. 22, 1787), in 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 73.
12 See infra notes 221-222 and accompanying text.
13 See Virginia Plan, Res. 8, 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 21. For
the number of federal judiciary intended to sit on the Council, see infra note 105.
14 The Virginia Plan provided that the Council's "dissent" from congressional action would
"amount to a rejection" unless the congressional act was again passed by a supermajority (left
unspecified under the Plan). Virginia Plan, Res. 8, 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra
note 1, at2l.
's See infra notes 104-120 and accompanying text.
16 See infra note Ill and accompanying text (Council of Revision) and notes 341-344 and
accompanying text (Bill of Rights).
17 See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 8, at 330 ("For were it not for Madison, a bill of rights might
never have been added to the Constitution. . . .Nearly all Madison's colleagues in Congress thought the
entire subject could be deferred until the new government was safely operating, by which point the
[Vol.27:459464
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understood in the context of Madison's disappointment over the rejection
of the Council of Revision at the Constitutional Convention.
Madison's initial reluctance to support a bill of rights, for example, is
largely attributable to the ways in which the judiciary's role under the
Constitution differed from the role he had attempted to create for it through
the Council of Revision.' 8 Madison believed that the Constitution's form
of judicial review would prove an ineffective and possibly
counterproductive mechanism for restraining Congress. He was confident
that the American people would identify most strongly with their elected
officials in Congress, particularly in the House of Representatives, and
would not countenance an unqualified check in the hands of the judiciary.' 9
Without the Council of Revision, Madison believed the Constitution's
structure of governance was likely to suffer the same "democratic
excesses" that had plagued the states in the period leading up to the
Convention.2 0
It is the contention of this article that the Bill of Rights must be
understood in the context of Madison's desire to reclaim some of the
ground that he had lost at the Convention when the Council had been
rejected. Specifically, this article will argue, Madison had come to believe
by the spring of 1789 that a bill of rights might help provide the work of
the judiciary with the crucial quality that he feared it most lacked after the
Council's demise: political legitimacy in the eyes of the American polity.2'
Madison hoped that this additional legitimacy might enable the judiciary to
perform, albeit less elegantly, the same function the Council had been
intended to serve in his constitutional structure.2 2 In particular, Madison
hoped that judicial review based on a bill of rights could help refine the
majoritarian process by interjecting additional opportunities for
desire for a bill of rights might well have evaporated."); Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the Bill of
Rights: A Reluctant Paternity, 1990 SUP. CT. REv. 301, 304 (1991) (arguing that Madison was "without
question the key player in the adoption of the Bill of Rights" and that without his efforts the Bill of
Rights "certainly would not have been ratified by 1791").
18 See infra notes 264-282and accompanying text.
'9 See infra notes 235-257 and accompanying text.
20 See infra note 255 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 290-291 and accompanying text.
22 This is not to say that Madison was not also motivated to propose a bill of rights for strategic
purposes. See infra notes 332-335 and accompanying text. This Article contends, however, that
Madison's commitment to the Bill of Rights cannot be attributed entirely to strategic advantage. See
infra notes 345-358 and accompanying text. In any event, the essential historical inquiry concerned
here is whether the individual most responsible for the proposal of the Bill of Rights genuinely believed
in their utility at the time he proposed them.
4652012]
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deliberation and rationality.2 3 Madison's preference for the Council,
however, strongly suggests that his support for the Bill of Rights was not
premised on the notion that the judiciary would wield an absolute veto.
Instead, his support appears to have been based on a faith that the practical
limitations of the judiciary's political legitimacy would constrain the
judiciary to its proper place within the constitutional structure.
The second reason the Council of Revision is worth studying stems
from the ways in which it challenges our own assumptions about the
proper role of the judiciary in a democratic society. Most theoretical
frameworks for constitutional interpretation today conceptualize the
judiciary's work as a "countermajoritarian" enterprise.24 As a result, the
presumption is that the judiciary should strive to stand "above politics" in
order to base its decisions on "legal" principles rather than political
considerations.25 According to this view, the appointment and the life-
tenure of the federal judiciary disqualifies it from a policymaking role and
the legislative process altogether.26
The Council of Revision reveals that Madison and the rest of the
Virginia delegates conceptualized the judiciary and its role within
democratic governance in quite different terms. Far from disqualifying it
from a policy making role, the judiciary's appointment and life tenure were
viewed by Madison and the other Virginia delegates as qualifications that
would have enabled the judiciary to contribute a level of deliberation and
rationality to the legislative process itself Under the Virginia Plan,
23 This Article is concerned primarily with Madison's views regarding judicial review in the
context of separation of powers (particularly with respect to the relationship between the judiciary and
Congress). This focus, however, is not intended to suggest that federalism concerns did not play a
leading role in the development of judicial review at the Convention and afterwards. See infra notes
213-218 and accompanying text.
24 See infra note 362 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 363-364 and accompanying text.
26 During the confirmation proceedings for Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan, Senator Grassley
of Iowa articulated this understanding of the judicial task:
Our goal is to see if you will exercise judicial restraint. We want to know that
you will exercise the preeminent responsibilities of a Justice by adhering to the
law and not public opinion. Policy choices need to be reserved for those of us
elected to the legislative branch of Government. It is our duty to confirm a
nominee who has superior intellectual abilities but, more importantly, it is our
duty to confirm a nominee who will not come with a results-oriented philosophy
or an agenda to impose his or her personal politics and preferences from the
bench.
The Nomination of Elena Kagan To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Illth Cong. 14 (2010) (statement of Sen. Charles E.
Grassley).
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approximately three fourths of the federal government would have been
appointed.2 7 The Virginia Plan's mixture of elected and appointed officials
was intended to create a structure of governance that was fundamentally
democratic but which would function in a more deliberate and judicious
manner than one based entirely on direct elections. By assigning primacy
to the role of Congress, and particularly to the electorally accountable
House of Representatives, the Virginia Plan maintained the democratic
legitimacy of the structure as a whole despite the integration of the
judiciary in the legislative process.29
The Council was narrowly rejected at the Convention but its rejection
was not based on the types of considerations that have led modem
commentators to criticize the institution. No one at the Convention, for
example, argued that it was improper for appointed officials to play a role
in the legislative process. 30 In fact, the original Constitution relied more
heavily on the appointment process than the Virginia Plan. In the end, a
slim majority of the delegates voted against the Council largely because
they had more faith than the Council's proponents in the executive's ability
to exercise the veto and because they chose to assign a central place to
judicial review in the federalism context. 32 It would be anachronistic,
therefore, to interpret the Council's rejection as a vindication of the
modern conception of judicial review. Judicial supremacy, a foundational
tenet of most modern schools of constitutional interpretation, was largely
an invention of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.33
This article is not intended to suggest that we are bound by Madison's
original conceptualization of judicial review, or the Bill of Rights, simply
by virtue of his role at the nation's founding. History should not constrain
the choices we make about our institutions today so much as enlighten
those choices by providing a fresh perspective from which to assess them.
To recognize the ways in which many of the Framers' ideas about the
judiciary and judicial review contradict our own assumptions is to invite an
important normative inquiry. Have we constructed a constitutional
27 Under the Virginia Plan, only the House of Representatives would have been directly elected.
See Virginia Plan, Res. 5, 7, 9, 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 20-21; see
also infra notes 77-93 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 77-124 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 125-130 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 173-179 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 142-149 and accompanying text.
32 For the discussion of the delegates' various motivations for opposing the Council, see infra notes
155-218 and accompanying text.
3 See infra note 365.
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paradigm that is optimal for our current society? Or, conversely, have we
created a paradigm that is damaging to our society in ways that are difficult
for us to detect? It is my hope that a study of the Council of Revision may
provide an additional perspective with which to make that inquiry.
This article will begin in Section I with an analysis of the Council of
Revision and the judiciary's role within the constitutional framework of the
Virginia Plan. Section II will address the Council of Revision's fate at the
Constitutional Convention and the reasons why it was narrowly rejected.
Section III will then argue that the Bill of Rights must be understood in the
context of the Council of Revision because of the ways in which the Bill of
Rights represented an effort by James Madison to compensate for the
Council's rejection in 1787. The Conclusion will sketch out a few of the
normative implications for the study of the Council with respect to our
understanding of the judiciary and its proper role in a modem democracy.
I. THE COUNCIL OF REVISION AND THE JUDICIARY'S ROLE UNDER THE
VIRGINIA PLAN
A. The Callfor a Convention
The Constitutional Convention of 1787 was precipitated by the
disenchantment many Americans felt toward their national and state
governments. 34 As Americans labored to realize the potential of democracy
(for themselves as well as the world they believed was watching), the
political developments of the 1780s were leading many of the nation's
political elites to question the fundamental tenet of democracy: that the
people were capable of responsibly governing themselves.3 5
34 Historians agree that the Philadelphia Convention was animated by concerns at both the national
and state levels. Historians disagree, however, about the relative significance of those concerns. For the
view that the overriding concern stemmed from a disenchantment with the failings of democracy at the
state level, see, for example, RAKOVE, supra note 8, at 29 ("When enlightened leaders like James
Madison or Alexander Hamilton fretted about the general condition of the Republic, they increasingly
worried less about the 'imbecility' of Congress than about the shortcomings of the individual
governments of the states."). For an example of an alternative view, see BANNING, supra note 8, at 78
("Preoccupied with Madison's alarm about abuses in the states, most interpreters have overlooked his
claim that many of the most distressing of these evils could be traced to the debilities of the
Confederation.").
3 Many Framers believed that the fate of modem democracy was closely tied to the success (or
failure) of the United States. See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 8, at 14 ("It is evident, too, that the
delegates believed that what they did would have lasting implications not only for their constituents but
for a larger world. No one dissented when Madison and Hamilton both observed that the decisions of
the Convention were destined to 'decide for ever the fate of Republican Government."') (quoting I
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 423-24).
[Vol.27:459468
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One of the most criticized "failings" of democracy during the period
leading up to the Convention related to the states' experimentation with
paper money legislation. 3 6 For many of the nation's elites, the paper money
issuances of the 1780s constituted a short-sighted and fundamentally unjust
effort by the various state legislatures to defraud creditors of their rightful
returns. This was perceived not only as an unjust taking of property from
creditors but also as a threat to the health of the states' economies, which
depended so heavily upon the availability of credit.38 In the absence of
congressional authority over interstate commerce, furthermore, there was
36 Seven state legislatures-Pennsylvania (1785), South Carolina (1785), North Carolina (1785),
New York (1786), New Jersey (1786), Georgia (1786), and Rhode Island (1786)-enacted some form
of paper money legislation during this period. See MERRILL JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES DURING THE CONFEDERATION 1781-1789, at 316-26 (1950). Under most of these
laws, paper money was issued as interest payments on state debts and as mortgage loans on farms and
real estate. Id. New York's legislation was fairly typical of the legislation passed at this time. New
York issued £200,000 in paper, £150,000 of which was loaned on real estate and £50,000 of which was
used to pay part of the interest due on the state and national debt owned by New York citizens. Id. at
321.
One of the principal criticisms of the paper money legislation was the fact that the currency tended
to depreciate rapidly in value. The issuances in North Carolina, New Jersey, Georgia, and Rhode Island
were particularly troubled. See id. at 320 (stating that North Carolina issuance was marked by
difficulties and significant depreciation); id at 322-23 (describing refusal of New York City and
Philadelphia merchants to accept New Jersey paper money and consequential substantial depreciation);
id at 323 (describing immediate depreciation of Georgia's money, which lost seventy-five percent of
its value within one year); id. at 323-25 (describing difficulties of Rhode Island issuance).
3 See RAKOVE, supra note 8, at 44 ("The emission of an unsecured currency amounted to an
unjust' . . . assault on the rights of property; the more popular such measures appeared, the more
[James Madison] fretted that Americans were supporting a policy that would 'disgrace Republican
Govts. in the eyes of mankind."') (quoting Letter from James Madison to James Madison, Sr. (Nov. 1,
1786), in 9 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 153-154); GORDON S. WOOD, CREATION OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776 1787, at 404 (1998) [hereinafter CREATION] ("An excess of power in
the people was leading not simply to licentiousness but to a new kind of tyranny, not by the traditional
rulers, but by the people themselves-what John Adams in 1776 had called a theoretical contradiction,
a democratic despotism."); GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 252
(1991) ("As far as [the political elites] were concerned, all the paper money and debtor-relief
legislation of the states were simply the consequence of men using government to promote their private
interests at the expense of the public good."). Of course, the proponents of paper money legislation
viewed the matter in quite different terms. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE IDEA OF AMERICA:
REFLECTIONS ON THE BIRTH OF THE UNITED STATES 138 (2011) [hereinafter THE IDEA OF AMERICA]
("These calls for paper money in the 1780s were the calls of American business. The future of
America's entrepreneurial activity and prosperity lay . . . with the thousands upon thousands of
ordinary traders, petty businessmen, aspiring artisans, and market farmers who were deep in debt and
were buying and selling with each other all over America.").
38 See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 74 (1990) (summarizing the
views of the Framers as being that "[n]o one would want to risk money in ventures in a country whose
government could not be relied upon to uphold the just rights of property").
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little to prevent the states from retaliating against one another through acts
of economic protectionism. 39
State efforts to deprive foreign creditors (particularly British creditors)
of an opportunity to collect their American debt implicated the nation's
foreign relations and threatened to embroil the nation in a trade war (or
worse) with Great Britain.4 0 Arguably these state impediments constituted
a violation of the Treaty of Paris of 1783 and Britain retaliated by refusing
to comply with some of its obligations under the treaty. 41 Among other
things, Britain refused to relinquish its forts in the Northwest Territory.42
Each state's ability to unilaterally destabilize the nation's foreign relations,
furthermore, only highlighted the infirmities of the national government
under the Articles of Confederation. European powers could afford to
discriminate against or impede American commerce without fear of
reprisal from a weak Congress.43 Even small and seemingly
inconsequential states appeared capable of denigrating American interests
* 44
with impunity.
3 See, e.g., BEEMAN, supra note 2, at 19 ("The Articles of Confederation lacked any provision
permitting the American government to impose uniform commercial regulations among the states. As a
consequence, the individual American states frequently fell into destructive competition with one
another. Virginia and Maryland argued over navigation rights on the Potomac River, disputes between
New York and the Vermont territory occasionally erupted into violence, and several of the states
imposed onerous restrictions on interstate commerce.").
40 British merchants were owed large prewar debts, particularly by Southern planters, and the debts
had been impossible to collect during the war. During the Revolutionary War, at least nine states had
enacted legislation that sequestered debts or obstructed their collection. See DWIGHT F. HENDERSON,
COURTS FOR A NEW NATION 72 (1971).
41 Article IV of the treaty required that "creditors on either side shall meet with no lawful
impediment" to the recovery of debts previously contracted in good faith. The Definitive Treaty of
Peace Between the United States of America and His Britannic Majesty, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. IV, Sept. 3,
1783, 8 Stat. 80. Similarly, Article V required that the American Congress recommend to the individual
states that they permit loyalists and British subjects to be able to sue for the recovery of confiscated
property. Id at art. V, 8 Stat. 80, 82.
42 See GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789-1815,
at 112 (2009). Britain justified its refusal to comply with the treaty's requirement that it surrender its
northwestem forts by noting that the United States had failed to comply with the treaty requirements
regarding British creditors. Id. British occupation of these forts was of crucial significance to many
Americans. It allowed the British both to control the important water passage between the Great Lakes
and the St. Lawrence River-upon which many Americans hoped to ship their goods-and to continue
to supply and support Indian tribes that were in conflict with Americans settling west of the
Appalachians. See id
43 See BANNING, supra note 8, at 65 ("[P]rofoundly troubled by repeated state and federal failures
to retaliate effectively against the Europeans, [Madison] had voted [in 1786] for a general convention
to consider better regulation of the nation's foreign trade."); RAKOVE, supra note 8, at 27 (discussing
concerns by many in the South that weakness of Confederation could facilitate Spain's closing of the
Mississippi to navigation).
4 See WOOD, supra note 42, at 634 ("In 1785 Algiers, encouraged by Great Britain, captured two
American ships and did enslave their crews. Lacking any resources, financial or otherwise, to retaliate,
the Confederation Congress remained helpless...."); ROSSITER, supra note 1, at 45 ("Of all the
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The result was that many American elites had come to believe by the
mid-1780s that a fundamental reevaluation of the nation's overarching
political structure had become necessary. 4 5 In 1786, James Madison and
eleven other delegates from five states met in Annapolis to explore ways in
which Congress' powers could be augmented with respect to interstate
commerce. 46 While such a small body lacked the mandate to propose
fundamental changes to the Articles of Confederation, the Annapolis
delegates pressed their tenuous mandate by issuing a call to all the states to
send delegations to a subsequent Convention to meet the next year in
Philadelphia. 7
The Annapolis Convention's appeal for constitutional change gained
additional momentum when the cradle of the American revolutionary
movement, Massachusetts, suffered an armed conflict between its own
citizens.4 8 For those who believed in the need for pervasive change, Shays'
impulses that drove men like Washington and Hamilton to Philadelphia in 1787, none was stronger
than the uncomplicated, patriotic sense of shame at the contempt in which the United States seemed to
be held-from Britain at one end of the scale of power to the Barbary states at the other."). For the
Barbary Wars, see generally FRANK LAMBERT, THE BARBARY WARS: AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE IN
THE ATLANTIC WORLD (2005).
45 Arguably the deficiencies of Congress on the national (and international) level were not
sufficient, in themselves, to require the kind of pervasive overhaul of the nation's political structure that
most at the Convention were prepared to undertake. At the Constitutional Convention, Madison argued
that one of the fundamental purposes of the Constitution was to "secure a good internal legislation &
administration to the particular States." Madison observed that:
In developing the evils which vitiate the political system of the U.S. it is proper
to take into view those which prevail within the States individually as well as
those which affect them collectively: Since the former indirectly affect the
whole; and there is great reason to believe that the pressure of them had a full
share in the motives which produced the present Convention.
1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 318 (June 19). It is likely that the majority
of delegates agreed with Madison's assessment. See, e.g., WOOD, CREATION, supra note 37, at 475
("The Federalists of the late eighties wanted and believed they needed much more than the nationalists
of the early eighties had sought. Their focus was not so much on the politics of the Congress as it was
on the politics of the states. . . . The supporters of the new federal Constitution thus aimed to succeed
where the states, not the Confederation, had failed....").
46 See BANNING, supra note 8, at 69-75 (describing Madison's involvement with the Annapolis
Convention and its relationship to the Constitutional Convention); JACK RAKOVE, REVOLUTIONARIES:
A NEW HISTORY OF THE INVENTION OF AMERICA 354-57 (2010) (same).
47 The Annapolis resolution called for a subsequent Convention in Philadelphia to "devise such
further provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render the Constitution of the Federal
Government adequate to the exigencies of the Union...." See Alexander Hamilton, Address of the
Annapolis Convention (1786), in FOUNDING AMERICA: DOCUMENTS FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE
BILL OF RIGHTS 313, 316 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 2006). For the Annapolis Convention generally, see
JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTERPRETATIVE HISTORY OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 368-75 (1979).
4 For an historical account of Shays' Rebellion, see DAVID P. SZATMARY, SHAYS'S REBELLION:
THE MAKING OF AN AGRARIAN INSURRECTION (1980); ROBERT J. TAYLOR, WESTERN
Journal ofLaw & Politics
rebellion was portrayed as a prime example of the precariousness of
America's experiment with democracy. 49 George Washington summarized
the mood of many committed nationalists in the fall of 1786:
[The disturbances associated with Shays' Rebellion]
exhibit a melancholy proof of what our trans atlantic foe
have predicted; and of another thing perhaps, which is still
more to be regretted, and is yet more unaccountable; that
mankind left to themselves are unfit for their own
government. I am mortified beyond expression whenever I
view the clouds which have spread over the brightest mom
that ever downed upon any Country.so
The armed rebellion of a segment of society in Massachusetts suggested
that the divisions within American society might be too intractable to be
resolved politically under the existing constitutional structure. Whichever
segment of society found itself in the majority, it seemed, was determined
to take advantage of its power to the detriment of others.52 The inevitable
result appeared to be a vicissitude of injustices as electoral fortunes shifted
back and forth or, worse yet, armed civil conflict in the event that electoral
victories proved too permanent.
When the Philadelphia Convention met in May of 1787, James Madison
and many others were prepared to press for a wholesale repudiation of the
Article of Confederation and a systemic change in the nation's
MASSACHUSETTS IN THE REVOLUTION (1954). For brief accounts of similar, if less notorious, uprisings
in Connecticut, New Hampshire, Maryland, New Jersey, Virginia, Vermont, Pennsylvania, and South
Carolina, see SZATMARY, supra, at 77-79, 124-26.
49 See, e.g., BEEMAN, supra note 2, at 18 ("[F]or those who cared about the fate of America, not as
a loose collection of states and localities but, rather, as a single nation-particularly those who had seen
firsthand the deficiencies of the continental government-the developments of late 1786 and early 1787
seemed ominous indeed. Shays' Rebellion convinced many of America's most influential people that
something drastic needed to be done to save their experiment in liberty and union.").
so Letter from George Washington to Henry Lee, Jr. (Oct. 31, 1786), in 4 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 318-19 (W.W. Abbott et al. eds., 1992).
5' See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 8, at 314 ("[Madison's] concern about the security of private
rights was rooted in a palpable fear that economic legislation was jeopardizing fundamental rights of
property. Paper-money laws, debtor-stay laws, and the specter of Shays's Rebellion in Massachusetts
all alarmed him terribly.").
52 See WOOD, CREATION, supra note 37, at 404 ("The confiscation of property, the paper money
schemes, the tender laws, and the various devices suspending the ordinary means for the recovery of
debts . . . [were] laws enacted by legislatures which were probably as equally and fairly representative
of the people as any legislatures in history.").
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constitutional structure.53 For several years, Madison had delved into
history, political philosophy, and constitutional theory in an effort to
discern a political solution to the specific challenges facing American
democracy in the 1780s.54 On the eve of the Constitutional Convention, he
shared with his allies in Philadelphia a plan for constitutional governance
that he hoped would save American democracy from itself.55
B. The Constitutional Design of the Virginia Plan
1. The Congressional Veto over State Legislation
Madison's overarching vision was to construct a national structure of
governance that was democratic at its core but which would function in a
more deliberative and rational manner than the existing structure
dominated by state legislatures. Central to Madison's plans was the
creation of a new national government, which he believed had the potential
to be intrinsically superior to the states by virtue of its larger domain.5 6
Conventional political theory had taught that democracies could only
succeed in relatively small states.57 For Madison, however, theory and
experience both led to the opposite conclusion.58 Based on his review of
5 See BANNING, supra note 8, at 75 ("[T]he failings of the Union with the growing tendency of
state majorities to sacrifice the general good to pressing, temporary interests would tighten in
[Madison's] mind into a vision of a full-blown crisis of the Revolution. The conviction that these
threats were linked . . . would be the crux of his proposals for sweeping constitutional reform.").
54 See, e.g., KETCHAM, supra note 3, at 174-89 (discussing Madison's studies and preparations
between the winter of 1785-86 and the summer of 1787); RAKOVE, supra note 8, at 42-43 (same).
s See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 8, at 34 ("The time had come, Madison concluded, not only to
free the Union from its dependence on the states but to free the states from themselves by taking steps
that would undo the damage done by the excesses of republicanism."); see also Charles F. Hobson, The
Negative on State Laws: James Madison, the Constitution, and the Crisis of Republican Government,
in THE NEW AMERICAN NATION, 1775-1820, at 217-18 (Peter S. Onuf ed., 1991) ("Madison regarded
the crisis of the Confederation in the 1780s as foremost a crisis of republican government.... On the
eve of the Federal Convention he sensed a widespread disillusionment with republicanism among
Americans, but at the same time he saw a unique opportunity for introducing a new theory that would
place republican government on a more secure and lasting foundation.").
56 In this respect, at the very least, Madison was a committed "nationalist." See BANNING, supra
note 8, at 140-46. Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress could hardly claim to be a national
government. Under the Articles, Congress had no power to coerce the states or legislate directly on the
citizens. As a true confederation, the "national" political structure before the Constitution was more
analogous to the United Nations' relationship today to its constituent members.
s7 See, e.g., BANNING, supra note 8, at 204 ("On the authority of Montesquieu, opponents of the
Constitution endlessly repeated that republican self-government was inappropriate for polities of great
extent."); RAKOVE, supra note 8, at 49 ("[P]revious writers had argued that stable republics could
survive only in small and socially homogeneous communities, where the underlying similarity of
interests would reduce the temptation one part of the community might feel to exploit another, and thus
encourage citizens to exercise the essential virtue of subordinating private interest to public good.").
58 See RAKOVE, supra note 8, at 47 ("One central conviction lay at the heart of [Madison's]
analysis. Experience conclusively proved that neither state legislators nor their constituents could be
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history and constitutional theory, as well as what he had personally
observed of American politics during his career as a state and federal
representative, Madison posited that the larger domain of the federal
government could enable Congress to function in a more just and
deliberative manner than its state analogues.59 The theory, well-known to
all students of Madison's political philosophy, was that majorities would
find it difficult to coalesce around an issue or set of issues in Congress by
virtue of the sheer scale of national politics. 6 0 Madison believed that the
myriad political, social, economic, and religious constituencies spread
throughout the country would tend to negate each other's political
influence in Congress, thereby allowing Congress the opportunity and
space to deliberate more rationally and evenhandedly than the state
legislatures that were tied much more directly and immediately to the
desires (and whims) of their electoral majorities. In addition, the
relied upon to support the general interest of the Union, the true public good of their own communities,
or the rights of minorities and individuals.").
5 For the ways in which Madison's experiences as a state and congressional representative prior to
the Convention contributed to his constitutional theory, see BANNING, supra note 8, at 13-107;
KETCHAM, supra note 3, at 68-174; JACK. N. RAKOVE, JAMES MADISON AND THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 21-48 (3d ed. 2007).
60 One of Madison's best summaries of this theory is contained in his Vices of the Political System,
drafted in the Spring of 1787 prior to the Convention:
If an enlargement of the sphere is found to lessen the insecurity of private rights,
it is not because the impulse of a common interest or passion is less predominant
in this case with the majority; but because a common interest or passion is less
apt to be felt and the requisite combinations less easy to be formed by a great
than by a small number. The Society becomes broken into a greater variety of
interests, of pursuits, of passions, which check each other, whilst those who may
feel a common sentiment have less opportunity of communication and concert.
James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr. 1787), in 9 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 4, at 356-57; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 135 (James Madison)
(Benjamin F. Wright ed. 1961) ("Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and
interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade
the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel
it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other."); DONALD S. LUTZ, THE
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 84-86 (1988) (summarizing Madison's theory of
extended republic); RAKOVE, supra note 8, at 46-56 (same).
61 See, e.g., WOOD, THE IDEA OF AMERICA, supra note 37, at 150 ("[Madison] did not see public
policy or the common good emerging naturally from the give-and-take of hosts of competing interests.
Instead he hoped that these clashing interests and parties in an enlarged national republic would
neutralize themselves and thereby allow liberally educated, rational men . .. to promote the public good
in a disinterested manner."); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 60, at 359
("In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and
sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any
other principles than those of justice and the general good....")
One of Madison's primary inspirations for his theory of the extended republic came from his own
experiences combating religious favoritism and intolerance in Virginia. In that context, he personally
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relatively small number of federal officials offered the prospect that federal
legislators would be drawn from a better pool of candidates than the
thousands of representatives who were sent by their constituents to the
state legislatures.62
Madison was evidently persuasive when he caucused with his Virginia
colleagues on the eve of the Constitutional Convention because the
Virginia Plan largely reflected his own political philosophy. 63 Among the
major components of the Plan, for example, the Virginia delegates adopted
a broad congressional veto over all state legislation. According to
Resolution 6 of the Virginia Plan, Congress would exercise the power "to
negative all laws passed by the several States, contravening, in the opinion
of the National Legislature the articles of the Union . . . ."
The veto contained in the Virginia Plan was central to Madison's
constitutional structure. In fact, Madison preferred an even bolder version
than that which was contained in the Virginia Plan.6 5 At the Convention,
experienced the benefits of diversity and the dangers of homogeneity. See, e.g., Jack N. Rakove, The
Madisonian Theory of Rights, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 245, 259 (1990) ("In the struggle over the
religious assessment bill of 1784-85, Madison and his allies had appealed to the mutual jealousies of
the various sects of Protestant Virginia."); see also BANNING, supra note 8, at 102 ("Jealousies between
the sects had done what no appeal to principle could have accomplished by itself. And differences
among the many more denominations of a vastly larger, federal republic might afford increased
security for other rights as well."); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 53, at 358
("In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It
consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects.").
62 See James Madison, Vices of the Political System (Apr. 1787), in 9 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON,
supra note 4, at 357 ("An auxiliary desideratum for the melioration of the Republican form is such a
process of elections as will most certainly extract from the mass of the Society the purest and noblest
characters which it contains; such as will at once feel most strongly the proper motives to pursue the
end of their appointment, and be most capable to devise the proper means of attaining it."); THE
FEDERALIST No. 57 (James Madison), supra note 60, at 386 (observing that representatives in
Congress would be elected by districts of five or six thousand voters while representatives in lower
houses of state legislatures were typically elected from districts of five or six hundred voters and
arguing that in the larger congressional districts "a fit representative would be most likely to be
found"); see also LUTZ, supra note 60, at 85 ("Madison rehearsed the common notion that elections
filter upward men of greater virtue."); WOOD, CREATION, supra note 37, at 506-18 (describing
"filtration of talent" that Federalists expected to make federal elected officials superior to their state
counterparts).
63 While he undoubtedly played the leading role in formulating the Virginia Plan, Madison always
maintained that the Plan was the product of the entire delegation. See Letter from James Madison to
Andrew Stevenson (Mar. 25, 1826), in 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 474
("[Randolph's] propositions were the result of a meeting of the whole Deputation, and concurred or
acquiesced in unanimously...."). There were, in fact, several aspects of the Plan that deviated, at least
somewhat, from Madison's own views. See infra notes 65-69 & 94 and accompanying text.
6 Virginia Plan, Res. 6, 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 21.
65 See Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Apr. 16, 1787), in 9 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 4, at 383 ("Over and above this positive power a negative in all cases whatsoever
on the legislative acts of the States, as heretofore exercised by the Kingly prerogative, appears to me to
be absolutely necessary, and to be the least possible encroachment on the State Jurisdictions.")
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Madison argued that the congressional veto should be unlimited in scope.66
Developments at the state level during the period leading up to the
Convention had convinced him that the deficiencies on the state level were
so fundamental that only a remedy as drastic and complete as a
congressional veto over all state legislation would suffice.67 Since the
states' potential for mischief was so multi-faceted, an effective remedy
would have to be equally all-encompassing.6 8 In the end, however,
Madison had to be content to compromise the point with his Virginia
69colleagues and to press for a broader veto at the Convention.
The congressional veto over state legislation was a centerpiece to
Madison's constitutional structure because he believed the national
legislature would be superior to its state analogues. 7 0 This superiority, it
should be noted, was premised on the hope that Congress would be less,
rather than more, democratically accountable than the state legislatures. 7 1
(emphasis added). The fact that Madison was willing to mirror the language of the dreaded Declaratory
Act of 1766 ("in all cases whatsoever") is one indication of how committed he was to an unlimited
congressional veto. See RAKOVE, supra note 8, at 51.
66 See 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 164 (June 8) ("[Mr. Madison]
could not but regard an indefinite power to negative legislative acts of the States as absolutely
necessary to a perfect system.").
67 See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 4, at 212 ("Injustice may be effected by such an infinitude of legislative
expedients, that where the disposition exists it can only be controuled by some provision which reaches
all cases whatsoever.").
68 id.
69 See Charles F. Hobson, in THE NEW AMERICAN NATION, 1775-1820, supra note 55, at 226 ("In
one important particular [the Virginia Plan] did not go as far as he wished: instead of a negative 'in all
cases whatsoever,' it provided that the power of the national legislature to veto state laws should be
restricted to unconstitutional acts, a concession probably necessary to win the support of the entire
Virginia delegation.") (emphasis added); see also BANNING, supra note 8, at 148 n.30. According to
Madison, the Virginia delegates understood from the beginning that they were free to argue against the
Plan where it deviated from their personal preferences. Letter from James Madison to John Tyler
(unsent), in 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 525 ("It was perfectly
understood, that the Propositions [i.e., the Virginia Plan] committed no one to their precise tenor or
form; and that the members of the Deputation wd. be as free in discussing and shaping them as the
other members of the Convention.").
70 See RAKOVE, supra note 59, at 60 (observing that congressional veto "lay at the heart of
[Madison's] conception of the role the national government would play in preserving both the union of
the states and the republican form of government."); see also Charles F. Hobson, in THE NEW
AMERICAN NATION, 1775-1820, supra note 55, at 218 ("Of the reforms he offered at the Convention . .
. none in Madison's view was more important than the one to vest the national legislature with the
power to negative state laws.").
71 See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 4, at 214 ("If then there must be different interests and parties in Society; and a
majority when united by a common interest or passion can not be restrained from oppressing the
minority, what remedy can be found in a republican Government, where the majority must ultimately
decide, but that of giving such an extent to its sphere, that no common interest or passion will be likely
to unite a majority of the whole number in an unjust pursuit."); see also RAKOVE, supra note 8, at 34
("The time had come, Madison concluded, not only to free the Union from its dependence on the states
2012] Lessons from a Lost Constitution 477
While Madison and the other Virginia delegates were deeply committed to
the idea that true sovereignty in a democracy ultimately emanated from the
people themselves, the overarching lesson gleaned from the state
experiences in the period leading up to the Convention was that
responsible governance required a constitutional structure that was not tied
72too directly or immediately to popular sentiment. A healthy degree of
separation or distance between the representatives and the people would
ensure that the representatives would have an opportunity to lead and
shape, rather than simply slavishly follow, popular sentiment.73 This
central idea accounts for Madison's preference for Congress over the state
legislatures and permeated his organizational structure for the federal
government itself. 74
2. Separation ofPowers within the Federal Structure
The challenge Madison and the Virginia delegates faced in constructing
a new federal government was to find the proper balance between
democratic legitimacy on the one hand and rationality and deliberation on
the other. If there was too much separation between the governmental
actors and the constituents they represented, the system as a whole could
not truly be characterized as a democracy.75  If there was too little
but to free the states from themselves by taking steps that would undo the damage done by the excesses
of republicanism.").
72 See RAKOVE, supra note 8, at 218 ("Madison's bleak view of state politics suggested that their
cumulative complaints were pulsing all too vigorously through the political system. The problem of
representation was not to make legislators more accountable than they were already, but to find ways to
dissipate the populist pressures of the people and improve the quality of lawmaking by reforming the
character of the lawmakers."); WOOD, CREATION, supra note 37, at 411 ("Yet the pressing
constitutional problem was not really the lack of power in the state legislatures but the excess of it-
popular despotism.").
73 This was, after all, a primary advantage of representative, as opposed to direct, democracy. See
THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 60, at 133-34:
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first,
the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens
elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere
of country, over which the latter may be extended.
The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the
public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens,
whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose
patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or
partial considerations.
74 RAKOVE, supra note 8, at 50 ("[Madison's] ideas of federalism, representation, and the
separation of powers-the crucial theoretical issues that the Convention would face-all reflected his
disillusion with the failings of state legislators and citizens alike.").
7s See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison), supra note 60, at 280-81 ("[W]e may define
a republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a government which derives all its powers
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separation between the governmental actors and their constituents, by
contrast, the government would inevitably suffer the same "democratic
excesses" that had plagued the states in the period leading up to the
Convention.76 The task was to construct a form of government that, as a
whole, possessed the proper balance between responsiveness and
rationality.
a. The House ofRepresentatives
Resolution 4 of the Virginia Plan called for the direct election of the
members of the first branch of Congress. 7 This first branch of Congress
(which was subsequently incorporated in the Constitution as the House of
Representatives) was the fulcrum of the Virginia Plan's national
government because it provided democratic legitimacy to the structure as a
whole. 78 For this reason, Madison believed that the members of this first
branch of Congress should be directly elected by their constituents for
relatively short terms in order to ensure that the body would directly reflect
popular sentiment.79
directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their
offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior.").
76 See RAKOVE, supra note 46, at 360 (describing Madison's desire to "improve the quality of
deliberation and decision making at the national level of government, so that its quest to identify and
pursue the public good would reduce the play of interest, opinion, and passion that seemed so prevalent
within the states").
n See Virginia Plan, Res. 4, 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 20 ("Resd.
that the members of the first branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the
several States every _ for the term of -.
* At the Convention, Madison argued:
Mr. Madison considered the popular election of one branch of the national
Legislature as essential to every plan of free Government. . . . That if the first
branch of the general legislature should be elected by the State Legislatures, the
second branch elected by the first - the Executive by the second together with the
first; and other appointments again made for subordinate purposes by the
Executive, the people would be lost sight of altogether; and the necessary
sympathy between them and their rulers and officers, too little felt.
I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 49-50 (May 31).
7 THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison), supra note 60, at 361 ("As it is essential to liberty
that the government in general should have a common interest with the people, so it is particularly
essential that [the House] should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with,
the people. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and
sympathy can be effectually secured."). When the issue of House terms was first raised, Madison
proposed a three-year term. See 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 214 (June
12). When Edmund Randolph proposed the two-year term, Madison argued that three years would be
optimal in light of the fact that most Representatives would be forced to travel 700-800 miles between
their districts and the seat of government. See id. at 360 (June 21).
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For the very reason that the people would identify so strongly with it,
however, and for the very reason that this branch of the legislature was
likely to be strongly tied to the vicissitudes of popular sentiment, Madison
believed it was essential that this first branch of Congress be subject to the
influence of less directly democratic elements. At the Convention and in
The Federalist, Madison referred to the House as a "vortex" of power that
threatened to overpower the other branches.80 As a result, the Virginia Plan
proposed another house in Congress and two other branches of federal
government that would be composed of members who were less directly
accountable to the people but who would have the collective power to
restrain the House's ability to enact legislation. '
b. The Senate
According to Resolution Number 5 of the Virginia Plan, the "second
branch" of Congress (which was subsequently incorporated into the
Constitution as the Senate) was to be appointed by members of the first
branch (out of a pool nominated by the state legislatures).82 In addition, the
members of this second branch of Congress were to receive "liberal
stipends" and were to be given significantly longer terms than their
counterparts in the House.83 Resolution Number 5 of the Plan provided that
the members of the second branch would serve for terms long enough to
s0 Madison referred to the House as a "vortex" of power during the Convention as well as in The
Federalist essays. See infra text accompanying note 121 (Madison's speech at the Convention on July
21); THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison), supra note 60, at 343 ("The legislative department is
everywhere extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.").
81 RAKOVE, supra note 46, at 360-61 ("The deep goal of [Madison's] constitution making was not
simply to assign powers and duties to institutions. It was also to foster the best deliberation possible.
That required insulating the people's elected representatives from the erratic currents of popular feeling
that seemed to surge and swirl all too forcefully within the states. It also meant protecting the weaker
branches of the executive and judiciary against the 'impetuous vortex' of legislative domination.").
82 See Virginia Plan, Res. 5, I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 20
("Resold. that the members of the second branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by
those of the first, out of a proper number of persons nominated by the individual Legislatures . . . .").
According to Madison, the Convention never considered the direct election of Senators. See, e.g,
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON,
supra note 4, at 209 ("In forming the Senate, the great anchor of the Government, the questions as they
came within the first object turned mostly on the mode of appointment, and the duration of it. The
different modes proposed were, 1. by the House of Representatives 2. by the Executive, 3. by electors
chosen by the people for the purpose. 4. by the State Legislatures."). In his observations on the
proposed Kentucky constitution, Madison argued that the state's senators should be appointed on a
statewide basis rather than by districts in order to minimize the senators' attachment to "local"
interests. See James Madison, Observations on the "Draught of a Constitution for Virginia" (Oct.15,
1788), in 11 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 285-89.
8 See Virginia Plan, Res. 5, 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 20.
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"ensure their independency." 84 The "independency" the authors of the
Virginia Plan were seeking was from the people themselves.85  The
Senators' longer terms of office and their indirect election would provide
the distance from popular sentiment required for their role as a foil to the
more directly democratic branch of Congress (the House).86 Under the
Virginia Plan, therefore, bicameralism provided a. crucial check on the
House of Representatives.87 At the very least, the Senate's participation
would slow the legislative process and allow opportunities for discussion
and rational deliberation that might otherwise be missing were the House
empowered to enact legislation on its own.8
The Senate alone, however, could not be expected to balance the
"vortex" of power that was the House of Representatives. The Virginia
Plan provided that the Senate's members were to be appointed by the
House itself, eroding to some extent their ability and incentive to oppose
the popular will expressed in the lower house. 89 Madison therefore wanted
84 Id. (specifying that members of the second house should "hold their offices for a term sufficient
to ensure their independency").
8 One could argue that the authors of the Virginia Plan were also seeking to ensure the Senators'
independence from the state legislatures, in light of the fact that Resolution 5 would have barred the
Senators from concurrently serving in a state office. See id at 21. This was a far more controversial
proposition than ensuring the Senators' insulation from the undue influences of the House and popular
sentiment generally, since many of the Constitutional delegates were wedded to the idea that Congress'
function was to represent the states qua states. The New Jersey Plan (the Virginia Plan's primary
alternative at the Convention), for example, was premised on that notion. See BEEMAN, supra note 2, at
162 ("The architects of the New Jersey Plan plainly intended the executive to be a creature of the
Congress and the Congress, in turn, to be a creature of the individual state governments."). The
deadlock between the proponents of the two plans was not resolved until the "Connecticut
Compromise" on July 16. See id. at 218-25.
. 8 See, e.g., James Madison, Observations on the "Draught of a Constitution for Virginia" (Oct. 15,
1788), in II PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 285 ("The term of two years [for Senators] is
too short. Six years are not more than sufficient. A Senate is to withstand the occasional impetuosities
of the more numerous branch. The members ought therefore to derive a firmness from the tenure of
their places."); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 62 (James Madison), supra note 60, at 410 ("The
necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the propensity of all single and numerous assemblies to
yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by factious leaders into
intemperate and pernicious resolutions. . . . [A] body which is to correct this infirmity ought itself to be
free from it, and consequently ought to be less numerous. It ought, moreover, to possess great firmness,
and consequently ought to hold its authority by a tenure of considerable duration.").
8 See RAKOVE, supra note 8, at 41 ("Madison thought the establishment of a well-constructed
Senate would provide the most effective check against the danger of faulty legislation.").
8 See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 114 (2004) ("Among the principle benefits of federalism and separation of powers
(not to mention the extensive size of the Republic) were thought to be that these complicated and
slowed politics long enough for reason to prevail.").
' See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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to utilize the other two branches to slow down the legislative process even
further and to provide additional safeguards against the House. 90
c. The Executive and the Judiciary
As with the Senate, the Virginia Plan provided that both the executive
and the judiciary should enjoy secure salaries and relatively long terms of
office in order to help ensure the requisite level of independence from both
the House and the people. Resolution Seven of the Plan provided that the
executive would be appointed by Congress and would "receive punctually
at stated times, a fixed compensation for the services rendered, in which no
increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the Magistracy,
existing at the time of increase or diminution[.]" 91 The Virginia Plan failed
to specify the length of the executive's term but the earliest proposal at the
Convention would have provided the executive with a seven-year term. 92
Similarly, Resolution Nine of the Virginia Plan provided that the judiciary
would be appointed by Congress, would possess their offices "during good
behaviour," and would enjoy the same form of salary protection as the
executive.93 Resolution Nine would appear to represent another
90 See, e.g., LUTZ, supra note 10, at 198-99 ("To control the effects of ill-considered majorities,
Madison constructed the now-famous theory of the extended republic, coupled with the fracturing of
government itself into competing factions through the separation of powers, and checks and balances. .
. . Forcing delay, enhancing due deliberation, replacing quick decision making with a slower system
that permits all factions to bring their interests to bear, enhances the probability that the experiments
undertaken will be well-considered and conducive to the long-run interest of the entire nation.").
9 See Virginia Plan, Res. 7, 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 21.
92 See 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 68-69 (June 1). Some delegates
argued for a shorter term (such as three years) and the vote on June 1 in favor of the seven-year term
was very close (five states voting yes, four voting no, and one divided). Id. George Mason argued in
favor of the seven-year term on June 1 but with the caveat that the executive should be ineligible for a
second term. Id. at 68.
93 See Virginia Plan, Res. 9, 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 21-22.
The accuracy of Madison's notes with respect to the Virginia Plan is more contested with respect to
Resolution 9 than any other resolution. According to Madison's notes, the first sentence of Randolph's
original Resolution 9 read:
"Resd. that a National Judiciary be established to consist of one or more supreme
tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the National Legislature, to
hold their offices during good behaviour; and to receive punctually at stated
times fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution
shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such
increase or diminution."
Id. Max Farrand believed that this wording likely represented the original Virginia Plan, as it was read
to the Convention on May 29, 1787. See 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at
593-94. John Franklin Jameson, by contrast, was convinced that Madison failed to transcribe the
Resolution verbatim and that the first sentence of the original Resolution 9 more likely read as follows:
482 Journal ofLaw & Politics [Vol.27:459
compromise between Madison and the other Virginia delegates because
Madison argued during the Convention that the judiciary should be
appointed by the Senate rather than by Congress as a whole. 9 4
Providing the executive and the judiciary with a level of insulation from
political and popular pressures was a relatively straightforward
proposition. The real difficulty lay in constructing an institutional
mechanism that would allow these two branches to appropriately and
effectively restrain the House. 95 Madison feared that neither the executive
nor the judiciary would possess sufficient political strength to
counterbalance the House. 96 The very features of these two branches that
most equipped them to provide rationality and deliberation to the
governing process (e.g., appointment, longer terms, and salary protection)
also served to limit the powers they could expect to exert within a
democracy. The judiciary's life tenure helped insulate it from the
vicissitudes of political whim and caprice but also limited the extent to
which the American public could identify with its members. 97 Working
Resolved, that a national judiciary be established, to be appointed by the
National Legislature, to hold their offices during good behavior; and to receive
punctually, at stated times, a fixed compensation for their services ....
John Franklin Jameson, Studies in the History of the Federal Convention of 1787, in I ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE YEAR 1902, at 89, 106 (1903).
In terms of judicial selection, it seems beyond question that the original version of the Virginia
Plan called for the appointment of the judiciary by "the National Legislature." The Convention
delegates debated this very feature of the Virginia Plan on June 5. See 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 116-21 (June 5). This fact can be reconciled with Madison's notes,
however, if the phrase "to be chosen by the National Legislature" is simply read to refer to the
"National Judiciary" rather than to the "inferior tribunals."
94 See I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 120 (June 5) ("Mr. Madison
disliked the election of the Judges by the Legislature or any numerous body. . . . He rather inclined to
give it to the Senatorial branch...."). George Mason, by contrast, likely favored an appointment process
that included the House because he was wary of entrusting too much power to the senatorial branch.
See, e.g., George Mason, Objections to the Constitution (Oct. 7, 1787), in FOUNDING AMERICA:
DOCUMENTS FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 47, at 428 (arguing against
ratification because Senate's broad prerogatives under the Constitution would "enable them to
accomplish what Usurpations they please upon the Rights & Libertys of the People").
9 This conception of separation of powers represented a significant break from the "Whig" notion,
prevalent among many Americans at the time, that the primary purpose of the separation of powers
doctrine was to protect the House (and popular sentiment)from the other branches. See infra notes 175-
177 and accompanying text.
9 See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 8, at 53 ("Alone, neither the executive nor the judiciary could
resist a legislature speaking for the political will of the community; united in the council of revision,
they might gain sufficient stature to correct its errors.").
9 Madison briefly sketched his views regarding judicial independence in a letter to his friend in
Kentucky, Caleb Wallace:
The Judiciary Department merits every care. . . . The main points to be attended
to are 1. that the Judges should hold their places during good behavior 2. that
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against the executive, furthermore, was the fact that it was composed of a
single individual.9 8 In light of many Americans' aversion to executive
power at that time, Madison doubted that the American people would
countenance a check on their favored branch (the House) by a single
individual. 99 Although the subsequent evolution of executive power may
belie this concern in our eyes, Madison and many others found it difficult
to conceive in 1787 that a single individual would ever possess the political
will to oppose the authority of both houses of Congress.100 Under the
Virginia Plan, furthermore, the executive would have been appointed by
their Salaries should be either fixed like the wages of the Representatives or not
be alterable so as to affect the Individuals in Office. 3. that their Salaries be
liberal. The first point is obvious: without the second the independence aimed at
by the first will be Ideal only; without the 3d the bar will be superior to the
bench which destroys all security for a Systematick administration of Justice.
Letter from James Madison to Caleb Wallace (Aug. 23, 1785), in 8 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra
note 4, at 352.
98 See, e.g., WOOD, CREATION, supra note 37, at 138 (observing that "all of the states destroyed the
substance of an independent magistracy" in their revolutionary constitutions). At the Convention,
Roger Sherman of Connecticut argued against "enabling any one man to stop the will of the whole" in
the context of a proposal for an unqualified executive veto. See I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 99 (June 4). "No man," Sherman argued, "could be found so far above
all the rest in wisdom." Id. The proposal was defeated unanimously on June 4, by a vote often states to
zero. Id. at 103. When an unqualified executive veto was proposed again, on August 7, it was defeated
by a vote of nine states to one. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 200
(Aug. 7).
9 See RAKOVE, supra note 46, at 377-78 ("[I3t was difficult to imagine the political dimensions of
executive power in a republic, where the people's own representatives were supposed to bear their
trust. Or rather, it was easy to envision an executive aspiring to be either a tyrant or a demagogue, but
difficult to conceive how a republic resting on the judgment and consent of the many could ever place
its confidence in the authority and will of one."); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison),
supra note 60, at 344 (defending executive's powers under Constitution but acknowledging that,
"where numerous and extensive prerogatives are placed in the hands of an hereditary monarch, the
executive department is very justly regarded as the source of danger, and watched with all the jealousy
which a zeal for liberty ought to inspire").
10o Within just a few years of the federal government's operation, Madison realized that he had
greatly underestimated the potential political strength of the Executive Branch. See Letter from James
Madison to Thomas Jefferson (May 25, 1794), in 15 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 338
("The influence of the [Executive] on events, the use made of them, and public confidence in the
[President] are an overmatch for all the efforts Republicanism can make."); see also WOOD, supra note
42, at 196 ("In fact, Madison now [by 1794] saw more clearly than ever before that the presidency was
the principal source of governmental power."). Today, many fear that the executive has become the
very type of "vortex" of power that Madison feared from the House. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653-54 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("In drama, magnitude and
finality [the executive's] decisions so far overshadow any others that almost alone he fills the public
eye and ear. No other personality in public life can begin to compete with him in access to the public
mind through modern methods of communications. By his prestige as head of state and his influence
upon public opinion, he exerts a leverage upon those who are supposed to check and balance his power
which often cancels their effectiveness.").
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Congress, thus undermining to a certain degree the executive's ability to
withstand political pressure from that body.o0
With respect to both the judiciary and the executive, therefore, the very
features that qualified them to perform the restraining function within the
constitutional structure served to undermine their practical ability to carry
out that function. If there was a political struggle between the House on the
one hand and either the executive or the judiciary on the other, Madison
was virtually certain that the people would vigorously support the branch
with which they most closely identified. As he stated in Federalist 49:
We have seen that the tendency of republican governments
is to an aggrandizement of the legislative at the expense of
the other departments. The appeals to the people,
therefore, would usually be made by the executive and
judiciary departments. But whether made by one side or
the other, would each side enjoy equal advantages on the
trial? Let us view their different situations. The members
of the executive and judiciary departments are few in
number, and can be personally known to a small part only
of the people. The latter, by the mode of their appointment,
as well as by the nature and permanency of it, are too far
removed from the people to share much in their
prepossessions. The former are generally the objects of
jealousy, and their administration is always liable to be
discolored and rendered unpopular. The members of the
legislative department, on the other hand, are numerous.
They are distributed and dwell among the people at large.
Their connections of blood, of friendship, and of
acquaintance embrace a great proportion of the most
influential part of the society. The nature of their public
trust implies a personal influence among the people, and
that they are more immediately the confidential guardians
of the rights and liberties of the people. With these
advantages, it can hardly be supposed that the adverse
party would have an equal chance for a favorable issue.102
'0 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
102 THE FEDERALIST No. 49 (James Madison), supra note 60, at 350.
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Madison's solution to the conundrum was to combine the executive and
judiciary into a single body. His hope was that the two branches together
could accomplish what he feared neither could do separately: command
sufficient political legitimacy to balance the "vortex" of power that was the
House. 0 3
3. The Council ofRevision
Resolution Eight of the Virginia Plan provided:
Resd. that the Executive and a convenient number of the
National Judiciary, ought to compose a council of revision
with authority to examine every act of the National
Legislature before it shall operate, & every act of a
particular [state] Legislature before a Negative thereon
shall be final; and that the dissent of the said Council shall
amount to a rejection, unless the Act of the National
Legislature be again passed, or that of a particular
Legislature be again negatived by - of the members of
each branch.104
The Virginia Plan's Council of Revision combined the executive with
key figures from the judiciary and equipped them with a collective (but
qualified) veto over congressional acts. 105 The Virginia Plan's Council of
Revision would have possessed the power to overturn congressional
legislation as well as congressional vetoes of state legislation. In either
case, however, the Council's veto could have been overridden by
103 See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 8, at 53 ("Alone, neither the executive nor the judiciary could
resist a legislature speaking for the political will of the community; united in the council of revision,
they might gain sufficient stature to correct its errors.").
'0 Virginia Plan, Res. 8, 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 21.
'o' The authors of the Virginia Plan likely contemplated that a "convenient" number of the
judiciary would comprise somewhere between two members of the Supreme Court and the Supreme
Court as a whole. See Statement of George Mason (June 4), in I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 111 (Mason's notes) (observing that judicial members of the Council of
Revision would be drawn from Supreme Court). New York was the only state utilizing a Council of
Revision at the time the Virginia Plan was formulated. New York's Council of Revision consisted of its
governor, chancellor, and "the judges of the supreme court, or any two of them ...." See N.Y. CONST. §
3 (1777). Although it was authorized to utilize more, the New York Council sat with just two Supreme
Court justices. See ALFRED BILLINGS STREET, THE COUNCIL OF REVISION OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK (1859). The Chancellor was the head judicial officer of the state's equity courts. Among the
other antecedents for the Virginia Plan's Council of Revision, the most prevalent was likely the British
Privy Council, which had possessed the power to review and veto colonial legislation in some contexts.
See, e.g., James T. Barry Ill, The Council of Revision and the Limits of Judicial Power, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 235, 237-41 (1989) (discussing historical roots of Virginia Plan's Council of Revision).
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Congress. The Plan left unspecified the level of congressional support that
would be required to overturn the Council but it is likely that the Virginia
delegates contemplated that either a two thirds or three quarter
supermajority would be sufficient. 106 The most immediate frame of
reference for Resolution Eight was New York's Council of Revision,
whose vetoes could be overridden by a two-thirds supermajority of the
legislature.10 7 Toward the end of the Convention, after the Council had
been rejected, Madison proposed that all congressional legislation be
submitted to the executive and judicial branches separately. 08 Under the
proposal, each branch would possess its own veto, which could be
overridden by two-thirds of Congress in the event that only one of the
branches was exercising the veto but which would require three-quarters of
Congress in the event that both branches exercised their vetoes on the same
piece of legislation.' 09
As with the President's veto power in Article II of the Constitution
(which was ultimately derived from the Virginia Plan's Council of
Revision), the Council of Revision's veto would not have been limited to a
"legal" or constitutional basis.110 The New York Council of Revision, upon
06 The Convention delegates initially opted for a two-thirds congressional supermajority to
override the Council. See I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 104 (June 4). In
the context of the executive veto, which emanated from the Council, the Convention delegates
vacillated between a two-thirds and three-fourths requirement. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 300-01 (Aug. 15) (adopting the three-fourths requirement by a vote of
six to four to one); id. at 585-87 (Sept. 12) (voting to replace three-fourths requirement with two-thirds
by same margin). The Virginia delegation voted in favor of the more stringent three-fourths
requirement on the last two occasions. Id. The Constitution ultimately specified that Congress could
override the veto with a two-thirds supermajority. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
107 N.Y. CONST. § 3 (1777).
"os 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 298 (Aug. 15).
109 Id.
11o The Virginia Plan simply specified that the Council's dissent "amount[ed] to a rejection." See
Virginia Plan, Res. 8, 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 21. For the executive
veto that ultimately emerged from the Plan, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate,
shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United
States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his
Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the
Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.
Washington vetoed only two congressional bills during his time in office. See 1 COMPILATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 124, 211-12 (James D. Richardson ed.,
1897) [hereinafter MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS] (veto messages of Apr. 15, 1792 and
Feb. 28, 1797). The messages he sent to Congress accompanying the vetoes suggest that one was based
on policy and one on constitutional grounds. See id. John Adams and Thomas Jefferson did not veto
any congressional legislation while James Monroe vetoed a single a bill on constitutional grounds. See
J. Richard Broughton, Rethinking the Presidential Veto, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 91, 120 (2005). James
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which Madison had largely drawn his inspiration for the proposal,"'
exercised its veto on policy as well as constitutional grounds.11 2 None of
the delegates at the Constitutional Convention, furthermore, assumed that
the Council's veto would be limited to constitutional grounds." 3 To the
contrary, most of the arguments for and against the Council were
predicated on the assumption that the Council's veto would be far broader
than the type of veto that a court would wield through judicial review.
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, for example, reasoned that judicial
review provided the judiciary with a "sufficient check agst.
encroachments." 114 He argued against the Council of Revision on the
grounds that it was "foreign" to the nature of the judiciary to "make them
judges of the policy of public measures" (emphasis added)." 5 Similarly,
Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts argued against the Council because,
Madison, on the other hand, vetoed seven congressional bills during his two terms. See ROBERT J.
SPITZER, PRESIDENT & CONGRESS 71 (1993). Of Madison's seven vetoes, three were based on policy
grounds. 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 91, 120 (2005). Among the bills Madison vetoed on policy grounds
were a naturalization bill and an attempt to create the Second Bank of the United States. See I
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra, at 523 (veto message of Nov. 5, 1812); id. at 555
(veto message of Jan. 30, 1815).
" See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Caleb Wallace (Aug. 23, 1785), in 8 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 4, at 351 ("As a further security against fluctuating & indegested laws the
Constitution of New York has provided a Council of Revision. I approve much of such an institution &
believe it is considered by the most intelligent citizens of that state as a valuable safeguard both to
public interests & to private rights.").
112 When the New York.Council of Revision vetoed legislation, it articulated the basis for its
objections. See STREET, supra note 105, at 201-402 (reprinting a large body of the messages). As a
result, it is possible to classify the various grounds upon which the New York Council exercised its
vetoes. According to the calculations of those who have analyzed the messages, more than half of the
Council's vetoes were based on policy grounds whereas only one third were based, even in part, on
constitutional considerations. Frank M. Prescott & Joseph F. Zimmerman, The Council ofRevision and
the Veto of Legislation in New York State: 1777-1821 (SUNY Albany, Graduate School of Public
Affairs, 1972) (calculating that "55.6 per cent of the Council's objections were mainly for policy
reasons, 21.8 per cent were for lack of constitutionality, and 12.4 per cent were disallowed because
they were deemed both 'inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution and with the public good....'")
(cited in Barry, supra note 105, at 245 n.45).
113 In fact, the line separating "policy" from "constitutional" considerations was not as distinct for
the Framers as it tends to be denominated today. The Framers were operating in a tradition where
fundamental "constitutional" norms were largely derived from practice, tradition, and natural law
concepts. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127,
1159 (1987) (observing that for Framers there was "a continuum of unconstitutionality coinciding with
a continuum of injustice, lack of wisdom, dangerousness, and destructiveness").
114 See I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 97-98 (June 4) ("Mr. Gerry
doubts whether the Judiciary ought to form a part of it, as they will have a sufficient check agst.
encroachments on their own department by their exposition of the laws, which involved a power of
deciding on their Constitutionality. In some States the Judges had actually set aside laws as being agst.
the Constitution. This was done too with general approbation. It was quite foreign from the nature of
ye. office to make them judges of the policy of public measures.").15 id.
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"[a]s Judges they are not to be presumed to possess any peculiar
knowledge of the mere policy of public measures."" 6
Proponents of the Council of Revision never attempted to defend the
veto on the grounds that it would be limited. Instead, they relied upon the
same expansive view of the Council's veto employed by its critics. James
Wilson, for example, argued that the Council of Revision was superior to
judicial review precisely because a purely constitutional basis of review
would be too limited:
It had been said that the Judges, as expositors of the Laws
would have an opportunity of defending their
constitutional rights. There was weight in this observation;
but this power of the Judges did not go far enough. Laws
may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous, may be
destructive; and yet not be so unconstitutional as to justify
the Judges in refusing to give them effect. Let them have a
share in the Revisionary power, and they will have an
opportunity of taking notice of these characters of a law,
and of counteracting, by the weight of their opinions the
improper views of the Legislature. 17
Similarly, George Mason argued that a broad veto was necessary
because it would allow the judiciary to exert an influence over the
legislative process that extended beyond constitutional issues:
It had been said [by Mr. L. Martin] that if the Judges were
joined in this check on the laws, they would have a double
negative, since in their expository capacity of Judges they
would have one negative. He [Mason] would reply that in
this capacity they could impede in one case only, the
operation of laws. They could declare an unconstitutional
law void. But with regard to every law however unjust
oppressive or pernicious, which did not come plainly
under this description, they would be under the necessity
as Judges to give it a free course. He wished the further
use to be made of the Judges, of giving aid in preventing
every improper law. Their aid will be the more valuable as
"6 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 73 (July 21).
"17 Id
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they are in the habit and practice of considering laws in
their true principles, and in all their consequences.1
It is clear that Madison also believed the Council's veto would
encompass policy grounds. Just after the Convention, in the context of a
proposal for a constitution for the emerging state of Kentucky, Madison
stated that the "revisionary power" of the executive and the judiciary was
meant to check not only unconstitutional laws but also "precipitate" and
"unjust" laws."' As a result, Madison proposed that the standards for
allowing the Kentucky legislature to overrule the executive and judiciary
should vary depending upon whether the veto was being exercised on
policy or constitutional grounds. 120
At the Convention, Madison made several impassioned defenses of the
Council. Typically instructive was the argument he made on July 21:
[The Council] would be useful to the Judiciary departmt.
by giving it an additional opportunity of defending itself
agst: Legislative encroachments; It would be useful to the
Executive, by inspiring additional confidence & firmness
in exerting the revisionary power: It would be useful to the
Legislature by the valuable assistance it would give in
preserving a consistency, conciseness, perspicuity &
technical propriety in the laws, qualities peculiarly
necessary; & yet shamefully wanting in our republican
Codes. It would moreover be useful to the Community at
large as an additional check agst. a pursuit of those unwise
& unjust measures which constituted so great a portion of
our calamities. If any solid objection could be urged agst.
the motion, it must be on the supposition that it tended to
give too much strength either to the Executive or
Judiciary. He did not think there was the least ground for
this apprehension. It was much more to be apprehended
that notwithstanding this co-operation of the two
departments, the Legislature would still be an overmatch
for them. Experience in all the States had evinced a
powerful tendency in the Legislature to absorb all power
' Id. at 78 (July 21).
" James Madison, Observations on the "Draught of a Constitution for Virginia" (Oct. 15, 1788),
in II PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 292.
120 Id.; see also infra notes 243-248 and accompanying text.
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into its vortex. This was the real source of danger to the
American Constitutions; & suggested the necessity of
giving every defensive authority to the other departments
that was consistent with republican principles. 121
Combined together in the form of the Council of Revision, therefore,
Madison hoped that the executive and judiciary would be sufficient to
withstand the influence of the House. The combination of the two branches
in the form of the Council would greatly increase the likelihood that the
members of the Council would even be willing to assert their check on
Congress. The executive, for example, would benefit psychologically from
the knowledge that he was not acting alone.122 Equally important, the
combined strength of the Council would dramatically increase the
likelihood that the Council's check on the House would be palatable to the
public. 123 The American people might have difficulty accepting the veto of
either the executive or the judiciary in isolation but the Council's rejection
would constitute much more than the act of a single individual, or even the
act of a single Branch. The Council's actions would carry the combined
weight of both branches and the collective gravitas of what would be, it
was hoped, an eminent group of the nation's leading figures. While
Southerners would be tempted to question the legitimacy of an executive
veto wielded by a Northern President with whom they might disagree, and
vice versa, the Council could include individuals drawn from various parts
of the country. As a result, the Council could enjoy a political legitimacy
that no single individual (other than possibly Washington) appeared
capable of commanding in a nation that suffered from sectional divisions
and jealousies.12 4
4. The Council ofRevision and Judicial Review
121 See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 74 (July 21).
122 Jack N. Rakove, The Madisonian Moment, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 473, 493 (1988) ("The presence
of the judges on the Council would have the added advantage of bracing the political will of an
otherwise timorous executive while assuring that the veto would be exercised on appropriate rather
than arbitrary grounds.").
123 Of course, the two issues are closely interrelated. Governmental actors often gauge their
political options in the context of how the public is likely to view the legitimacy of their actions.
124 The period leading up to the Constitutional Convention was marked by sectional tensions over
issues such as westward expansion, the navigation of the Mississippi, and the propriety of impost taxes.
By 1787, some Americans were contemplating the possibility of dividing the nation into a group of
regional confederations. See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 8, at 33 ("By the fall of 1786 ... [s]ectional
rifts within Congress over commercial policy and the navigation of the Mississippi had exposed the
fault lines along which the Union might divide should the national government fail to satisfy the rival
interests of different states and regions.").
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Under the Virginia Plan, there appeared to be little or no role for
judicial review as a constitutional check on Congress or the states. Judicial
review would be necessary for the resolution of private disputes and
possibly to address ambiguities in statutory language. By virtue of the
Council of Revision, however, judicial review would simply not be
necessary to guard against constitutional violations. The judiciary's broad
opportunity to veto laws through the Council obviated the need for that
type of review. It made little sense, furthermore, to give the judiciary a
qualified veto through the Council if they could exercise an unqualified
veto through judicial review. The Council also appeared incompatible with
that type of judicial review because the judiciary's participation in the
legislative process would mean that judicial review would allow them to sit
in judgment of their own work.12 5
Madison's later correspondence confirms that he viewed the Council of
Revision as a replacement for, rather than a supplement to, the judicial
review of constitutional questions. In an 1817 letter to James Monroe,
written while the latter was President, Madison stated:
Another & perhaps a greater danger is to be apprehended
from the influence which the usefulness & popularity of
measures may have on questions of their Constitutionality.
... These considerations remind me of the attempts in the
Convention to vest in the Judiciary Dept. a qualified
negative on Legislative bills. Such a Controul, restricted to
Constitutional points, besides giving greater stability &
system to the rules of expounding the Instrument, would
have precluded the question of a Judiciary annulment of
Legislative Acts.126
Madison's reference to the attempts at the Convention to bestow the
judiciary with a qualified negative refers to the Council of Revision. It is
not clear what he meant by "restricted to Constitutional points," since
Madison's own letters and speeches reveal that he did not view the
Council's work as being limited to constitutional objections during the
125 As we shall see in the next section, this incompatibility between the Council and judicial review
was what ultimately doomed the Council after the Convention decided to incorporate judicial review
into the constitutional structure. See infra notes 190-218 and accompanying text.126 Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Dec. 27, 1817), in 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON: RETIREMENT SERIES 191 (David B. Mattem, et al. eds., 2009).
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relevant time period. 127 Perhaps Madison was simply clarifying that
judicial review would have been necessary in some contexts (e.g., statutory
construction) even with the Council of Revision. What is clear is that
Madison's 1817 recollection was that the judiciary's qualified veto through
the Council would have "precluded" any subsequent judicial review of
congressional legislation based on constitutional grounds.12 8
The crucial point is that Madison's faith in the efficacy and legitimacy
of the Council of Revision stemmed in no small measure from the qualified
nature of its veto. The organic structure of the system required a careful
balancing of powers between the various components. The popularly
responsive House was the fulcrum of Madison's constitutional structure
because the legitimacy of the entire system depended upon the central role
the House would play within that structure. An absolute veto over the
House in the hands of either the executive or the judiciary would be
incompatible with the House's central role in a democracy. 12 9 Insofar as
judicial review could give the judiciary an unqualified veto over the House,
it would appear to disrupt the delicate balance and imperil the legitimacy
of the structure as a whole.1 30
Madison's qualms about an unqualified veto, furthermore, were not
simply theoretical. Madison was convinced that the people would never
accept such an invasive intrusion on the prerogatives of their elected
legislators. 131 At the time of the Convention, the practice of judicial review
127 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
128 See, e.g., Charles F. Hobson, in THE NEW AMERICAN NATION, 1775-1820,supra note 55, at 269
n.31 ("[Madison's] proposal at the Convention to give the executive and judiciary a joint 'revisionary'
power over legislative bills was designed to preclude 'the question of a Judiciary annulment of
Legislative Acts. "') (quoting Letter from James Madison to James Monroe, supra note 126).
29 When proposals were made at the Convention for an absolute veto, for example, Madison
argued against them. See I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 104 (June 4)
(statement of Madison); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 60, at 357 ("An
absolute negative on the legislature appears, at first view, to be the natural defence with which the
executive magistrate should be armed. But perhaps it would be neither altogether safe nor alone
sufficient. On ordinary occasions it might not be exerted with the requisite firmness, and on
extraordinary occasions it might be perfidiously abused.").
130 For similar reasons, Madison omitted entirely the role of judicial review in his 1785 letter to
Caleb Wallace regarding constitutional theory. See Letter from James Madison to Caleb Wallace (Aug.
23, 1785), in 8 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 350-57.
131 The infirmities of judicial review constituted one of the reasons Madison advocated so
strenuously in favor of the congressional veto over state legislation. See, e.g., 2 RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 27-28 (July 17) ("Confidence can (not) be put in the State
Tribunals [courts] as guardians of the National authority and interests. In all the States these are more
or less dependt. on the Legislatures. . . . In R. Island the Judges who refused to execute an
unconstitutional law were displaced, and others substituted, by the Legislature who would be willing
instruments of the wicked & arbitrary plans of their masters."). The controversy in Rhode Island to
which Madison was referring involved the case of Trevett v. Weeden. The decision itself was not
reported. For a discussion of the case and the ensuring controversy between Rhode Island's high court
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was nascent and controversial. 13 2 Madison advocated for the Council
precisely because it was so difficult for him to imagine that the people
would accept even a qualified veto of their favored branch at the hands of a
body that was so removed from their political control. 13 3 The idea that they
would ever come to accept an absolute veto in such hands must have
seemed quite implausible to him in 1787.
Integrating members of the judiciary in the legislative process itself,
therefore, gave the judicial members a political legitimacy that transcended
judicial review. The judicial members of the Council would presumably
not be perceived as wearing their robes, figuratively or literally, while
sitting on the Council. They would operate, in essence, as ex officio
members of a legislative body. By virtue of their membership on the
Council, the judicial members of the Council were freed from the necessity
of defending their vetoes as a legal reversal of the popular will. As with the
Senate and the executive (both of whom were to be appointed by the
House under the Virginia Plan), the democratic legitimacy of the
appointment process would empower the Council to project its vetoes as
representative of the popular will. The executive and judiciary's individual
claims of political legitimacy were not as strong as the directly elected
House, but their combined claim to political legitimacy should have been
sufficient to justify a veto of a qualified nature.
Finally, Madison didn't see the need for the type of absolute veto that
judicial review could bestow on the judiciary. Under the Madisonian
scheme, a qualified veto was sufficient to empower the Council to perform
its assigned role. It is important not to overstate Madison's misgivings with
majoritarian governance. 134 While he may have seen the abuse of
and legislature, see BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCE THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 29-33 (2009);
Sherry, supra note 113, at 1138-41.
132 See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 88, at 69 ("The status of judicial review on the eve of the Federal
Convention was thus uncertain at best.... There had been few cases, and no court had yet published an
opinion affirmatively explaining, much less defending, judicial authority to nullify legislation.");
WOOD, CREATION, supra note 37, at 454-55 ("By the 1780's the judiciary in several states ... was
gingerly and often ambiguously moving in isolated but important cases to impose restraints on what the
legislatures were enacting as law...."); Matthew P. Harrington, Judicial Review Before John Marshall,
72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 51, 73 (2003) ("In the years immediately following the Revolution, opponents
of judicial review appear to have raised enough doubts in the minds of political and legal theorists that
the courts rarely exercised the power to test the constitutionality of legislative acts."); see also Sherry,
supra note 113, at 1134-46 (describing handful of state cases prior to Convention where judicial review
appeared to be exercised in some form).
133 See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
134 See, e.g., BANNING, supra note 8, at 184 ("In emphasizing his determination to restrain majority
excesses, we should never let ourselves forget that it was popular self-governance that he was working
to preserve."); KRAMER, supra note 88, at 46 ("[S]cholars have too seldom appreciated that Madison's
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majoritarian politics as the single greatest danger to democratic
governance, he never appeared to waver in his commitment to the principle
of democratic governance itself. 135 The Council of Revision would perform
its critical function within the Madisonian structure by slowing down the
legislative process and by interjecting critical opportunities for
deliberation, rationality, and leadership. The Council's veto would
necessarily draw attention to a bill and invite further discussion over its
propriety and wisdom. In addition, the veto would embolden opponents of
the legislation within and without the legislature, threaten fragile coalitions
that had supported the original bill, and allow for a passage of time, which
might weaken public support. If a bill could survive that kind of process
and still be passed by a supermajority of both houses of Congress, it
deserved to be law. For Madison, the goal was not to remove certain types
of laws from the majoritarian process altogether. He likely viewed such an
approach as too crude to be a legitimate form of democratic governance
and too audacious to be acceptable to the American public. Instead,
Madison's goal was to create a process that would ensure that the laws
produced would reflect not only majoritarian politics but also the wisdom
and temperance of the nation's most responsible leaders. "6
C. The Role of the Judiciary under the Virginia Plan
For modern readers, the Council of Revision is one of the most
provocative aspects of the Virginia Plan because it seems to contradict
many of our own assumptions about the function of the judiciary in a
democratic society.' 37 For modern readers, the prerogatives enjoyed by the
feelings about republican politics in the years immediately [prior to the Convention] were
uncharacteristically pessimistic."); DREW R. MCCoy, THE LAST OF THE FATHERS: JAMES MADISON &
THE REPUBLICAN LEGACY 137 (1989) ("Madison, of course, had long evinced both a fear of majority
faction and a solemn concern for the rights of minorities, as anyone familiar with the Federalist well
knows. But Madison's preoccupation with the perils of majority rule must not be confused with a
rejection of the principle itself.").
"' See, e.g., BANNING, supra note 8, at 372 ("However much he feared an unrestrained, self-
interested, and passionate majority of people, Madison was also adamant that once the proper checks
had been imposed and passing passions had been cooled, the will of the majority must rule."); see also
THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison), supra note 60, at 330 ("The federal and State govemments
are in fact but agents and trustees of the people . . . . [Tihe ultimate authority, wherever the derivative
may be found, resides in the people alone....").
116 See, e.g., BANNING, supra note 8, at 137 ("[A]s the states' experience had shown, a prompt
response by govemment to the majority's immediate demands was not the only quality to be desired. ..
. In the circumstances of the middle 1780s, Madison was more and more inclined to favor measures
that would temper the majority's demands with wisdom, steadiness, and new protections for the rights
of the propertied few....").
137 See infra notes 362-365 and accompanying text.
Journal ofLaw & Politics [Vol.27:459494
Lessons from a Lost Constitution
Council of Revision would seem to be too limited in some respects and too
expansive in others.
Under the Council of Revision, for example, the judiciary possessed
only a qualified power to define the Constitution. The Council of Revision
was empowered to veto congressional actions but that veto, even when
purported to be based on constitutional norms, could subsequently be
overturned by Congress. Under the Virginia Plan, therefore, Congress
possessed the ultimate power to define the meaning of the Constitution and
perhaps even natural rights. The structure of the Virginia Plan is therefore
completely antithetical to the notion of judicial supremacy and contradicts
a fundamental tenet of modem constitutional interpretation that it is
"emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is."138
Another striking feature of the Council for modem readers is the way in
which the judiciary's sphere of influence was extended beyond that which
is typically viewed as appropriate today. By virtue of the Council of
Revision, members of the federal judiciary would have played an integral
role in the legislative and policy-making process. The members of the
federal judiciary sitting on the Council would have exercised this political
function in the constitutional framework of governance despite the fact that
they would have possessed those very characteristics that many now argue
disqualify them from making policy: appointment, life tenure, and salary
protection.139
m3 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). It is unlikely that anyone believed those
words signified a broad doctrine of judicial supremacy at the time they were written. See, e.g.,
KRAMER, supra note 88, at 125 ("Read in context, this sentence [from Marbury] did not say what, to
modem eyes, it seems to say when read in isolation."); Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial
Review Revisited, or How the Marshall Court Made More out of Less, 56 WASH. & LEE L. R-Ev. 787,
806 (1999) ("The decision was so subtle and so oblique that most people did not see its implications...
. Marshall in 1803 was not embarking on a crusade for judicial supremacy."). By virtue of Supreme
Court's revisionist history, however, the words are frequently employed today for the proposition of
judicial supremacy. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (claiming that Marbury "declared
the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution"); see also WILLIAM E. NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 59 (2000) ("Marshall and the other justices ... had no intention to behave as the
Supreme Court ultimately would in Cooper v. Aaron, a 1958 school desegregation case in which the
Court for the first time in its history explicitly arrogated to itself the exclusive power to interpret the
Constitution.").
139 See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, How the Constitution Disappeared, 81 Commentary (Feb. 1986),
reprinted in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 35, 45 (Jack N.
Rakove ed., 1990) [hereinafter INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION] ("[T]he basic premise of democratic
government [is] that public-policy issues are ordinarily to be decided through the electoral process, not
by unelected judges...."); see also ROBERT A. DAHL, How DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION? 152-53 (2002) ("We cannot simultaneously lodge the authority to make laws and
policies exclusively in the hands of elected officials who are, at least in principle, accountable to
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There were several reasons why all the authors of the Virginia Plan
(including the soon to be antifederalist George Mason) would view the
judiciary's role on the Council as democratically legitimate. The first
reason is that the authors of the Virginia Plan viewed the appointment
process itself as a democratically legitimate form of representation.140
Under the Virginia Plan, three of the four units of government were to be
appointed rather than elected (the Senate, the executive, and the judiciary
were to be appointed while only the House was to be elected). 141 In this
respect, the authors of the Virginia Plan were in concert with the majority
of the Framers at the Convention. As with the Virginia Plan, the original
Constitution provided for the appointment of Senators and the federal
judiciary. 142 In addition, the Constitution provided a mode of selection for
the executive that was essentially appointive in nature. The Constitution
provides that the state legislatures "shall appoint" the Electors, who in turn
have the responsibility of choosing the executive. 14 3 In the first four
presidential elections, the prevailing practice was for the state legislatures
to simply appoint the Electors without any reference to elections. 144 The
result was that the people elected the state legislatures, who then appointed
citizens through elections and at the same time give the judicial branch the authority, in effect, to make
crucial public policies.").
14' THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison), supra note 60, at 281 ("It is essential for [a
republican form of government] that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an
inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it .. .. It is sufficient for such a government that the
persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people....").
141 See supra notes 77-93 and accompanying text.
142 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (providing for appointment of Senators by state legislators); U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2 (providing for Presidential appointment of the "Judges of the supreme Court, and all
other Officers of the United States"); see also BANNING, supra note 8, at 157 ("Nearly all [the
Convention delegates] agreed . . . that what they wanted in a senate was a body that would stand at a
sufficient distance from the people and the lower house to check majority oppression, but one that
would be chosen in a manner that would not offend the democratic precepts of the Revolution.").
143 U.S. CONST. art 11, § I ("Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof
may direct, a Number of electors, equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which
the State may be entitled in the Congress....").
'" In the 1792 presidential election, for example, the state legislatures directly chose the electors in
nine of the fifteen states; only five states relied on direct elections to choose all of their electors and one
state (Massachusetts) chose its electors from a combination of legislative appointment and popular
election. See NEAL R. PEIRCE & LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY, THE PEOPLE'S PRESIDENT: THE ELECTORAL
COLLEGE IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND THE DIRECT VOTE ALTERNATIVE 247-48 (rev. ed. 1981). In the
1800 presidential election, the state legislatures directly chose the electors in ten of the sixteen states;
only five states relied on direct elections to choose all of their electors and one state (Tennessee) chose
its electors from a combination of legislative appointment and popular election. Id. It was not until
1816 that popular election permanently became the method employed by a majority of states. Id. South
Carolina, the last state to abandon the legislative appointment of its electors, did so until 1860. Id. at
249.
2012] Lessons from a Lost Constitution 497
the Electors, who then appointed the executive.145  The first several
presidential "elections," therefore, involved a scheme of appointment that
was even more indirect and removed from popular control than the mode
of executive selection contemplated by the Virginia Plan (direct
appointment by the Congress). 146
The essential point is that the Virginia delegates and the majority of
those at the Convention viewed the appointment process as a legitimate
form of representative democracy. 147 The Senate, executive, and judiciary
were all understood to represent the people despite the fact that they were
not directly elected.148 While their connection to the people may have been
indirect, the means of selection for all three could ultimately be traced back
to the popular will. 149
The second basis for the democratic legitimacy of the judiciary's role
on the Council derived from the fact that the authors of the Virginia Plan
145 See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1788-1800, at 514 (1993) ("Perhaps the Electoral College could be said to have functioned
in 1796 more or less the way the Founders intended, with the people or their representatives choosing
their most prominent citizens to serve as electors, and the electors in turn meeting and choosing without
coercion the two worthiest of the candidates for the nation's two highest offices. A presidential contest
organized by competing parties and designed to draw in as many voters as possible was a thing the
Fathers neither planned nor wanted.").
146 For a criticism of the Electoral College, see generally GEORGE C. EDWARDS III, WHY THE
ELECTORAL COLLEGE IS BAD FOR AMERICA (2001). Many political scientists and constitutional
scholars have argued that numerous aspects of the original constitutional structure are incompatible
with modem concepts of democracy. See, e.g., DAHL, supra note 139, at 15-20 (discussing
undemocratic aspects of the original constitutional structure with respect to the electoral college,
slavery, equal state suffrage in the Senate, the legislative appointment Senators, federalism, and judicial
review); SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES
WRONG (AND How WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 6 (2006) ("1 believe that it is increasingly
difficult to construct a theory of democratic constitutionalism, applying our own twenty-first-century
norms, that vindicates the Constitution under which we are governed today."). Assessing the
democratic viability of our current constitutional structure is made all the more difficult by the wide
variety of possible meanings for democracy. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL
SELF-GOVERNMENT 62 (2001) ("Democracy, in sum, is not the same thing as 'government by voters.'
From the standpoint of democratic theory, the first question we should ask is not how to make
government accountable to voters, but under what circumstances 'voters' (or 'the electorate') can
adequately represent the people.").
147 See, e.g., WOOD, CREATION, supra note 37, at 546 ("And to the Federalists, using and
broadening the connotations of actual representation that had developed in the years since 1776, the
entire government, president as well as Congress, became a responsible agency of the people. For the
Federalists the historic distinction between rulers and people, governors and representatives, was
dissolved, and all parts of the government became rulers and representatives of the people at the same
time.").
148 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison), supra note 60, at 281 ("The President is
indirectly derived from the choice of the people, according to the example in most of the States. Even
the judges with all other officers of the Union, will, as in the several States, be the choice, though a
remote choice, of the people themselves.").
149 id
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did not evaluate the political legitimacy of the branches in isolation.
Rather, they evaluated the democratic legitimacy of the structure as a
whole. The various branches were intended to collectively represent the
values, priorities, and morality of the American people. 150 The House, in
particular, was expected to mirror public sentiment.'5 1 By design, however,
the other branches were not intended to reflect popular sentiment as closely
or as immediately as the House. The Framers' ambition was to create a
governmental structure that functioned, as a whole, in a manner that was
both tied to popular control and simultaneously possessing a requisite
distance from it. The fact that Madison and the other Virginia delegates
were willing to reject a formalistic approach to "separation of powers" and
combine the executive and judiciary on the Council demonstrates the
organic way in which they viewed the structure.15 2 Rather than treating the
judiciary or any branch as a sui generis entity, they focused on the task of
organizing the various branches to function together as an integrated
whole. The directly elected House of Representatives was the fulcrum of
the system while the less democratically accountable branches interjected
elements of rationality and deliberation into the process of governance
without destroying the legitimacy of the structure as a whole. 153
In the overarching context of the Virginia Plan's constitutional
structure, therefore, there was nothing incongruous with assigning
150 For a thoughtful exploration of how this system of overlapping institutions is legitimate from a
modem, pluralistic perspective, see TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 216
(1999) ("The appropriate standard in a pluralist system for determining an institution's legitimacy and
value is not whether it is majoritarian or subject to elections. Rather, that standard is the degree to
which it adds to the number and diversity of arenas in which groups can regularly and effectively
advance their interests, thereby contributing to the reliability and stability of the political process as a
whole in ascertaining the enduring bases of political consent."). An eighteenth-century product of the
enlightenment, Madison did not think in such terms. See WOOD, THE IDEA OF AMERICA, supra note 37,
at 149 ("We have too often mistaken Madison for some sort of prophet of a modem interest-group
theory of politics.... Despite his hardheaded appreciation of the multiplicity of interests in American
society, he did not offer America a pluralist conception of politics.").
151 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
152 For Madison's views regarding separation of powers, see infra notes 180-189 and
accompanying text.
13 Madison's own statements at the Convention are instructive. On May 31, he argued:
[Madison] was an advocate for the policy of refining the popular appointments
by successive filtrations, but thought it might be pushed too far. He wished the
expedient to be resorted to only in the appointment of the second branch of the
Legislature, and in the Executive & judiciary branches of the Government. He
thought too that the great fabric to be raised would be more stable and durable if
it should rest on the solid foundation of the people themselves, than if it should
stand merely on the pillars of the Legislatures.
I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 50 (May 31).
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members of the judiciary to a political role within the legislative process.154
Quite to the contrary, Madison and the other proponents of the Virginia
Plan wished to provide the federal judiciary with a measure of
independence from popular sentiment because that very independence
would uniquely qualify them to play their assigned political role within the
constitutional framework. A degree of separation from popular sentiment
allowed the judiciary, through the Council of Revision, to inject the
requisite levels of deliberation and caution that might otherwise be lacking
from the legislative process (and was largely viewed as lacking in the state
governments). The judiciary's proposed political role on the Council was
not viewed as an usurpation of the other branches' right to govern or an
illegitimate assertion of power by an "oligarchy" of unelected judges, any
more than the Senate's ability to frustrate the House's will through
bicameralism or the executive's ability to oppose Congress through the
veto.
II. THE COUNCIL OF REVISION AT THE PHILADELPHIA CONVENTION
Despite considerable support from Madison and a number of other
influential delegates, the Council of Revision was ultimately rejected at the
Constitutional Convention by a narrow margin of four states to three (with
two states divided and one abstaining).155 There were three principal
reasons for its demise. First, support for the Council began to erode when a
number of delegates expressed optimism about the executive's ability to
154 Of the three branches, the federal judiciary was arguably the most removed from the electorate
by virtue of the judges' life tenure. Perhaps for that very reason, the judiciary's political role under the
Virginia Plan was the most limited of the three branches. Unlike the Senate, it could not propose laws.
Unlike the executive, it did not possess a broad power or discretion to enforce the law. Nor did the
Virginia Plan appear to contemplate a role for judicial review based on constitutional grounds. Instead,
the Virginia Plan bestowed the federal judiciary with a political role on the Council, and even here, the
judiciary's role was limited by the fact that it shared the Council with the executive and by the fact that
its vetoes could be overridden by Congress. See supra notes 104-109 and accompanying text.
15 See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 72, 80 (July 21)
(Massachusetts, Delaware, North Carolina, and South Carolina voted against the Council. Virginia,
Connecticut, and Maryland voted in favor of the Council. Pennsylvania, and Georgia were divided on
the question, and New Jersey abstained). The July 21 decision represented the final vote at the
Convention on the Council. The Council had previously been considered and voted upon on June 6,
where it had lost by a vote of eight states to three. See 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION,
supra note 1, at 140 (June 6). One of the three votes in favor of the Council on June 6 had been New
York. See id. If the New York delegation had not left the Convention early, perhaps the Constitution
would have included the Council. For more on the departure of the New York delegation, see BEEMAN,
supra note 2, at 202-03.
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wield the veto power effectively without the assistance of the judiciary.
This confidence in the executive eviscerated a primary rationale for
including the judiciary on the Council and led some delegates to argue that
the judiciary's presence on the Council might actually undermine the
executive's prerogatives within the constitutional structure. Second, a
number of delegates objected to the Council on the grounds that it violated
formalistic notions of separation of powers.' 57 Third, and probably most
significantly, proponents of the Council were hindered when the
Convention opted to assign a central role within the constitutional structure
to judicial review.158 As was discussed earlier, the Council of Revision was
intended to be a replacement for, rather than a supplement to, the judicial
review of constitutional issues. When judicial review assumed a prominent
role at the Convention, the Council suffered a fatal setback.
A. The Council of Revision and Executive Power
Many of the Convention delegates did not appear to share the Virginia
delegates' pessimism regarding the executive's potential as an independent
counterweight to Congress. In fact, the Convention sought to provide the
executive with a number of prerogatives that were missing in the Virginia
Plan. The Constitution provided the executive with a relatively short term
of four years but did not limit the executive to one term, as the Virginia
Plan had done.15 9 Whereas the Virginia Plan provided that the executive
would enjoy "the Executive rights vested in Congress by the
Confederation," the Convention arguably strengthened the executive's
powers by specifying a number of independent bases for authority.160
Equally significantly, the Convention stripped Congress of the power to
appoint the executive (as provided in the Virginia Plan), and instead
156 For the debates at the Convention regarding the Council and the executive veto, see infra notes
159-172 and accompanying text.
15 For the debates at the Convention regarding the Council and separation of powers, see infra
notes 173-189 and accompanying text.
'58 For the debates at the Convention regarding the Council and judicial review, see infra notes
190-218 and accompanying text. At the Convention, judicial review assumed a particularly central role
with respect to federalism. See infra notes 201-218 and accompanying text.
'5 See Virginia Plan, Res. 7, 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 21
("Resd. that a National Executive be instituted; to be chosen by the National Legislature for the term of
_ years, ... and to be ineligible a second time...."); 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra
note 1, at 520, 525 (Sept. 6) (reporting vote of Convention in favor of four year terms). The length of
the President's term of office, as well as whether s/he should be limited to one term, was interrelated to
the mode of the President's selection. See, e.g., BEEMAN, supra note 2, at 302-05.
' Compare Virginia Plan, Res. 7, I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 21,
with U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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assigned the state legislatures with the freedom to choose the means of
selecting the Electors.16 1
Throughout the Convention, proponents of the Council of Revision
maintained that the executive would find it difficult to effectively wield the
veto without the assistance of the judiciary. George Mason, for example,
argued that the presence of judiciary on the Council would "give a
confidence to the Executive, which he would not otherwise have, and
without which the Revisionary power would be of little avail."1 62 Oliver
Ellsworth of Connecticut argued that the presence of the judiciary on the
Council would give "more wisdom & firmness to the Executive."l63
In addition, several proponents of the Council argued that the judiciary
could assist the executive's ability to wield the veto prudently. Mason, for
example, argued that the members of the judiciary were well suited to
exercise the veto power because of their "habit and practice of considering
laws in their true principles, and in all their consequences."1 64 Madison,
Ellsworth, and others made similar arguments that the executive would
benefit from the judiciary's expertise on the Council.165
In the end, however, the proponents of the Council were unable to
persuade a sufficient number of delegates that the executive needed the
judiciary to effectively wield the veto. By virtue of the fact that the
Council's veto would be based on policy as well as constitutional grounds,
a number of delegates were skeptical of the benefits of including the
judiciary on the Council. Luther Martin of Maryland argued: "A
161 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. Providing the executive with an independent means of selection
that circumvented Congress allowed for the possibility that the executive would enjoy an independent
basis of political power and support. It should be noted, however, that the Convention's decision to
abandon the executive's congressional appointment came after the Convention's final decision to reject
the Council, thereby undercutting this rationale as a basis for the Council's rejection. The key
compromises that led the Convention to abandon congressional selection for the executive occurred
within the "Committee of Eleven" (aka the "Committee on Postponed Parts") and between September 4
and September 6 during the Convention. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1,
at 493-53 1; see also BEEMAN, supra note 2, at 296-305.
162 See 2 RECORDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 74 (July 21). Mason stated that
he had "always been a friend to this provision," which is consistent with Madison's assertion that the
Virginia Plan enjoyed the unanimous support of the Virginia delegation. Id.
16 Id. at 73-74. Ellsworth also argued that the judiciary should be included on the Council because
of their "systematic and accurate knowledge of the Laws, which the Executive can not be expected
always to possess." Id. He specifically referenced the judges' knowledge of international law as
something that would be beneficial to the Council's work. Id.
6 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
65 See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 74 (July 21); see also RAKOVE,
supra note 8, at 260-62 ("[T]he case for a joint council assumed that the executive, acting alone, would
lack the political resources to withstand the legislature ..... This pragmatic argument reflected the
deeper difficulty the framers faced in imagining how a single official, however independent, could set
his opinion against the collective weight and influence of a representative assembly.").
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knowledge of mankind, and of Legislative affairs cannot be presumed to
belong in a higher degree to the Judges than to the Legislature."l 6 6 As
previously mentioned, Elbridge Gerry argued that it was "quite foreign
from the nature of ye. office to make [the judiciary] judges of the policy of
public measures." 67 For those who believed that the executive possessed
the political strength to wield the veto successfully, in short, there simply
appeared to be little need or benefit to forcing the executive to share the
veto power.
The Convention's efforts to strengthen the executive's prerogatives,
furthermore, provided an affirmative argument against the Council insofar
as some delegates feared that the judiciary's share of the veto power might
undermine the executive's position within the constitutional structure. John
Dickinson of Delaware summarized this point at the Convention when he
argued against the Council:
Secrecy, vigor & despatch are not the principal properties
reqd. in the Executive. Important as these are, that of
responsibility is more so, which can only be preserved; by
leaving it singly to discharge its functions.168
Along the same lines, Rufus King of Massachusetts argued that the
Council was inconsistent with the "unity of the Executive." 69 Nathaniel
Gorham, the other signer from Massachusetts, pointed out that the
President would be outnumbered on the Council by the members of the
judiciary and feared that the judicial members could therefore use the
Council to "sacrifice" the Executive."1 70 Some proponents of executive
power went so far as to propose that the executive should enjoy an
unqualified veto power over congressional acts.171
Madison, of course, remained convinced that a veto power invested
solely in the executive was unlikely to be effective. Typically instructive
166 See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 76 (July 21).
167 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. For a similar comment from Gorham, see supra
note 116 and accompanying text.
168 See 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 140 (June 6).
16'9 See id. at 139 (June 6) ("If the Unity of the Executive was preferred for the sake of
responsibility, the policy of it is as applicable to the revisionary as to the Executive power.").170 See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 79 (July 21) ("[A]s the Judges
will outnumber the Executive, the revisionary check would be thrown entirely out of the Executive
hands, and instead of enabling him to defend himself, would enable the Judges to sacrifice him.").
171 On June 4, James Wilson and Alexander Hamilton proposed that the executive be given "an
absolute negative on the laws." See 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 98
(June 4).
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was his argument on June 4 in favor of the Council and against vesting an
absolute veto in the hands of the executive:
[I]f a proper proportion of each branch should be required
to overrule the objections of the Executive, it would
answer the same purpose as an absolute negative. It would
rarely if ever happen that the Executive constituted as ours
is proposed to be would, have firmness eno' to resist the
legislature, unless backed by a certain part of the body
itself. The King of G. B. with all his splendid attributes
would not be able to withstand ye. unanimous and eager
wishes of both houses of Parliament. To give such a
prerogative would certainly be obnoxious to the temper of
this Country; its present temper at least.172
Here we see Madison's pessimism regarding the executive veto.
According to Madison, the "temper" of the Country was unlikely to
countenance an absolute veto against the people's beloved legislature.
Even in Britain, where the monarchy enjoyed a theoretical right to veto
Parliament, the veto could not be exercised with success. How unlikely, it
seemed to Madison, that an American executive who did not enjoy the
traditional prerogatives of the British monarchy would fare any better.
B. Separation Powers
A second obstacle for the proponents of the Council was the fact that it
appeared to contradict a formalistic interpretation of the principle of
separation of powers. According to the prevailing theory inherited from
Montesquieu and others, the various branches of government were required
to be as separated as possible.173 Many Americans had come to accept
Montesquieu's notions as dogma because they continued to view
separation of powers in the context of ensuring that the various branches
172 See I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 99-100 (June 4). The proposal
for an absolute veto for the executive was defeated on that same day by a unanimous vote of the states.
See id at 103 (June 4). As previously noted, Madison quickly learned that the Constitutional
framework actually provided the executive with far more opportunities to wield and aggrandize power
than he had anticipated. See supra note 100.
173 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 60, at 299-300 ("One of the principal
objections inculcated by the more respectable adversaries to the Constitution, is its supposed violation
of the political maxim, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments ought to be separate
and distinct. . . . The oracle who is always consulted and cited on this subject is the celebrated
Montesquieu.").
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remained faithful to the will of their constituents.174 Since Whig theory
held that the legislature was the branch most in tune to the will of the
people, separation of powers in this context was viewed predominately as a
protection for the legislature against the other branches.' 75 This was the
perspective of the one delegate, Elbridge Gerry, who offered the most
thorough argument against the Council on separation of powers grounds:
The [Council] was liable to strong objections. It was
combining & mixing together the Legislative & the other
departments. It was establishing an improper coalition
between the Executive & Judiciary departments. It was
making Statesmen of the Judges; and setting them up as
the guardians of the Rights of the people. He relied for his
part on the Representatives of the people as the guardians
of their Rights & interests. It was making the Expositors of
the Laws, the Legislators which ought never to be done. A
better expedient for correcting the laws, would be to
appoint as had been done in Pena. a person or persons of
proper skill, to draw bills for the Legislature. 76
For Gerry, the elected legislators were the "proper guardians" of the
people's rights and interests because the legislature was the most directly
linked to popular sentiment. The primary purpose of separation of powers,
therefore, was to wall off the executive (and to a lesser extent the judiciary)
174 See RAKOVE, supra note 8, at 249 ("From the memory of the wrongs inflicted by generations of
royal govemors and the belief that ambitious monarchs and their ministers regularly threatened liberty,
the American constitution writers of 1776 drew two great lessons. The first was to 'strip' the new state
executives of what John Adams called 'those badges of domination called prerogatives'; the second
was to affirm the principle of separated powers with the fervor that enabled the Virginia constitution of
1776 to declare 'that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments shall be separate and distinct;
so that neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the other; nor shall any person exercise the
powers of more than one of them at the same time."') (quoting Virginia Constitution of 1776, reprinted
in I THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 7 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)).
' See, e.g., WOOD, CREATION, supra note 37, at 157 ("When Americans in 1776 spoke of keeping
the several parts of the government separate and distinct, they were primarily thinking of insulating the
judiciary and particularly the legislature from executive manipulation."). For an additional discussion
of Whig political theory and its evolution in America, see LUTZ, supra note 10, at 1-18.
76 See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 75 (July 21). Caleb Strong
echoed Gerry's argument immediately thereafter. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION,
supra note 1, at 75 (July 21) ("Mr. Strong thought with Mr. Gerry that the power of making ought to be
kept distinct from that of expounding, the laws. No maxim was better established. The Judges in
exercising the function of expositors might be influenced by the part they had taken, in framing the
laws."). John Dickinson argued against the Council on the grounds that it "involved an improper
mixture of powers." See 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 140 (June 6).
[Vol.27:459504
Lessons from a Lost Constitution
from the legislative function so that those branches could not interfere with
the legislature's ability to represent the popular will. 177
It is important to note, however, that Gerry's argument against the
Council was not specifically premised on the fact that the judiciary was
appointed. Not a single delegate at the Convention made that argument.
Most, if not all, of the Convention delegates shared the Virginia delegates'
overarching view that the appointment process was a legitimate form of
democratic representation.178 As has been discussed, the Constitution relied
as heavily, if not more heavily, on the appointment process for the Senate,
the executive, and the judiciary and sought to equip these less
democratically accountable branches, much as Madison had sought to do
in the Virginia Plan, with the collective power to check the more
electorally responsive House. 179
Madison's views regarding the doctrine of separation of powers
diverged sharply from those espoused by Gerry.180 While Gerry was most
concerned with protecting the legislature from the encroachments of the
executive branch, Madison feared the very opposite, namely, that the
"vortex" of power that was the legislative branch would devour the other
branches.181 Madison was therefore prepared to abandon a formalistic
interpretation of the separation of powers principle in order to find the best
solution to what he perceived as the fundamental challenge of democratic
governance: to moderate and refine popular sentiment as it was reflected in
the legislative branch. 182 In a sense, Madison was prepared to redefine the
fundamental notions of separation of powers by reconceptualizing their
purpose.
77 See RAKOVE, supra note 8, at 253 ("Americans ... still regarded separation of powers more as a
formula for restricting the executive than as a symmetrical balance among coequal departments.").
178 See supra note 147.
179 See supra notes 142-149 and accompanying text.
1s0 After the Council had been rejected, Madison attempted to salvage something of his original
design by proposing that the Judiciary and the executive each be given their own qualified vetoes over
pending congressional legislation. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 298
(Aug. 15). Under this proposal, Congress would have been able to override the veto with a two-thirds
supermajority if only one of the branches was exercising the veto but would have been required to
muster a three-fourths supermajority in the event that both branches were exercising their vetoes. Id.
The proposal was defeated by the same margin (eight to three) by which the Council was rejected for
the first time on June 6. Compare id. with I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at
140 (June 6). In fact, the Council received more votes on July 21 than the proposal for separate vetoes
received on August 15. See supra note 155.
181 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
182 See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 8, at 53 ("The benefits this council [of revision] would provide
justified the threat it posed to the axiomatic view that the three powers of government had to be rigidly
separated.").
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For Madison, the primary danger of democratic government was not the
possibility that it would deviate from popular control and seek to oppress
the majority of people. That was a legitimate fear in the context of a
monarchical or aristocratic regime.183 For democracies, by contrast, the
greatest danger was that the legislature would manifest popular sentiment
only too well, and seek to oppress minorities through the legitimate
exercise of majoritarian rule.' 84 The complete separation of branches,
therefore, was neither necessary nor advantageous in the context of
democratic government. 185 Instead, Madison's goal was to overlap and
blend the functions of the various branches in order to slow down the
democratic process itself and introduce opportunities and avenues for
deliberation, rationality, and leadership.' 86 As Madison summarized the
point at the Convention:
Mr. Madison could not discover in the proposed
association of the Judges with the Executive in the
Revisionary check on the Legislature any violation of the
maxim which requires the great departments of power to
be kept separate & distinct. On the contrary he thought it
an auxiliary precaution in favor of the maxim. If a
Constitutional discrimination of the departments on paper
were a sufficient security to each agst. encroachments of
the others, all further provisions would indeed be
superfluous. But experience had taught us a distrust of that
security; and that it is necessary to introduce such a
balance of powers and interests, as will guarantee the
provisions on paper. Instead therefore of contenting
ourselves with laying down the Theory in the Constitution
that each department ought to be separate & distinct, it was
183 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 4, at 214 ("In absolute monarchies, the Prince may be tolerably neutral towards
different classes of his subjects, but may sacrifice the happiness of all to his personal ambition or
avarice.").
'n Id. ("In small republics, the sovereign will is controlled from such a sacrifice of the entire
Society, but is not sufficiently neutral towards the parts composing it.").
1' See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra note 60, at 343 ("[The separation of
powers doctrine] does not require that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be
wholly unconnected with each other. . . . [U]nless these departments be so far connected and blended as
to give to each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim
requires, as essential to a free government, can never in practice be duly maintained.").
116 See id_
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proposed to add a defensive power to each which should
maintain the Theory in practice.'8 7
The genius and originality of Madison's thought was arguably most
evident in instances like the Council of Revision where he was willing to
discard prevailing theories in order to construct new models and
approaches. 188 For Madison, theory gave way to experience and practical
considerations and observations outweighed theoretical principles.' 89
C. Judicial Review
Probably the single most important reason the Council of Revision was
rejected derived from the Convention's commitment to judicial review as
an integral part of the constitutional structure.190 The incompatibility
between the Council and judicial review was the most cited argument
against the Council at the Convention.'91 It was feared that the Council
would undermine the judiciary's credibility with respect to judicial review
because the Council would compel at least some members of the Supreme
Court to play a legislative role in creating the very same acts the Court
would later review. The result appeared to be a conflict of interest, or at
least a perceived impropriety.
Many of the arguments against the Council along these lines emanated
from the members of the Massachusetts delegation. Rufus King argued that
the Judges "ought to be able to expound the law as it should come before
them, free from the bias of having participated in its formation." 92 King's
Massachusetts colleague, Caleb Strong, similarly argued that "[t]he Judges
in exercising the function of expositors might be influenced by the part
they had taken, in framing the laws."l93 Nathaniel Gorham (also from
Massachusetts) made essentially the same point when he contended that
"' 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 77 (July 21).
188 See RAKOVE, supra note 8, at 55 (arguing that originality of Madison's thought "lay in part in its
self-conscious willingness to challenge received wisdom, even if that wisdom often took the form of
clich6s about small republics and the separation of powers").
19 See Rakove, supra note 122, at 489 ("Nothing better illustrates the pragmatic cast of Madison's
mind than his efforts to modify the strict -theory of the separation of powers that so many Americans
had seemingly imbibed from their reading of 'the celebrated Montesquieu."').
190 This point, of course, is related to the separation of powers arguments insofar as judicial review
based on constitutional issues was identified as the core function of the judiciary. But for Madison and
many others, it was not. As previously discussed, the Council of Revision appeared to be a replacement
for rather than a supplement to the constitutional review of legislation by the judiciary in the form of
judicial review. See supra notes 125-128 and accompanying text.
191 See infra notes 192-196 and accompanying text.
192 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 98 (June 4).
'9' 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 75 (July 21).
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"the Judges ought to carry into the exposition of the laws no
prepossessions with regard to them."1 9 4
Beyond Massachusetts, John Rutledge of South Carolina and Luther
Martin of Maryland voiced similar concerns. Rutledge maintained that
"Judges ought never to give their opinion on a law till it comes before
them."1 95 Martin argued:
And as to the Constitutionality of laws, that point will
come before the Judges in their proper official character.
In this character they have a negative on the laws. Join
them with the Executive in the Revision and they will have
a double negative. It is necessary that the Supreme
Judiciary should have the confidence of the people. This
will soon be lost, if they are employed in the task of
remonstrating agst. popular measures of the Legislature. 19 6
Note that Martin's idea of a "double negative" was contrary to Madison's
belief that the Council of Revision would replace, rather than supplement,
the judicial review of congressional acts based on constitutional
grounds. 197
There were several reasons why the Convention placed more emphasis
on judicial review than the Virginia Plan. Unlike the Virginia Plan, the
Convention chose to include a number of specific restrictions on Congress.
Article 1, Section 9 prohibited Congress from, inter alia, passing bills of
attainder, enacting ex post facto laws, taxing exports, curtailing the slave
trade prior to 1808, and improvidently suspending the writ of habeas
corpus.198 In addition, the distribution of powers between the executive and
Congress were left somewhat ambiguous. It is not clear, for example, to
what extent the executive's powers as Commander in Chief overlaps with
9 Id. at 79.
'9' Id at 80.
'96 Id at 76-77.
97 See supra notes 125-128 and accompanying text.
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. With respect to habeas corpus, the Constitution is not entirely clear
whether the power to suspend belongs entirely to Congress or is shared with the executive. Abraham
Lincoln argued that the executive is empowered to suspend the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the absence
of congressional legislation. See, e.g., Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July
4, 1861), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-65, at 246, 253 (Don E. Fehrenbacher
ed., 1989) ("But the Constitution itself, is silent as to which, or who, is to exercise the power; and as
the provision was plainly made for a dangerous emergency, it cannot be believed the framers of the
instrument intended, that in every case, the danger should run its course, until Congress could be called
together....").
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Congress' power to declare war and to raise and support armies and
provide and maintain a Navy.199 The Convention delegates must have
anticipated that judicial review would play an important role with respect
to these prohibitions and, quite possibly, with the ongoing clarification of
the overlapping prerogatives. It is also quite possible that many of the
Framers envisioned that the courts could conduct judicial review of
congressional acts based on natural rights.200
Even more than the federal government, furthermore, judicial review
was implicated with respect to federalism and the enforcement of the
boundaries between federal and state authority. In that respect, much of the
Convention's decision to rely on judicial review flowed from its decision
201to reject the Virginia Plan's congressional veto over state legislation.
The majority of Framers appeared to be in agreement that the state
legislatures had been guilty of dangerous transgressions during the period
leading up to the Constitutional Convention. 202 When the Virginia Plan's
congressional veto was rejected as too radical a solution to that problem,
the delegates were forced to devise alternative means of restraining the
states. Most of these alternatives implicated judicial review in a way that
the Virginia Plan did not.
One of the Convention's approaches to restraining the states, for
example, was to embed a number of specific prohibitions within the
Constitution itself. Article I specifically prohibits some of the more
egregious (in the eyes of the Framers) state practices that had characterized
the period leading up to the Convention. Section 10 of Article I prohibits
i9 See U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cls. 11-13.
200 Justice Samuel Chase espoused this view in his seriatim opinion in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (Chase, J.) ("There are certain vital principles in our free Republican
governments, which will determine and over-rule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative
power...."). In a separate opinion from the same case, Justice Iredell contested Chase's conclusion that
the judiciary was empowered to overturn legislation on the basis of natural rights. See id. at 399
(Iredell, J.) ("[T]he Court cannot pronounce [legislation] to be void, merely because it is, in their
judgment, contrary to the principles of natural justice."). The controversy, of course, remains with us to
this day in no small measure by virtue of the Ninth Amendment, which refers to rights not found
("enumerate[ed]") in the Constitution but nonetheless "retained" by the people. See U.S. CONsT.
amend. IX. For a thoughtful exploration of the possibility that the Framers intended judicial review
based on natural rights, see Sherry, supra note 113, 1158 ("[The Framers] apparently contemplated that
laws not prohibited by the Constitution might still be invalid as contrary to natural law."); see also
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004).
201 See Jack N. Rakove, Judicial Power in the Constitutional Theory ofJames Madison, 43 WM &
MARY L. REv. 1513, 1523 (2002) ("In the aftermath of [the Connecticut Compromise], the negative
was eliminated, and the Convention instead began the process of making the judiciary, acting under the
Supremacy Clause, the institution responsible for weighing the legislative acts of the states against the
dictates of the Constitution.").202 See supra notes 34-55 and accompanying text.
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the states from issuing paper money,203 from "impairing the Obligation of
Contracts,"204 and from imposing imposts or duties on goods traveling
between states from foreign countries.20 5 In addition, Section 10 prohibits
the states from entering into treaties or alliances with other states or with
foreign nations, from passing bills of attainder or enacting ex post facto
laws, from granting titles of nobility, and from engaging in war or even
maintaining their own "Troops or Ships of War" without the consent of
Congress.206
Article IV, similarly, was intended to curtail a number of specific state
practices deemed detrimental to the nation. The Full Faith and Credit
Clause requires the states to respect each others' laws and judgments. 2 07
Section 2 of Article IV includes a constitutional requirement for criminal
extradition between the states 208 and prohibits states from discriminating
against each others' citizens with respect to the "[p]rivileges and
[i]mmunities" of citizenship. 209 Finally, Section 4 of Article IV prohibits
the states from employing non-representative forms of government and
allows the state legislatures to request federal intervention in response to
domestic violence.2 10
All of these specific prohibitions contrasted sharply with the Virginia
Plan's more open ended and flexible approach of allowing Congress to
exercise an ad hoc review of state legislation through the veto. The
enforcement of the Constitution's specific prohibitions would naturally
devolve to the judiciary in the course of their review of the cases these
203 U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. I ("No State shall ... coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any
Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender Payment of Debts. . .204 d
205 Id cl. 2. The prohibition is qualified to allow states to impose duties or imposts when
"absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws." This exception is subject to the control of
Congress and, in the event that a state is allowed to impose a duty or impost for such purposes, the
State is required to render all the proceeds to the federal government. Id With respect to foreign
countries, Section 10 provides that "[n]o State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of
Tonnage . . ." Id. cl. 3.
206 Id. cls. 1, 3 (providing that a state can defend itself, prior to congressional approval, in response
to an invasion or other "imminent Danger").
207 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
208 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2 ("A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other
Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive
Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having
Jurisdiction of the Crime.").
209 Id. cl. I ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens in the several States."). Section 2 also included the Fugitive Slave Clause, that was repudiated
by the Thirteenth Amendment. See id. cl. 3, repealed by U.S. CoNST. amend. XIII.210 U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 4.
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constitutional prohibitions would inevitably generate. 2 11 When the
Convention opted for specific prohibitions, therefore, the process of
judicial review became implicated in the constitutional structure in a way
that it simply was not under the Virginia Plan.2 12
Theoretically, the Council of Revision might have survived the federal
judicial review of state legislation because the primary objection to the
Council was based on the federal judiciary's integral role in congressional
legislation. It was the second method the Convention chose to restrain the
states, therefore, that delivered the most devastating blow to the Council.
In Article I, Section 8, the Convention delegated specific areas of
authority to the national Congress.213 The Convention then took the
additional step of subordinating state authority in those areas by
formulating the Supremacy Clause.2 14 The result was "dual federalism,"
where the authority of the state legislatures would be severely constrained
in those substantive areas that were seen as prime candidates for state
abuse and where state transgressions were viewed as particularly
threatening to national interests.215
As with the specific prohibitions, dual federalism necessarily implicated
judicial review. Controversies regarding the boundaries between federal
and state authority were inevitable. Congress' powers under Article I,
Section 8 would need to be defined (as would the concept of what was
"necessary and proper" to Congress' execution of its Article I powers), and
the courts were the logical place where such controversies would be
contested. 216 In short, the Supremacy Clause required the judiciary,
211 At the Convention, for example, Madison observed that the ex post facto prohibition would
"oblige the Judges to declare such [state] interferences [with existing contractual rights] null & void."
See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 440 (Aug. 28).
212 See KRAMER, supra note 88, at 73 ("[T]he Framers clearly opted for judicial review as a device
to control state law.").
213 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
214 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
215 See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 63-73 (describing origins of dual federalism in United
States).
216 Madison made this precise point in The Federalist:
In this relation, then, the proposed government cannot be deemed a national one;
since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the
several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects. It is
true that in controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions,
the tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to be established under the general
government.
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through the process of judicial review, to police the contours of the dual
federalist structure by reviewing congressional acts that purported to be
consistent with it. 2 17 Indeed, many of the Supreme Court's most
controversial rulings during the first twenty-five years of its existence
involved issues of federalism and the interpretation of Article I, Section
8.218
In summary, the Framers expected judicial review to play an integral
role in the maintenance of the overarching constitutional structure. It was
expected to function as a direct restraint on the states, as the primary
referee to police the contours of dual federalism, and to some extent as a
restraint on the federal government itself. The result was the demise of the
Council of Revision. In light of the widespread belief that it was improper
for the judiciary to review its own actions, the Council of Revision had
been premised on the idea that judicial review of congressional legislation,
at least with respect to constitutional issues, would be inconsequential.
The loss of the Council of Revision and the Convention's decision to
drop the congressional veto were severe blows to the constitutional
structure of the Virginia Plan. 2 19 Despite the fact that a number of their
proposals had been adopted, the majority of the Virginia delegation failed
to sign the Constitution. 2 20 Even Madison, who signed the document, was
severely disappointed with the Constitution.221 He had succeeded in
shaping the Convention's early deliberations and the Constitution itself
appeared to reflect his overarching ideological outlook. The federal
government included three branches and a bicameral legislature. The
THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison), supra note 60, at 285.
217 See Jack N. Rakove, The Original Justifications for Judicial Independence, 95 GEO. L.J. 1061,
1068-69 (2007) ("The significance of the Supremacy Clause cannot be understated. It not only
confirmed the status of the Constitution as fundamental law, but it also made the enforcement of its
essential division of power between the Union and the States an inherently judicial function."); see also
KRAMER, supra note 88, at 75 ("By adding the Supremacy Clause, Martin removed all doubts, again
allaying the fears of others who wanted guarantees of an effective alternative [to the Virginia Plan's
legislative veto]. . . . From this point on, then, the delegates assumed the existence of judicial review
over state laws in their deliberations.").
218 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 131, at 44-104.
219 A third major blow to the Virginia Plan was the loss of proportional representation in the Senate
by virtue of the "Connecticut Compromise." See BEEMAN, supra note 2, at 200-25. These three losses
were viewed as devastating to its proponents. See RAKOVE, supra note 59, at 73 ("To sustain three such
defeats in the space of a week must have devastated the Madison who had come to Philadelphia imbued
with such faith in his own ideas. From this point on, he began to fear that the results of the Convention
would fall far short of the reforms required.").
220 See supra note II and accompanying text.
221 See RAKOVE, supra note 59, at 78 ("Believing that in his understanding of the principles of
government he had now surpassed the celebrated writers of ancient and modem times, Madison viewed
all the decisions that had so diluted his system not as necessary compromises but as fundamental errors
of judgment.").
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House of Representatives was structured to be electorally responsive to the
people. The various branches enjoyed a degree of separation from popular
sentiment and possessed avenues for restraining the House. By virtue of
the Supremacy Clause and a host of specific prohibitions, there were even
opportunities for the federal government to rein in the most egregious
instances of state misrule. Despite all of that, however, Madison had lost
two key features of the Virginia Plan that he had considered essential to the
proper functioning of the constitutional structure. As a result, before the
Convention was even over, Madison expressed his dismay about the
Constitution's inadequacies to his friend Thomas Jefferson: "I hazard an
opinion nevertheless that the plan should it be adopted will neither
effectually answer its national object nor prevent the local mischiefs which
every where excite disgusts agst the state governments."222
Madison's actions in the years following the Convention must be
understood in the context of this disappointment that he felt after the
Convention. In particular, Madison's views with respect to the. Bill of
Rights must be understood in the context of his frustration over the loss of
the Council of Revision. As we shall see in the next section, Madison's
initial reluctance to support the Bill of Rights is attributable largely to the
ways in which judicial review differed from the Council. Madison's
eventual decision to draft and press for the adoption of the Bill of Rights,
furthermore, manifested (at least in part) an effort to address and correct
some of the fundamental inadequacies that had been created in his
constitutional structure when the Council was rejected. From an historical
point of view, therefore, the Bill of Rights and the Council of Revision are
inextricably bound together.
III. MADISON'S BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. Madison's Disappointment with the Constitution
Madison believed that the loss of the Council of Revision and the
congressional veto over state legislation had fundamentally undermined his
constitutional scheme with respect to both state and federal legislation.2 3
In each of those contexts, the Constitution essentially provided two
separate checks where the Virginia Plan had provided only one. With
respect to state legislation, for example, the Virginia Plan had provided a
222See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Sept. 6, 1787), in 10 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 4, at 163-64.
223 See infra notes 226-257 and accompanying text.
2012] 513
Journal ofLaw & Politics
single congressional veto whereas the Constitution provided both judicial
review (based on a litany of specific prohibitions) and the added protection
of dual federalism (made effective through the Supremacy Clause).224 In
the congressional context, the Virginia Plan had essentially provided one
check (the Council of Revision) whereas the Constitution provided both
the executive veto and judicial review based on specific prohibitions (and
even, possibly, natural rights).2 25 From Madison's perspective, however,
the Constitution's structure was inadequate in both the state and
congressional contexts because he believed that two ineffective checks
were inferior to a single restraint that had the capability of being
effectively implemented.
1. The Constitution's Deficiencies with Respect to State Legislation
Madison believed the Constitution's litany of specific prohibitions
would never adequately remedy the deficiencies of the state legislatures for
several reasons. First, Madison believed the flexibility of the legislative
process would enable the states to circumvent the constitutional limitations
in myriad ways.226 In a letter to Jefferson on October 24, 1787, Madison
articulated his disappointment in the Convention's decision to rely on
judicial review as the mechanism for controlling the states:
A constitutional negative on the laws of the States seems
equally necessary to secure individuals agst.
encroachments on their rights. The mutability of the laws
of the States is found to be a serious evil. The injustice of
them has been so frequent and so flagrant as to alarm the
most stedfast friends of Republicanism. . . . The restraints
agst. paper emissions, and violations of contracts are not
sufficient. Supposing them to be effectual as far as they
go, they are short of the mark. Injustice may be effected by
such an infinitude of legislative expedients, that where the
disposition exists it can only be controuled by some
provision which reaches all cases whatsoever. 22 7
224 See supra notes 203-218 and accompanying text.
225 See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
226 See, e.g., Rakove, supra note 61, at 264 ("By its very rulemaking powers, the legislature could
circumscribe the best efforts of the two weaker branches of government to correct the injustices of
legislation.").
227 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 4, at 212.
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The Convention's reliance on judicial review was equally misplaced
because the process of judicial review was unlikely to be viewed as
legitimate by those it sought to constrain. As Madison articulated in the
same letter:
It may be said that the Judicial authority under our new
system will keep the States within their proper limits, and
supply the place of a negative on their laws. The answer is,
that it is more convenient to prevent the passage of a law,
than to declare it void after it is passed; that this will be
particularly the case, where the law aggrieves individuals,
who may be unable to support an appeal agst. a State to the
supreme Judiciary; that a State which would violate the
Legislative rights of the Union, would not be very ready to
obey a Judicial decree in support of them, and that a
recurrence to force, which in the event of disobedience
would be necessary, is an evil which the new Constitution
meant to exclude as far as possible.2 2 8
One can ask why Madison was so much more confident that the states
would accept the Virginia Plan's legislative veto when he was so
pessimistic about the states' willingness to accept the legitimacy of judicial
review. Part of the answer lies in the fact that the legislative veto was
something of a preemptive strike. People were less likely to get attached to
a particular law if it was struck down in its infancy as a mere bill. 22 9
The other half of the answer, however, relates to the legitimacy of the
process by which the law was to be struck down under the Virginia Plan.
Under the Virginia Plan, the House would have played a key role in the
congressional veto. As we have seen, Madison's fear of the House as a
potential "vortex" of power drove much of his constitutional theory with
respect to separation of powers.2 30 With respect to the veto of state
legislation, however, Madison had sought to harness the House's
tremendous power for the cause of good. What is more, the House would
have been incapable of vetoing state legislation on its own accord. The
Senate would have had to concur with the House before the veto could be
exercised and, even then, the executive and the judiciary would have had
228 Id. at 211.
229 In Madison's terminology, it was more "convenient" to prevent a law's passage than to declare
it void after its enactment. Id.
230 See supra notes 75-103 and accompanying text.
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the power to overrule the veto through the Council of Revision.2 31 In other
words, a state law could only have been vetoed if all of the federal
branches were in agreement that the law should be struck.
The thorough and democratic process by which state laws could be
vetoed under the Virginia Plan contrasted sharply with the Constitution's
nearly exclusive reliance on judicial review. Rather than implicating all of
the branches, including the single branch most likely to merit the trust and
confidence of the American people, the Constitution bestowed the
responsibility for enforcing the specific prohibitions, as well as for policing
the contours of dual federalism, to the one branch of the federal
government that was the farthest removed and least accountable to the
people themselves.23 2 The Constitution devolved primary responsibility in
the federalism context, in other words, on the branch that was least likely
to be perceived as legitimate in the eyes of the American people.2 33 As his
letter to Jefferson demonstrates, Madison doubted that the state
constituencies would allow such a body to wield an absolute check over
state legislation without the involvement (let alone the consent) of the
other federal branches.
It is easy to see how Madison could argue that his congressional veto
actually constituted a less intrusive encroachment on the states than the
231 See supra notes 104-107 and accompanying text.
232 See, e.g., Rakove, supra note 201, at 1525 ("[Madison's] reservations were pragmatic. Judicial
power simply will be too weak to provide a satisfactory solution to the challenges to national
supremacy that he still expected the states to mount.").
233 One of the best articulations of these concerns was voiced by one of the leading antifederalists
("Brutus") in March of 1788:
Perhaps nothing could have been better conceived to facilitate the abolition of
the state governments than the constitution of the judicial....
Had the construction of the constitution been left with the legislature, they
would have explained it at their peril; if they exceed their powers, or sought to
find, in the spirit of the constitution, more than was expressed in the letter, the
people from whom they derived their power could remove them, and do
themselves right; and indeed I can see no other remedy that the people can have
against their rulers for encroachments of this nature. A constitution is a compact
of a people with their rulers; . . . if they determine contrary to the understanding
of the people, an appeal will lie to the people at the period when the rulers are to
be elected, and they will have it in their power to remedy the evil; but when this
power is lodged in the hands of men independent of the people, and of their
representatives, and who are not, constitutionally, accountable for their opinions,
no way is left to controul them but with a high hand and an outstretched arm.
"Brutus," Essay XV, N.Y.J. (Mar. 20, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 441-42
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). The identity of Brutus remains unknown. See 13 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 411 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino
eds., 1993).
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form of judicial review that the Constitution ultimately employed.2 34 The
Virginia Plan's sweeping congressional mandate could be perceived as less
intrusive of state independence and authority because it required the
consent of every branch of the federal government and provided the
flexibility of evaluating state practices in an individualized context. For
Madison, the scheme employed under the Virginia Plan was a far more
effective alternative both in the sense that it was broader than judicial
review and more likely to be accepted as legitimate by the citizens of the
states.
2. The Constitution's Deficiencies with Respect to Judicial Review
In terms of the Constitution's limitations on congressional action,
Madison had an equal if not greater cause for pessimism. The Constitution
relied heavily on the executive veto as a restraint on Congress. As has been
discussed, however, Madison was convinced that the executive alone
would not be able to muster the political will or command the type of
235political legitimacy that would allow it to effectively restrain Congress.
For those who were committed to legislative supremacy, the weakness of
the executive veto was a potential blessing. For some others, less sanguine
about the infallibility of representative bodies, the potential weakness of
the executive veto was compensated, at least in part, by the prospects of
judicial review. Alexander Hamilton, one of Madison's co-authors of The
Federalist, summarized the case in support of judicial review in Federalist
78:
No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution,
can be valid. To deny this, would be to affirm, that the
deputy is greater than his principal; that the servant is
above his master; that the representatives of the people are
superior to the people themselves; that men acting by
virtue of powers, may do not only what their powers do
not authorize, but what they forbid.
If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the
constitutional judges of their own powers, and that the
construction they put upon them is conclusive upon the
other departments, it may be answered, that this cannot be
234 See, e.g., 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 28 (July 17) (quoting
Madison's argument at Convention that congressional veto was "the most mild & certain means of
preserving the harmony of the system").
235 See supra notes 98-102 & 172 and accompanying text.
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the natural presumption, where it is not to be collected
from any particular provisions in the Constitution. It is not
otherwise to be supposed, that the Constitution could
intend to enable the representatives of the people to
substitute their will to that of their constituents. It is far
more rational to suppose, that the courts were designed to
be an intermediate body between the people and the
legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter
within the limits assigned to their authority. The
interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar
province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must
be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It
therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well
as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the
legislative body.236
Undoubtedly, Madison would have agreed with some of the assertions
contained in Hamilton's Federalist 78 when he first read them in the spring
of 1788.237 He would have agreed that the Constitution was fundamental
23law and took precedent over legislative acts.238 He would have agreed that
ultimate sovereignty rested with the people. He also would have agreed
with Hamilton's assertion that the judiciary could serve as an
"intermediary" of the people insofar as that suggested that the judiciary
could function in a representative capacity. 239 The Council of Revision
demonstrated Madison's belief that the judiciary, by virtue of its
appointment, was qualified to serve in a policy-making (and hence
representative) capacity within the democracy.
The idea in Federalist 78 that would have perplexed Madison, however,
was the notion that the judiciary occupied a place in the democracy
236 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 60, at 492.
237 Federalist 78 was first published on May 28, 1788. Accord KRAMER, supra note 88, at 81, 284
n.45. It is unlikely that Madison read it before May 28 because he had stopped sharing drafts with
Hamilton after the early essays had been published. See BANNING, supra note 8, at 396 (concluding
from a review of Madison's writings that he and Hamilton had quickly "dispensed with their initial
practice of reading each other's essays before they went to press.").
238 See, e.g., Sherry, supra note 113, at 1153-54 (outlining Madison's belief during Convention that
Constitution would constitute a positively enacted form of fundamental law).
239 See, e.g., Wood, supra note 138, at 794 ("[In Federalist 78] Hamilton implied, and others drew
out the implication much more fully in subsequent years, that the judges, though not elected, resembled
the legislators and executives in being agents or servants of the people with a responsibility equal to
that of the other two branches of government to carry out the people's will, even to the point of sharing
in the making of law.").
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between the people and their elected representatives. Since the ultimate
source of authority and legitimacy in a democracy flowed from the people,
Hamilton's assertion that the judiciary stood closer to the people than the
legislature was antithetical to Madison's entire constitutional structure,
premised as it was on the belief that the American people would identify
most strongly with their elected representatives in the House. 240 In 1788,
Madison would have had great difficulty with the proposition that the
judiciary could (or should) occupy a superior place over the legislature in
the democratic hierarchy. 241 That was the type of structural error that
Madison had sought to avoid in the Virginia Plan with the Council of
Revision. If too many Americans viewed judicial review as illegitimate, as
Madison feared they would, the practical consequence would be that the
judiciary would have no functional capacity to correct congressional errors.
The state of Madison's thinking with respect to judicial review during
the critical period over the summer and fall of 1788 was revealed in a letter
he wrote in October of 1788. Just five months after Hamilton's Federalist
78, Madison drafted a letter regarding Jefferson's draft for a constitution
for the emerging state of Kentucky.242 In that correspondence, Madison
proposed that the Kentucky constitution provide both the executive and the
judiciary with an opportunity to veto legislation.243 This was essentially the
240 See, e.g., BANNING, supra note 8, at 398 ("Sensible conjecture can suggest, although it cannot
prove, that there were several topics on which Hamilton might well have made the other Publius
uneasy. Notwithstanding Hamilton's denials that it did have this effect, Madison may well have seen
his doctrine of judicial review (78:524-26 and 81:542-46) as implying 'a superiority of the judiciary to
the legislative power' in the construction of the Constitution (78:524). This was undeniably a prospect
that worried him at the time.").
241 Madison did not have to look far, or wait long, to confirm that other Americans shared precisely
these types of reservations regarding the legitimacy of judicial review. In Essay XV, Brutus criticized
the Constitution's scheme for judicial review:
The power of this court is in many cases superior to that of the legislature. I have
shewed [sic], in a former paper, that his court will be authorised to decide upon
the meaning of the constitution, and that, not only according to the natural and
ob[vious] meaning of the words, but also according to the spirit and intention of
it. In the exercise of this power they will not be subordinate to, but above the
legislature. For all the departments of this government will receive their powers,
so far as they are expressed in the constitution, from the people immediately,
who are the source of power.
"Brutus," supra note 233, at 440. In fact, Hamilton's Federalist 78 was in large part a response to this
essay by Brutus. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 88, at 79.242 James Madison, Observations on the "Draught of a Constitution for Virginia" (Oct. 15, 1788),
in 11 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 292-93.243 d
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same proposal Madison had made at the Convention on August 15, after
the Council had been rejected.244
Under Madison's proposal for Kentucky, the executive and judiciary
vetoes would be subject to varying override procedures depending upon
how the vetoes were exercised. In the event that the executive and the
judiciary were both in agreement that the legislation should be vetoed on
policy grounds, Madison proposed that the legislature should be allowed to
override the vetoes with a three-quarters supermajority of each House.2 45
In the event that the executive and the judiciary were in disagreement
about a policy veto, by contrast, Madison proposed that the legislature
should be allowed to override the veto with only a two-thirds
supermajority.246
In the event that the veto was based on constitutional grounds, Madison
believed that the procedure should be altered in order to make a legislative
override more difficult. When the veto was based on constitutional
grounds, by either the executive or the judiciary, Madison proposed that
the legislature be required to wait until a subsequent election before being
allowed to reconsider the veto. 247 It would then be allowed to override the
veto based on the same supermajority requirements as a policy veto (two-
thirds for one branch and three-fourths for both).248
Several aspects of this proposal shed light on the state of Madison's
thinking about judicial review as of October 1788. First, the proposal
demonstrates that Madison believed that the executive should have the
power to veto legislation on constitutional grounds. Here we discern his
commitment to the principle that the judiciary had no special prerogative
or claim with respect to constitutional interpretation. For Madison, the
people were the ultimate source of authority and legitimacy and therefore
ultimately responsible for defining the Constitution. 24 9 For this reason, the
244 See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text. In all likelihood, Madison still preferred the
Council structure to this system of separate vetoes but was proposing this variation to circumvent the
types of objections he had encountered at the Convention.
245 James Madison, Observations on the "Draught of a Constitution for Virginia" (Oct. 15, 1788),
in 11 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 293.
246 id247id
249 See THE FEDERALIST No. 49 (James Madison), supra note 60, at 348:
As the people are the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is from them that
the constitutional charter, under which the several branches of government hold
their power, is derived, it seems strictly consonant to the republican theory, to
recur to the same original authority, not only whenever it may be necessary to
enlarge, diminish, or new-model the powers of the government, but also
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executive and legislative branches were as qualified to decide issues of
constitutional interpretation as the judiciary. In fact, insofar as the
legislature was more closely tied to popular sentiment, it was the
legislative branch rather than the judicial branch that wielded the strongest
prerogative for constitutional interpretation. As a result, Madison persisted
in his belief that constitutional objections by the executive and judiciary
should be subject to an override by the legislative branch. As much as he
may have feared the House as the "vortex" of power, Madison was simply
not prepared to bestow either the executive or judicial branches with an
absolute veto over the legislative prerogative, even when such a veto was
asserted by both the executive and the judiciary on constitutional
grounds. 25 0 For Madison, that would amount to "disarming the Legislature
of its requisite authority." 251 Madison elaborated the point in the letter:
In the State Constitutions & indeed in the Fedl one also, no
provision is made for the case of a disagreement in
expounding them; and as the Courts are generally the last
in making their decision, it results to them, by refusing or
not refusing to execute a law, to stamp it with its final
character. This makes the Judiciary Dept paramount in fact
to the Legislature, which was never intended, and can
never be proper.252
Giving the judiciary an absolute veto over the legislature (as Federalist
78 seemed to do) threatened to destroy the symmetry and legitimacy of the
system as a whole. The qualified nature of Madison's veto would have
ensured its legitimacy within the constitutional structure because it
included an institutional mechanism whereby the people could assert the
final word on constitutional meaning through a supermajority of the
whenever any one of the departments may commit encroachments on the
chartered authorities of the others. .. . [A]nd how are the encroachments . .. to
by [sic] redressed, without an appeal to the people themselves, who, as the
grantors of the commission, can alone declare its true meaning, and enforce its
observance?
250 For Madison's references to the House of Representatives as a "vortex" of power, see supra
note 80 and supra note 121 and accompanying text.
251 See James Madison, Observations on the "Draught of a Constitution for Virginia" (Oct. 15,
1788), in 11 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 292-93 (stating that the revisionary power of
the executive and the judiciary could be implemented "without disarming the Legislature of its
requisite authority" provided the legislature retained the power to overturn the vetoes by a
supermajority and that when the legislature exercised its option to overturn the veto it should "not be
allowed the Judges or the Ex to pronounce a law thus enacted, unconstitul. & invalid").
252 Id. at 293.
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legislature. Rather than removing issues from the majoritarian process,
Madison's veto would have performed its critical function by, inter alia,
slowing down the legislative process, by interjecting opportunities for
additional debate and consideration, by threatening fragile coalitions, and
by requiring that controversial legislation command a supermajority of
support. 253
Madison's proposal for the Kentucky constitution of requiring an
intervening election before the Legislature could override the judicial veto
was ingenious. It provided a solution to the conundrum of what to do when
the various branches were in disagreement about constitutional meanings
because it invited the people to assert their primacy over the entire system
and break the tie between coordinate branches. The people were the
legitimate tiebreaker because only they stood above all three branches. An
intervening election allowed the people to weigh in on the controversy and
encouraged the various branches to make the election a plebiscite on the
constitutional controversy dividing the government.2 54
As with state legislation, therefore, Madison was doubtful that judicial
review could command sufficient legitimacy in the eyes of the people to be
an effective restraint on congressional legislation.255 In fact, the infirmity
of judicial review may have been more acute in the separation of powers
context than it was in the context of state legislation. In the federalism
context, Madison was willing to press for the congressional veto because
253 See supra notes 134-136 and accompanying text.
254 Even in this context, however, Madison desired that the popular will be mediated through the
refining filter of representation. In Federalist 49, Madison argued against the utilization of popular
conventions to resolve every constitutional disagreement between the branches. For one, such a device
would be destabilizing to the government. See THE FEDERALIST No. 49 (James Madison), supra note
60, at 349 ("[F]requent appeals would, in a great measure, deprive the government of that veneration
which time bestows on every thing....") In addition, Madison was loathe to rely on frequent appeals to
raw public sentiment. See id ("The danger of disturbing the public tranquility by interesting too
strongly the public passions, is a still more serious objection against a frequent reference of
constitutional questions to the decision of the whole society.").
255Madison's concerns in this regard were confirmed by Antifederalists such as Brutus, who
criticized the legitimacy ofjudicial review in the strongest terms possible:
I question whether the world ever saw, in any period of it, a court of justice
invested with such immense powers, and yet placed in a situation so little
responsible....
There is no power above them, to controul any of their decisions. There is no
authority that can remove them, and they cannot be controuled by the laws of the
legislature. In short, they are independent of the people, of the legislature, and of
every power under heaven. Men placed in this situation will generally soon feel
themselves independent of heaven itself.
"Brutus," supra note 233, at 438.
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he believed that the federal government had a broader claim to legitimacy
than the states. Madison was not prepared to accept the type of
nullification arguments that others like Thomas Jefferson and Spencer
Roane would later employ. 25 6 At least in theory, therefore, the Supreme
Court might have the authority to command the states by virtue of its
federal nature.257
In the separation of powers context, by contrast, the judiciary had no
claim over the other coordinate branches. Madison believed his proposal
for the Council of Revision had surmounted these concerns because it
represented the combined strength and prestige of two branches, because it
struck down bills before they became law, and because the Council's veto
could be overridden by a supermajority in Congress. Judicial review lacked
all of these crucial components of legitimacy. If there was a political
struggle between the House and the federal judiciary, Madison could not
see how the people would fail to vigorously support the branch with which
they most closely identified. The "vortex" of power that was the House
seemed poised to overwhelm judicial review under the new constitutional
structure, Hamilton's suggestion of judicial supremacy notwithstanding.
B. Madison's Initial Ambivalence toward the Bill ofRights
Prior to the Constitution, Madison had been generally supportive of
efforts to include declarations of rights at the state level. 2 58 He had been
particularly solicitous and successful in winning protections in Virginia for
the freedom of conscience.25 9 When proposals were first made for a federal
declaration of rights, however, Madison refused to lend his support. When
George Mason proposed at the Convention that a declaration of rights be
added to the Constitution, for example, Madison declined to support his
fellow Virginian's motion.2 60
256 See infra notes 322-324 and accompanying text.
257 See THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison), supra note 60, at 285 ("It is true that in
controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdiction [state and federal], the tribunal
which is ultimately to decide, is to be established under the general government.").
258 RAKOVE, supra note 59, at 15-16 (describing Madison's contribution to the religious freedom
provision in Virginia's Declaration of Rights of 1776).259 See, e.g., BANNING, supra note 8, at 84-104; KETCHAM, supra note 3, at 162-68.
260 See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 587-88 (Sept. 12). Mason's
motion was unanimously rejected by a vote of ten states to zero. See id. at 583, 588. It seems almost
certain that Madison voted against it. Both the Journal and Madison's notes record Virginia as having
voted against the measure. In addition to Mason, one of the other Virginia delegates, Edmund
Randolph, was strongly critical of the Constitution's lack of a bill of rights. See MAIER, supra note 11,
at 90 ("Like Mason and Gerry, Randolph wanted amendments adopted prior to ratification."). If
Randolph was present on September 12, therefore, Virginia only could have voted against the measure
if Washington, Blair, and Madison all opposed it. McClurg and Wythe were both absent by then. See
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Throughout the ratification period, furthermore, Madison continued to
oppose efforts to append a declaration of rights to the Constitution.26 1
Among his chief concerns at that time was his desire to stave off
antifederalist efforts to use the issue as leverage for a second constitutional
convention and to support federalist efforts to defeat conditional
ratifications in key states such as Massachusetts, New York, and
262
Virginia. Even after ratification had been safely secured, however,
Madison remained ambivalent about a federal bill of rights into the fall of
1788 and did not publicly support such proposals until the beginning of
1789.263 Madison's early reluctance to support proposals for a bill of rights
must be understood in the context of the ways in which judicial review
appeared inferior to the Council's veto.
The evolution of Madison's thought regarding a bill of rights can be
glimpsed in a letter he wrote to Thomas Jefferson in October of 1788 (the
same month he commented on the draft for the Kentucky constitution). In
this private correspondence with his close friend, Madison suggested that
he would be prepared to support certain proposals for a bill of rights out of
deference to those proponents whom he respected (such as Jefferson).26 4
He also stated, however, that he personally saw no significant advantage or
need for such proposals. "I have never thought the omission [of a bill of
rights] a material defect," Madison wrote, "nor been anxious to supply it
supra note I1. If Randolph was absent, by contrast, it is theoretically possible that Virginia could have
voted down the measure solely on the strength of Washington and Blair's votes but only ifMadison had
failed to support Mason by abstaining.
At least some of the delegates' opposition to Mason's motion may have been attributable to the
timing of the motion. The delegates had endured a trying ordeal throughout the summer of 1787 and
the Convention closed just five days later on September 17. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 641-49 (Sept. 15); BEEMAN, supra note 2, at 343-44 ("They were
desperately weary and hot in the stuffy Assembly Room and profoundly anxious to avoid anything that
would prolong the Convention. Although Mason had suggested that 'a bill might be prepared in a few
hours,' the delegates knew better.").
261 At the Virginia Ratifying Convention, Madison argued that a bill of rights could dangerously
imply greater powers for the federal government than were intended. See 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 233, at 1473, 1501-02 (Virginia Ratifying
Convention, June 24, 1788) ("If an enumeration be made of our rights, will it not be implied, that
everything omitted, is given to the General Government?").
262 See, e.g., MAIER, supra note I1, at 395-96 (regarding conditional ratification). For Madison's
opposition to a second convention, see Letter from James Madison to George Lee Turberville (Nov. 2,
1788), in I1 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 330-31.
263 See, e.g., BANNING, supra note 8, at 281 ("[I]t seems quite certain that until the fall of 1788,
Madison agreed with many other Federalists that a reservation of essential rights was inappropriate in a
federal Constitution and could, indeed, be positively dangerous to many of the liberties that its
proponents wanted to protect.").
264 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 4, at 297.
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even by subsequent amendment, for any other reason than that it is
anxiously desired by others."26 5
The letter to Jefferson suggests that Madison wished to support
proposals for a federal bill of rights but was struggling to find principled
reasons for such a course. Support for a bill of rights was strong in his
native Virginia, which meant not only that many of his most respected
friends were in favor of such proposals but also that it would be difficult
for Madison to gain election to the newly created Congress if he were
perceived to be against them.2 66 To a certain extent, therefore, the October
letter to Jefferson appears to have been an effort by Madison to work out
his own position on the subject rather than an effort to convince Jefferson
of any proposition (who was already steadfastly in favor of amendments).
While Madison failed to reach a definitive conclusion in the letter itself,
the thoughts contained in the letter strongly suggest that Madison was very
close in the fall of 1788 to a resolution of the key issues that most
perplexed him.
After expressing his initial ambivalence in the letter, Madison began his
discussion by articulating a number of arguments against a bill of rights.
Two of these arguments related to the federal government's relative
weakness within the constitutional scheme. Stripped of the congressional
veto, Madison believed that the Constitution had allocated too much
freedom to the states and it was therefore those entities that warranted the
most scrutiny under the new system. 26 7 A bill of rights was simply not as
necessary on the federal level, he argued, by virtue of the limited nature of
Congress' enumerated powers and by virtue of the states' abilities to rein
in the federal government. 268
The argument against a bill of rights that Madison articulated in greatest
detail, however, stemmed from his pessimism that a bill of rights could be
successfully implemented. Madison stated:
Repeated violations of these parchment barriers have been
committed by overbearing majorities in every State. In
Virginia I have seen the bill of rights violated in every
instance where it has been opposed to a popular current...
. Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is
265 id.
266 See infra note 333.
267 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 4, at 297.
268 id.
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the danger of oppression. In our Governments the real
power lies in the majority of the Community, and the
invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not
from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its
constituents, but from acts in which the Government is the
mere instrument of the major number of the Constituents. .
... Whereever there is an interest and power to do wrong,
wrong will generally be done, and not less readily by a
powerful & interested party than by a powerful and
interested prince. . . . [I]n a popular Government, the
political and physical power may be considered as vested
in the same hands, that is in a majority of the people, and,
consequently the tyrannical will of the Sovereign is not
[to] be controuled by the dread of an appeal to any other
force within the community. What use then it may be
asked can a bill of rights serve in popular Governments? 269
Here we see the connection between Madison's ambivalence toward the
bill of rights and his reservations about judicial review. How could the Bill
of Rights, in themselves mere "parchment barriers," serve to restrain the
majority when the American people were so unlikely to accept judicial
review as a constitutional practice? 270 Madison had difficulty believing that
a federal bill of rights could be successfully implemented and enforced in
light of the public's propensity to identify so closely with their elected
representatives in Congress.271 In a struggle between the judiciary and
Congress, it seemed inevitable that the people would vigorously support
the branch with which they most closely identified.2 72
Madison's pessimism regarding the legitimacy of judicial review not
only undermined his support for a bill of rights but also supplied an
affirmative argument against their adoption. There was "great reason to
269 Id. at 297-98.
270 See RAKOVE, supra note 8, at 314 (arguing that Madison failed to see the value of a bill of
rights "because he doubted whether any bill of rights, however carefully drawn or exhaustive, could
counter the real forces of republican politics").
271 See, e.g., Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49 STAN.
L. REv. 1031, 1060 (1997) ("Madison found it difficult to imagine how courts could withstand the
superior political power that legislators and voters wielded-whether or not it was finally proper for
judges to countermand the considered decisions of representative assemblies.").
272 See Harrington, supra note 132, at 88 ("Madison thought it unlikely that judges, either federal or
state, would have the political courage to stand up to efforts by the states to enlarge their powers.
Indeed, this same sort of pessimism was behind Madison's belief that a bill of rights was
unnecessary.").
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fear," Madison stated in his October letter, that a "positive declaration of
some of the most essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite
latitude."273 Jefferson argued in response that "half a loaf is better than no
bread."274 Madison, however, had perceived the possibility that a bill of
rights could actually prove counterproductive. In addition to his concern
that the articulation of the rights themselves might be unduly narrow,
Madison feared that the rights could be eviscerated through the process of
their interpretation. 275
There were at least two ways in which a bill of rights could prove
counterproductive as a result of the infirmities of judicial review. In the
event that judicial review lacked legitimacy in the eyes of the American
public, there was the distinct possibility that the judiciary would feel
compelled to capitulate to Congress in controversial cases. A bill of rights
could then prove counterproductive if the judicial capitulation constituted a
precedent that invited still further encroachment by Congress.2 76 Under this
scenario, it might be better not to commit the rights to writing at all
because the absence of a definitive interpretation by the courts might help
preserve the ability of others to argue for more expansive interpretations of
the rights in the future.
Similarly, a bold effort by the judiciary to restrain Congress could prove
equally counterproductive. The people's propensity to support their
legislators might empower Congress to disregard judicial rulings in
controversial cases. As with judicial capitulation, therefore, the likely
practical result would be an institutional narrowing of rights. Madison
summarized the point towards the end of his letter to Jefferson:
Supposing a bill of rights to be proper the articles which
ought to compose it, admit of much discussion. I am
inclined to think that absolute restrictions in cases that are
273 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in II PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 4, at 297.
274 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), in 12 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 4, at 14.275 See, e.g., Rakove, supra note 61, at 264 ("An enumeration of rights, [Madison] feared, would
prove far more effective in limiting the judicial protection of rights than an enumeration of legislative
powers would in preventing their violation. . . . The enumeration of rights, in other words, might prove
restrictive in a way or to an extent that the enumeration of legislative powers could not.").
276 This concern was particularly germane when set against the backdrop of British
constitutionalism, where practice and tradition were central elements in defining constitutional norms.
See, e.g., Sherry, supra note 113, at 1131 ("[E]arly American revolutionaries stressed that acquiescence
to abhorrent Parliamentary actions was dangerous precisely because it threatened to ratify such actions
as consistent with or part of fundamental law.").
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doubtful, or where emergencies may overrule them, ought
to be avoided. The restrictions however strongly marked
on paper will never be regarded when opposed to the
decided sense of the public, and after repeated violations
in extraordinary cases they will lose even their ordinary
efficacy.27 7
Under either scenario that Madison thought likely under judicial review,
therefore, the end result could be a counterproductive narrowing of the
meaning of the very rights that the amendments were intended to preserve.
While he articulated a potential danger that seemed to escape
Jefferson's blithe disposition, Madison's October 1788 letter was not so
much an attempt to dissuade his friend of the propriety of a bill of rights as
it was an effort by Madison to work out his own position. As a result,
Madison followed his discussion of the disadvantages of a bill of rights
with an exploration of their potential benefits. In response to his own query
whether a bill of rights could possibly serve a legitimate purpose in
democracies, he offered two possible answers. The first potential benefit
was the possibility that "[t]he political truths declared in that solemn
manner acquire by degrees the character of fundamental maxims of free
Government, and as they become incorporated with the national sentiment,
counteract the impulses of interest and passion." 27 8 The second benefit he
articulated accrued in those occasions (which Madison thought would be
rare) where a duly elected government usurped its role and consciously
acted contrary to the best interests of the majority. 2 79 In that event,
Madison argued, "a bill of rights will be a good ground for an appeal to the
sense of the community." 280
Conspicuously absent from his discussion of the putative benefits of a
bill of rights was any reference to judicial review. Jefferson pointed out
this deficiency in the return letter he penned in March of 1789,281 but it is
easy to understand why Madison chose to omit the prospect of judicial
277 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in II PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 4, at 299.
278 Id at 298-99.
279 Id at 299.2
sd
281 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), in 12 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 4, at 13 ("In the arguments in favor of a declaration of rights, you omit one
which has great weight with me, the legal check which it puts into the hands of the judiciary.").
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review from his October letter. Madison was as committed as anyone to
the idea of equipping the judiciary with a form of veto over Congress. He
had labored for months at the Convention to convince the other delegates
to accept a judicial veto in the form of the Council of Revision. As of
October 1788, however, he was having difficulty seeing how a bill of
rights could be implemented successfully in light of the infirmities of
judicial review. He had read Hamilton's Federalist 78 a few months prior
and it had failed to persuade him.
As a result, Madison's focus on the potential benefits for a bill of rights
was initially limited to the ways in which he believed a bill of rights could
directly affect the American public. Madison undoubtedly found this point
insufficient in itself to persuade him of the need for a bill of rights.
Madison had been driven to the Philadelphia Convention out of a profound
concern about the ability and willingness of majorities to govern
responsibly without the interceding influence and direction of well-chosen
leaders.2 83 It is difficult to believe that his apprehensions on this point
could be so easily assuaged by a bill of rights that he repeatedly referred to
as mere "parchment barriers." 284 It is the contention of this article,
however, that Madison's remarks about the bill of rights in his October
letter to Jefferson signaled an impending shift in his thinking about judicial
review. It is the further contention of this article that this shift in his
perspective played a pivotal role in his decision to advocate for a federal
bill of rights the next year.
C. Madison's Conversion
1. Parchment Barriers to Guardians in a Peculiar Manner
According to his October 1788 letter to Jefferson, the redeeming virtues
of a bill of rights derived from the effect such a document could have on
the American people themselves. The values and norms expressed in a bill
of rights, he stated, could "become incorporated with the national
sentiment" and could inform and inspire "the sense of the community."2 85
This was a crucial observation with seemingly inevitable consequences
282 Rakove, supra note 201, at 1531 ("That Madison could in fact omit an argument that modem
commentators would place high if not indeed atop their accounts of the functions of a bill of rights is,
of course, the key point in itself, for it confirms how little faith Madison placed in the efficacy of
judicial power.").
283 See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
284 See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
285 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 4, at 299.
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under Madison's political philosophy. For Madison, as we have seen, the
political legitimacy of the constitutional structure flowed from its
connection to the people.2 86 The House of Representatives was the fulcrum
that lent legitimacy to his entire constitutional structure by virtue of the
ways in which the people identified with that body. The other branches
were further removed from popular sentiment in order to add additional
opportunities for deliberation and leadership to the governing process. The
fact that the executive and the judiciary were further removed from the
people, however, ultimately required that their position in the
constitutional structure be subservient to the House.28 7 That fact accounts
for the qualified nature of the Council's veto. Madison must have objected
to Hamilton's vision of judicial review in Federalist 78 because it
appeared to invert the natural order of the constitutional structure by
making the House subservient to the judiciary.288 That was not only a
theoretical problem but a practical one as well, since Madison perceived
little likelihood that the American people would accept such an
arrangement.289
Madison's realization that a bill of rights could directly affect the
people, however, provided the basis for a significant shift in Madison's
thinking about judicial review. Insofar as a bill of rights became
"incorporated with the national sentiment," it could constitute an additional
source of legitimacy for the institution most connected to it: the judiciary.
To the extent that the people personally identified with the rights embodied
in a bill of rights, it was possible that they could come to identify more
strongly, and more directly, with the judiciary whose constitutional task it
was to assert and defend those rights. In other words, a bill of rights had
the potential to foster and institutionalize a direct political connection
between the people and the judiciary that could augment the existing
indirect connection derived from the appointment process. 2 90 The power of
286 See supra notes 75-136 and accompanying text.
287 The fact that the Virginia Plan provided for the appointment of the judiciary and the executive
by Congress helps illustrate how Congress (particularly the House) served as the fulcrum of the
structure and how the judicial and executive roles were ultimately subservient to the House. See supra
notes 150-153 and accompanying text.
288 See supra notes 240-253 and accompanying text.
289 See supra notes 130-133 and accompanying text.
290 See Wood, supra note 138, at 793 ("The sources of something as significant and forbidding as
judicial review never could lie in the accumulation of a few sporadic judicial precedents, or even in the
decision of Marbury v. Madison, but had to flow from fundamental changes taking place in the
Americans' ideas of government and law.... Perhaps the most crucial of these changes involved
reducing the representative character of the people's agents in the legislatures and enhancing the
representative character ofjudges.").
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a bill of rights to become incorporated into a national consensus, therefore,
helped provide the answer to Madison's perplexing question about why the
people would ever countenance a check from the judiciary that lacked an
institutional mechanism for override.
It is the contention of this article that Madison proposed the Bill of
Rights precisely because he hoped that it would help create and
institutionalize a connection between the people and the judiciary that
would approximate and approach (although probably never equal) the
ways in which the people identified with Congress (particularly the
House).291 In fact, a direct connection between the judiciary and the people
could provide an avenue by which the judiciary could escape its entirely
subordinate role in the constitutional structure. It would have been natural
for Madison to think in such representational terms about the judiciary
because the judiciary's intended function on the Council had been
fundamentally political.
In his letter to Jefferson in October of 1788, Madison failed to spell out
the ramifications of his observations with respect to judicial review. Quite
likely he had not yet fully grasped those ramifications. But his intuition
about the capacity of a bill of rights to be incorporated into the public
sentiment was a watershed statement with inevitable consequences under
his political philosophy.
Less than three months after his letter to Jefferson, Madison publicly
expressed his support for a bill of rights. 29 2 When he arrived in the House
of Representatives a few months later, he announced his intention to
submit a bill of rights for Congress' consideration. 2 9 3 On June 8, 1789, he
introduced nineteen proposed alterations and additions for the House's
consideration.2 94 Madison's statements to the House when he introduced
291 That is not to say that this was the only reason Madison advocated for the Bill of Rights in 1789.
Undoubtedly Madison perceived strategic advantages to their passage that may have contributed to his
desire to propose them in Congress. See infra notes 332-335 and accompanying text.
292 On January 2, 1789, for example, Madison wrote a letter to a prominent Baptist minister in his
House district which expressed his willingness to support a federal bill of rights. Letter from James
Madison to George Eve (Jan. 2, 1789), in 11 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 404 ("The
Constitution is established on the ratifications of eleven States and a very great majority of the people
of America; and amendments, if pursued with a proper moderation and in a proper mode, will be not
only safe, but may serve the double purpose of satisfying the minds of well meaning opponents, and of
providing additional guards in favour of liberty."). Accord KETCHAM, supra note 3, at 276 (describing
Eve as an "influential Baptist preacher"). For a discussion of Madison's other public statements in
support of a federal bill of rights in the months leading up to his House election, see id.
293 On May 4, 1789, Madison announced his intention to introduce a bill of rights later in that
month. See 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 391-92 (Charlene Bangs
Bickford et al. eds., 2004).
294 See 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 811 (Charlene Bangs
Bickford et al. eds., 2004).
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the amendments suggest that his position with respect to judicial review
and the bill of rights had evolved significantly since the prior year.
Madison began his June 8 statement with a summary of the weaknesses
of the constitutional structure as it had emerged from Philadelphia.29 5 The
statements reveal Madison's continued belief that the rejection of the
Council of Revision had thrown his constitutional structure out of balance
by providing Congress too much power:
In our government it is, perhaps, less necessary to guard
against the abuse in the executive department than any
other; because it is not the stronger branch of the system,
but the weaker: It therefore must be levelled against the
legislative, for it is the most powerful, and most likely to
be abused, because it is under the least control; hence, so
far as a declaration of rights can tend to prevent the
exercise of undue power, it cannot be doubted but such
declaration is proper.296
The deficiency of the executive veto, Madison made sure to point out, was
a consequence of the Convention's decision to reject his Council of
Revision.297 To the end of his days, Madison likely believed in the
superiority of the Council over judicial review.
Madison then clarified that the legislative branch was the most to be
feared not because it was the most likely to deviate from public sentiment
but rather because it was likely to reflect it closely:
The prescriptions in favor of liberty, ought to be levelled
against that quarter where the greatest danger lies, namely,
that which possesses the highest prerogative of power: But
this [is] not found in either the executive or legislative
departments of government, but in the body of the people,
operating by the majority against the minority. 2 98
Majorities were destined to control the legislative branch and the
legislative branch seemed destined to reflect the majority will, to the
295 See 12 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 199.
296 Id at 204.
297 Id at 199 ("There have been objections of various kinds made against the constitution: Some
were levelled against its structure, because the president was without a council .... ")
298 Id at 204.
[Vol.27:459532
Lessons from a Lost Constitution
detriment of the nation as a whole when the majority clamored for
shortsighted or irrational legislation.
Madison continued by reiterating the fundamental logic contained in his
letter to Jefferson from the prior year.299 The key to a bill of rights derived
from the possibility that the values and norms expressed in such a
document might actually become incorporated into the national sentiment:
It may be thought all paper barriers against the power of
the community are too weak to be worthy of attention. I
am sensible they are not so strong as to satisfy gentlemen
of every description who have seen and examined
thoroughly the texture of such a defence; yet, as they have
a tendency to impress some degree of respect for them, to
establish the public opinion in their favor, and rouse.the
attention of the whole community, it may be one mean to
controul the majority from those acts they might be
otherwise inclined.oo
For Madison, the value of a bill of rights did not derive from its creation
of a set of enforceable rights in the positivist sense. Instead, the value of a
bill of rights derived from the document's capacity to create a consensus
among the American people about their defining values, norms, and
principles. In this respect, Madison's speech in June of 1789 mirrored the
letter to Jefferson he had written the prior October. But then Madison went
on to articulate the natural consequence of his logic with respect to judicial
review:
It has been said, that it is unnecessary to load the
constitution with this provision, because it was not found
effectual in the constitution of the particular states. It is
true, there are a few particular states in which some of the
most valuable articles have not, at one time or other, been
violated; but does it not follow but they may have, to a
certain degree, a salutary effect against the abuse of power.
If they are incorporated into the constitution, independent
tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar
manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an
299 See supra text accompanying note 278.
300 i
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impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power
in the legislative or executive; they will be naturally led to
resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated
for in the constitution by the declaration of rights.30 '
These remarks would appear to reflect a significant shift in Madison's
thinking regarding judicial review. Conspicuously absent was the
pessimism that had pervaded his outlook regarding judicial review just
eight months before. If a bill of rights could inspire a consensus among the
American people regarding their fundamental values, he appeared to
reason, it could empower the judiciary to restrain Congress in the way that
the Council of Revision had been originally intended.302 As the self-
conscious "guardians" of the American people's fundamental values, the
judiciary could enjoy a source of legitimacy that would approach and rival,
if never fully equal, that of Congress. 30 3 By June of 1789, therefore,
Madison seemed prepared to believe (or hope) that a bill of rights could
help provide judicial review with the type of legitimacy that could restore
balance to the constitutional structure; a balance he had previously
believed, just eight months before, had been permanently lost with the
rejection of the Council of Revision.
The modem tendency to treat the Bill of Rights as a positivist creation
of rights had little allure for Madison. To conceive of the Bill of Rights in
such terms would relegate them to mere "parchment barriers" that enjoyed
little or no chance of successful implementation. The capacity of a bill of
rights to foster a consensus within the American people was the principal
benefit for Madison because that consensus that could forge a direct
connection between the judiciary and the people.304
30 Id. at 206-07.
302 There was also the possibility that such a consensus of norms and values could directly
influence Congress by virtue of the American public's control over that body, but it is unlikely that
Madison was very optimistic about such a prospect in 1789. See supra text accompanying notes 283-
284.
303 See, e.g., WOOD, THE IDEA OF AMERICA, supra note 37, at 185-86 ("When, in order to justify
judicial review, Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No. 78 referred to judges as agents of the people
and not really inferior to the people's other agents in the legislature, he opened up a radically new way
of thinking of the judiciary. . . . Conceiving of judges as just another one of their agents perhaps helps
explain why Americans eventually became so accepting of judicial review ....").
304 Legal historian William Nelson argues that this was the approach ultimately employed by the
Marshall Court. See NELSON, supra note 138, at 59 ("[T]he foundation of Marshall's constitutional
jurisprudence is the distinction between political matters, to be resolved by the legislative and executive
branches in the new democratic, majoritarian style, and legal matters, to be resolved by the judiciary in
the govemment-by-consensus style that had prevailed in most eighteenth century American courts.").
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The fact that the Bill of Rights was intended to foster and reflect a
consensus among Americans is consistent with the fact that they were
drafted in the broad, political language of natural rights. All of the Bill of
Rights 305 can be traced back to Madison's proposal of June 8.306 One of
the amendments that Madison proposed, for example, read:
The rights of the people to be secured in their persons,
their houses, their papers, and their property from all
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
by warrants issued without probably cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, or not particularly describing the
places to be searched, or the persons or things to be
seized.307
With very slight alteration, this proposal was subsequently adopted as the
Fourth Amendment. 3 08 Similarly, his proposal that "No soldier shall in
time of peace be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner;
nor at any time, but in a manner warranted by law" became the basis for
the Third Amendment with very slight changes.309 Madison's proposal for
305 The vast majority of additions and alterations that Madison proposed concerned individual
rights. In addition to proposing a series individual rights, Madison's proposals included a slight
alteration to the required population ratio for representatives, a limitation on the ability of members of
Congress to alter their own salaries during the same session (which was ultimately was ratified in 1992,
in slightly altered form, as the Twenty-Seventh Amendment), a precursor to the Tenth Amendment that
sought to clarify that federal powers were delegated by the states, a requirement for the strict separation
of powers, and a preamble of sorts that included a declaration of general principles self-consciously
modeled after the Declaration of Independence. See 12 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at
196-207.
306 See RAKOVE, supra note 8, at 331 ("[T]he amendments [Congress] eventually submitted to the
states in September 1789 followed closely the proposals [Madison] introduced in June."). In fact, the
similarities include the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. With respect to the Ninth Amendment,
Madison's original language proposed: "The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in
favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights
retained by the people; or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the constitution; but either as actual
limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution." 12 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON,
supra note 4, at 201-02. For the Tenth Amendment, Madison proposed: "The powers not delegated by
this constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the States respectively." Id. at 202.
This language largely tracks the ultimate language of the amendments, with the notable exception that
"or to the people" was added at the end of the Tenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend X ("The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.") (emphasis added).
307 See 12 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 201.
308 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
309 Compare 12 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 201, with U.S. CONST. amend. III
("No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in
time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.").
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the Second Amendment varied little from the final version although
Madison couched the need for militias in terms of the "country's" freedom
rather than the "State's" and would have included a specific provision
relieving conscientious objectors from military service. 3 10 The Fifth and
Seventh Amendments represented compilations of Madison's proposals
but contained only slight variations from Madison's original proposals and
the Eighth Amendment was derived from his June 8 proposals without any
alteration."' The only two amendments which contain significant
variations from Madison's original language are the First and Sixth
Amendments, but even here the final versions retained Madison's
preference for natural rights language.312
310 Compare 12 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 201 ("The right of the people to keep
and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed, and well regulated militia being the best security of
a free country: but not person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render
military service in person."), with U.S. CONST. amend. 11 ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.").
3" One of Madison's proposals protected an individual's right to a civil jury, while a different
proposal protected the factual findings ofjuries (both criminal and civil) from appellate review. See 12
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 202. These two protections were combined into the
Seventh Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. Under Madison's proposals, there would have been a
general monetary floor for all appeals to federal court. See 12 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note
4, at 202. The Seventh Amendment, by contrast, imposed a twenty dollar requirement for an
individual's right to a civil jury but dropped the requirement for appeals. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
With respect to the Fifth Amendment, Madison's proposal would have protected an individual from
double jeopardy in cases other than impeachment. See 12 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at
201. The Fifth Amendment, as ultimately adopted, did not carve out impeachment as an exception and
limited the double jeopardy protections to cases involving "life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend V. The
Fifth Amendment, furthermore, specifically limited the protection against self-incrimination to criminal
cases. Id Madison's proposed protection against self-incrimination arguably applied to civil cases as
well. See 12 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 201 ("No person shall be subject, except in
cases of impeachment, to more than one punishment, or one trial of the same offence; nor shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself .... ). For the Eighth Amendment, compare 12 PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 201 ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."), with U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
312 In the context of criminal jury trials, Madison would have required a "jury of freeholders of the
vicinage" whereas the Sixth Amendment ultimately required simply that the jury be drawn from "the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." Compare 12 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 4, at 202, with U.S. CONST. amend VI. Madison's proposal, furthermore, would
have explicitly required that criminal juries be unanimous, that defendants would have a "right [to]
challenge" the jury, and that the juries would possess "other accustomed requisites." 12 PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 202. None of these additional requirements were incorporated in the
Sixth Amendment as it was ultimately adopted, leaving open the question of whether the ratifiers were
consciously subjecting those aspects of the criminal jury to modification. U.S. CONST. amend VI. The
Supreme Court grappled with the Sixth Amendments requirements regarding unanimity in Apodaca v.
Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), where a plurality decision found that the Sixth Amendment does not
require unanimity with respect to trials in state court but refused to overturn prior case law finding that
the Sixth Amendment implied a unanimity requirement in federal trials.
With respect to the First Amendment, Madison's original draft would have required: "The civil
rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national
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2. The Middle Course between Judicial Review and Judicial Supremacy
In Federalist 78, Hamilton argued that the judiciary could function as
"an intermediate body between the people and the legislature." 3 13 It is
unlikely that Madison ever accepted the proposition that the judiciary
could occupy a place in the constitutional structure that was superior to the
legislature. Madison likely believed that there were limits to how much the
American public would ever identify with an unelected body with life
tenure and that such limits would always serve to restrain the judiciary's
role within the constitutional structure. While he undoubtedly hoped that
the judiciary would enjoy sufficient legitimacy to restrain Congress in a
meaningful way, he likely assumed as a practical matter that the judiciary
would never enjoy much more than the type of qualified veto intended for
the Council of Revision. Where a determined supermajority of the
legislature was intent on a particular course of action, Madison probably
believed (at least in 1789) that the judiciary would be essentially powerless
to stop such actions even when purporting to act pursuant to the Bill of
Rights.
Over the course of his life, Madison did become increasingly confident
in the judiciary's ability to elicit the respect and attachments of the
American public. Some fifty years after the Constitutional Convention, just
before he died, Madison sounded his most confident note in the strength of
the judicial mandate:
It is the Judicial department in which questions of
constitutionality, as well as of legality, generally find their
ultimate discussion and operative decision: and the public
deference to and confidence in the judgment of the body
are peculiarly inspired by the qualities implied in its
members; by the gravity and deliberations of their
proceedings; and by the advantage their plurality gives
them over the unity of the Executive department, and their
fewness over the multitudinous composition of the
Legislative department.
religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any
pretext infringed." 12 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 201.
313 See supra text accompanying note 236.
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Without losing sight, therefore, of the co-ordinate
relations of the three departments to each other, it may
always be expected that the judicial bench, when happily
filled, will, for the reasons suggested, most engage the
respect and reliance of the public as the surest expositor of
the Constitution, as well in questions within its cognizance
concerning the boundaries between the several
departments of the Governments as in those between the
Union and its members.3 14
Here we see a loud echo of Madison's June 1789 statement regarding
the public's capacity to identify with the judiciary as the "guardians" of
their fundamental values.315 It is interesting to speculate how far he had
come to believe the public's "deference and confidence" to the judiciary
could extend. 1 When Madison stated that the judiciary would "most
engage the respect and reliance of the public," had he come to believe by
the end of his life that the judiciary could equal or surpass the legislature in
terms of their institutional claims to constitutional interpretation?317 If so,
did he believe that such a state of affairs was consistent with the principles
of democratic governance underlying his constitutional theory?
Such questions are difficult to answer with any conviction. In the same
writing quoted above, Madison emphasized that he continued to reject the
notion of judicial supremacy as a theoretical matter (at least with respect to
Congress):
As the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial departments of
the United States are co-ordinate, and each equally bound
314 Letter from James Madison to unknown (1836), THE JAMES MADISON PAPERS AT THE LIBRARY
OF CONGRESS, available at http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/mjm.24_1078 1079.
315 For Madison's statements in June of 1789 when he introduced his amendments, see supra notes
295-301 and accompanying text.
316 Although they were generally adversaries and Madison was frequently at odds with his rulings,
it is interesting to speculate whether Madison's later optimism in the judiciary's standing could have
been attributable, at least to some degree, to John Marshall's largely successful tenure as Chief Justice
from 1801 to 1835. For a useful summary of Marshall's career as Chief Justice, see generally CHARLES
F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF LAW (1996). For
Madison's views regarding some of Marshall's more important rulings, see MCCOY, supra note 134, at
68-70, 99-103.
3" In this respect, it is possible that Madison drew a distinction between the federalism and
separation of powers contexts. See supra notes 255-257 and accompanying text. Madison's criticisms
of judicial supremacy often occurred in the separation of powers context while his later defenses of
judicial review most often occurred in the federalism context. See infra notes 318-324 and
accompanying text.
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to support the Constitution, it follows that each must, in
the exercise of its functions, be guided by the text of the
Constitution according to its own interpretation of it; and,
consequently, that in the event of irreconcilable
interpretations, the prevalence of the one or the other
department must depend on the nature of the case, as
receiving its final decision from the one or the other, and
passing from that decision into effect, without involving
the functions of any other.318
It seems, therefore, that Madison was committed to the very end of his
life to charting a middle course between judicial review and judicial
supremacy. 319 As a result, he was never reluctant to criticize judicial
rulings that he believed were mistaken. As Secretary of State in Marbury v.
Madison,32 0 he even appeared prepared to flout a Supreme Court ruling
that he was convinced would be wrong.3 2 1 By the same token, however,
Madison always seemed to stop short when the criticisms of the judiciary
were directed at the legitimacy of judicial review itself. 3 22 In a letter to
Jefferson in 1823, he stated:
318 id.
319 See, e.g., Wood, supra note 138, at 796 ("Both Jefferson and Madison remained convinced to
the end of their lives that all parts of America's governments had equal authority to interpret the
fundamental law of the Constitution...."). In fact, one of Madison's most vigorous renunciations of
judicial supremacy came during the very same month he introduced the Bill of Rights, in the context of
a congressional debate regarding the executive power over the removal of federal officers:
I acknowledge, in the ordinary course of government, that the exposition of the
laws and constitution devolves upon the judicial. But, I beg to know, upon what
principle it can be contended that any one department draws from the
constitution greater powers than another, in marking out the limits of the powers
of the several departments. The constitution is the charter of the people to the
government; it specifies certain great powers as absolutely granted, and marks
out the departments to exercise them. If the constitutional boundary of either be
brought into question, I do not see that any one of these independent departments
has more right than another to declare their sentiments on that point.
12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 238 (June 17, 1789).
320 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
321 As the official defendant, Madison failed to appear before the Court and did little to defend the
case. See, e.g., JAMES F. SIMON, WHAT KIND OF NATION: THOMAS JEFFERSON, JOHN MARSHALL, AND
THE EPic STRUGGLE TO CREATE A UNITED STATES 177-79 (2002). Had Marshall ordered Madison to
deliver the commissions, in all likelihood, Madison would have ignored the order. See, e.g., id. at 183
("No matter how erudite an opinion demanding that Jefferson's secretary of state deliver the
commissions might be, the likelihood that the president and his secretary would bow to the Court's
dictate was remote.").
322 This was particularly true with respect to federalism, the context in which Madison offered his
strongest defenses of judicial review. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Edward Everett (Aug. 28,
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I am not unaware that the Judiciary career has not
corresponded with what was anticipated. At one period the
Judges perverted the Bench of Justice into a rostrum for
partizan harangues. And latterly the Court, by some of its
decisions, still more by extrajudicial reasonings & dicta,
has manifested a propensity to enlarge the general
authority in derogation of the local, and to amplify its own
jurisdiction, which has justly incurred the public censure.
323But the abuse of a trust does not disprove its existence.
Even in the context of the Virginia Resolves, when Madison was perhaps
at the height of his criticism of the federal judiciary, he was careful to
avoid the type of fundamental attacks upon the legitimacy of judicial
review that Jefferson wished to include. 32 4
In summary, there is no reason to think that Madison ever relented in
his belief that the Council of Revision was superior to judicial review. In
terms of theoretical purity, the Council of Revision was free of the internal
contradictions and limitations that plagued judicial review. As in so many
other respects, however, Madison proved to be a pragmatist with respect to
judicial review and the Bill of Rights. Ultimately, he was willing to adapt
to a theoretically flawed paradigm in the hope and confidence that it could
be made to function correctly in the real world. A bill of rights could
elevate the political legitimacy of the judiciary and thereby enable it to
perform, albeit much less elegantly, the essential function he had hoped the
Council of Revision would perform under his preferred constitutional
structure.
1830) (published in North American Review), reprinted in JAMES MADISON'S WRITINGS 847 (Jack N.
Rakove ed., 1999) ("Those who have denied or doubted the supremacy of the judicial power of the U.S.
& denounce at the same time nullifying power in a State, seem not to have sufficiently adverted to the
utter inefficiency of a supremacy in a law of the land, without a supremacy in the exposition &
execution of the law...."); see also McCoy, supra note 134, at 130-51 (describing Madison's defense
ofjudicial review in the context of the Nullification Crisis of the 1830s).
323 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 27, 1823), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 142-43 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1900-19 10).
324 See BANNING, supra note 8, at 388 ("Madison was similarly cautious in his draft of resolutions
for Virginia, which also called on the other states to concur in declaring that the acts in question were
'unconstitutional,' but which did not add that they were 'not law, but utterly null, void, and of no force
or effect.' Madison, indeed, was possibly, although not certainly, responsible for checking an attempt
by Jefferson to have the latter phrase inserted in his text."); McCoy, supra note 134, at 145
("Apparently Madison, in 1798, did not see Jefferson's draft before it was on the wing to Kentucky ...
but once he did, he lost no time alerting Jefferson to the errors and dangers in his logic. Above all,
Madison rejected any hint of the notion that the Constitution conferred upon each state legislature the
power to act within its borders against federal laws that it judged unconstitutional.").
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In terms of the compatibility of judicial review with the fundamental
tenets of democracy, Madison likely trusted that the practical limits of the
judiciary's legitimacy would ultimately consign it to its proper place within
the constitutional framework. What he viewed as that "proper place" by the
end of his life is difficult to say. What does seem clear is that, when
occupied with the task of constructing a government in the late 1780s and
early 1790s, he was prepared to prioritize practical solutions over
theoretical objections. In fact, his adaptation to judicial review as a
replacement for the.Council of Revision was reminiscent of the manner in
which he had adopted the Council of Revision in the first place. In both
contexts, he discarded formalist conceptions of separation of powers in
favor of a device that he believed could, as a practical matter, lend balance
to the structure as a whole. 3 25
3. The Timing of Madison's Evolution
It is clear that Madison's position regarding judicial review changed
dramatically over time. Immediately after the Convention, he harbored
326 i iprofound doubts about its efficacy. Later in his life, he expressed
profound confidence in the judiciary's capacity to "most engage the respect
and reliance of the public as the surest expositor of the Constitution."m
We will never be able to pinpoint the precise timing of the evolution in his
thought.328 Most scholars have speculated that it was a slow process and
that he did not come to genuinely. espouse judicial review until well after
he had proposed the Bill of Rights. 32 9 According to this view, Madison was
merely feigning confidence in his June 8 speech before the House of
Representatives when he expressed optimism about the utility of the bill of
rights and the prospects of judicial review.330 With respect to his June 8
contention that a bill of rights could lead the American public to identify
directly with the work of the judiciary as the "guardians" of their rights, for
example, many scholars have suggested that Madison essentially parroted
325 See supra notes 180-189 and accompanying text.
326 See supra notes 235-257 and accompanying text.
327 See supra text accompanying note 314.
328 See, e.g., Rakove, supra note 61, at 257 (observing "the difficulty, if not the absurdity," of
"attempting to freeze a moment of historical time as the point when [Madison] possessed a true original
understanding of exactly how the Constitution was to protect rights").
329 Those espousing this view include the most eminent Madison scholars. See, e.g., Rakove, supra
note 122, at 501 ("Political calculations, not a fundamental change of opinion, were what led [Madison]
by late 1788 to accede to the idea that a bill of rights could be safely added to the Constitution so long
as no door was thereby opened for more substantive or structural amendments.").
330 See, e.g., Finkelman, supra note 17, at 302-03 ("Madison, even as he introduced the Bill of
Rights in the Congress, had little faith in the value of what he derisively called 'parchment barriers."').
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the proposition from a letter he had recently received from Thomas
Jefferson.331
It is the contention of this article that the evolution of Madison's
thought occurred much more quickly, and that the shift in his perspective
began to take place as early as October of 1788. It is the further contention
of this article that this shift in his views regarding judicial review helps
account for the relatively sudden change in his position with respect to the
Bill of Rights. In fact, Madison's views toward judicial review and the Bill
of Rights seemed to be linked together in a symbiotic way. Madison's
desire for some type of judicial veto over congressional action, like the one
he had lost with the Council of Revision, led Madison to actively seek out
a way to legitimize judicial review. Madison's belief that a bill of rights
could be instrumental in legitimating judicial review paved the way for his
support of the Bill of Rights.
Those scholars who are not convinced that Madison had come to
believe in the utility of the Bill of Rights by June of 1789 have emphasized
(in this author's view, overemphasized) Madison's strategic purposes for
introducing the amendments in Congress. 3 32 These scholars point to the
fact that Madison's support for a bill of rights helped him secure election
in the closely contested battle for his first House seat. Some have also
3' ANDREW BURSTEIN & NANCY ISENBERG, MADISON AND JEFFERSON 196-97 (2010)
("[Jefferson] did not, as some have suggested, convince Madison to support a bill of rights.... As a
result of their correspondence, [Madison] inserted Jefferson's concern with judicial review into a
speech before Congress."); Rakove, supra note 201, at 1531-32 (2002) ("Madison dutifully
incorporated Jefferson's reminder in his speech of June 8, 1789, introducing his proposed amendments
to the House of Representatives."). It is interesting to note that Madison did not receive Jefferson's
letter until after he had announced to his constituents in January 1789 that he would support a bill of
rights and after he had announced to Congress on May 4 that he intended to introduce amendments. See
supra note 293; MAIER, supra note I1, at 445 (observing that Jefferson's reply letter, dated March 15,
1789, did not reach Madison until late May).
332 See, e.g., Kenneth R. Bowling, "A Tub to the Whale": The Founding Father and Adoption of
the Federal Bill of Rights, 8 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 223, 224 (1988) (arguing that "practical political
concerns were [Madison's] primary motivation" for proposing the amendments that became the Bill of
Rights); Finkelman, supra note 17, at 345-46 (arguing that Madison's support of the Bill of Rights was
"fundamentally political" and that "[t]o the end Madison was uncertain about the value of a bill of
rights").
333 See e.g., RICHARD LABUNSKI, JAMES MADISON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BILL OF RIGHTS
158-77 (2006); Arthur E. Wilmarth, The Original Purpose ofthe Bill ofRights: James Madison and the
Founders' Search for a Workable Balance Between Federal and State Power, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1261, 1264 (1989) ("Madison sponsored the Bill of Rights in the First Federal Congress both to
persuade moderate Antifederalists to accept the Constitution, and to fulfill his own campaign pledge.").
Some of Madison's (less charitable) contemporaries ascribed his support for the amendments to his
experiences in the recent election. See Letter from Robert Morris to Francis Hopkinson (Aug. 15,
1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL
CONGRESS 278 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) ("[P]oor Madison got so Cursedly frightened in
Virginia that I believe he has dreamed of amendments ever since.").
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argued that Madison intended his amendments to undermine antifederalist
efforts to make more substantive changes to the Constitution (by proposing
a more pervasive set of amendments and/or by calling a second
convention).3 34 In addition, Madison may have wished to use the Bill of
Rights to engender support for the new federal government from those who
had opposed ratification and from those who had yet to ratify (North
Carolina and Rhode Island).335 While at least some of these strategic
considerations undoubtedly contributed to Madison's desire to propose the
Bill of Rights, however, it would be a mistake to overlook the sincerity of
Madison's commitment to the amendments at the time he proposed them in
Congress.
When Madison arrived as a representative in the first federal Congress
in 1789, there was little immediate support for amending the Constitution.
Both houses of Congress were dominated by supporters of the Constitution
who, like Madison, had ardently fought to secure the passage of the
Constitution without a declaration of rights.336 A number of these
"federalists" had voiced strong opposition to a federal bill of rights during
the ratification period on the grounds that the enumeration of a specific set
334 See, e.g., Bowling, supra note 332, at 224 ("[Madison] believed rights related amendments
would satisfy enough Antifederalists to protect the new Constitution from both the structural
amendments and the second Federal Convention which Antifederal leaders demanded ....").
335 See, e.g., Finkelman, supra note 17, at 303 ("Madison's primary purpose in supporting
amendments was two-fold: to fulfill promises made to his constituents during his campaign for
Congress and to undermine opposition to the Constitution."); Rakove, supra note 61, at 254 (arguing
that "Madison remained convinced that his reasons for dismissing bills of rights as useless 'parchment
barriers' were still sound" but nonetheless proposed the Bill of Rights because "public opinion
demanded the addition of some amendments to the new Constitution").
Alleviating the concerns of Antifederalists was, in fact, one of the benefits Madison articulated in
his June 8 address. See 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 196-207. Additionally, in
a letter Madison wrote a few months after he had introduced the amendments, Madison referred to
North Carolina's potential ratification as one of the benefits of adoption. See Letter from James
Madison to Richard Peters (Aug. 19, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at
346-47. Madison in fact sent a draft of the amendments to the governor of North Carolina in an effort
to influence that state's ratifying convention which met in November 1789. See MAIER, supra note 11,
at 457.
336
See, e.g., BANNING, supra note 8, at 286 ("[The Federalists'] resentment of concessions they
considered both unnecessary and improper prompted much of the resistance to [Madison's proposal for
amendments], which was reinforced by sheer impatience to get on with other business."). At the first
Federal Congress, the number of senators who had supported the Constitution's adoption ranged from
twenty to twenty-one, due to William Paterson's resignation. Members, BIRTH OF THE NATION: THE
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789-1791, http://www.gwu.edul-ffcp/exhibit/p I/members/ (last visited
Apr. 7, 2012). The remaining five to six members of the Senate either had opposed the Constitution's
ratification or did not have clearly articulated positions. Id. In the House of Representatives, thirty-nine
of the chamber's sixty-five members had supported the Constitution's ratification. Id. Of the remaining
twenty-six Representatives, twenty-five had either opposed the Constitution, were ambivalent, or did
not have clearly articulated positions. Id. The only member who is unaccounted for in this list is
Alexander White, for whom relevant biographical information is unavailable. Id.
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of rights could be used to derogate or undermine those rights that were left
out of the enumeration.337 Secure and fresh from their victory, most of
them saw little need or advantage in revisiting a battle they had already
won. Virtually everyone in the first Congress agreed, furthermore, that
the body's most pressing tasks related to the construction of an
infrastructure for the nation's first federal government. 339  The
antifederalists, many of whom had strenuously criticized the Constitution
during ratification for its failure to include a declaration of rights, showed
little interest in pursuing amendments during the first Congress because
they knew it was unlikely that they could secure the full range of
amendments they desired.340
In light of the federalists' control over Congress, the pressing need for
alternative business, and the malaise of the antifederalists, it seemed
unlikely that anyone, even Madison, would be able to marshal a set of
amendments through the first Congress. 341 Madison nonetheless assumed
the task of culling through the mass of proposals for amendments that had
been submitted during the ratification period (as well as at least some of
the rights declarations already existing at the state level) and formulated a
list of nineteen proposed amendments.342 What is more, he relentlessly
337 See, e.g., Speech of James Wilson to the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, in 2 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 233, at 387-91;
Speech of James Wilson in the Statehouse Yard (Oct. 6, 1787), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 233, at 167-72; see also Sherry, supra note 113,
at 1161-64 (describing federalists' arguments that enumeration could lead to counterproductive
narrowing of rights). As previously discussed, Madison himself had expressed these same concerns at
the Virginia Ratifying Convention. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
3 See Bowling, supra note 332, at 234 ("Most Federalists, basking in their election sweep,
believed amendments unnecessary either as a political stratagem or because personal rights needed
protection at the federal level."); see also LABUNSKI, supra note 333, at 194-206 (describing initial
opposition in Congress to Madison's proposal for a Bill of Rights).
3 See LABUNSKI, supra note 333, at 203 ("Madison had barely [introduced a bill of rights] when
one member after another denounced his proposals - primarily arguing that amendments were
unnecessary, premature, and certainly less important than other legislative business.").
340 See RAKOVE, supra note 8, at 330 ("By the time the First Congress mustered a quorum in April
1789, it was not evident that action on amendments was imperative. Most Federalists had grown
indifferent to the question, nor were former Anti-Federalists now sitting in Congress any more
insistent, largely because they knew that the substantive changes they desired in the Constitution lay
beyond their reach."); Bowling, supra note 332, at 224 ("Antifederal members saw them [proposals for
a bill of rights] as an impediment to the changes in the structure and power of the new federal
government that they sought.")
341 See RAKOVE, supra note 8, at 330 ("Nearly all Madison's colleagues in Congress thought the
entire subject [of Amendments] could be deferred until the new government was safely operating...").
342 See LABUNSKI, supra note 333, at 198-99; RAKOVE, supra note 59, at 96-100. Prior to the first
Congress, two hundred and ten proposals for amendments had emanated from eight ratifying
conventions. See Bowling, supra note 332, at 228. According to Kenneth Bowling, approximately one
hundred separate amendments can be distinguished from that set of two hundred and ten proposals. See
id. Madison assumed that the text of the Constitution would be changed, rather than simply appended.
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pressed a largely recalcitrant Congress to take up consideration of his
proposals at a time when it was consumed with a host of other matters.343
As one scholar has summarized, "[w]ithout Madison's commitment there
would have been no federal Bill of Rights in 1791 [.]"'43
It seems unlikely that Madison would have gone to such lengths, in the
face of such varied obstacles, purely for the strategic considerations
outlined above. 34 5 While he may have felt some obligation to propose the
amendments in light of the statements he had made during his campaign
for Congress, for example, it is difficult to believe that Madison would
have consciously espoused a position in which he did not believe for the
346
purpose of securing an election. Whatever moral obligations Madison
may have felt toward his constituents, furthermore, were likely satisfied
when Madison proposed the Bill of Rights for Congress' consideration.
Some of his federalist colleagues made that point when they attempted to
dissuade him from pursuing his proposals further. 3 47
Similarly, there are fundamental limitations to the "tub to the whale"
theory that Madison proposed his set of amendments to undermine
antifederalist efforts to change the Constitution in more substantive
ways. 34 8 With respect to a second constitutional convention, there was no
immediate threat of such during the summer of 1789. Despite concerted
As a result, his proposals included the specific places in the Constitutional text where his alterations
would occur. 12 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 207.
3 See LABUNSKI, supra note 333, at 213-40 (describing congressional debates and amendments to
Madison's proposals).
344 See Bowling, supra note 332, at 224; see also supra note 17. .
345 For concurring views, see BANNING, supra note 8, at 281 ("A close examination of Madison's
thinking shows that while he did have reservations, he had also privately concluded that the Bill of
Rights was proper in itself. The reasons ran much deeper than can possibly be captured in a cynical,
reductionist account."); LABUNSKI, supra note 333, at 194 ("It is hard to believe that political
expediency, keeping his word to local constituents, or a wish to assuage the concerns of those who
remained opposed to the new government would be enough to motivate an individual to endure what
Madison would go through during the summer of 1789. Only a genuine conviction that such rights
were necessary and important could have generated the passion and commitment that Madison poured
into his campaign for amendments....").
346 It is possible that Madison had come to believe in the utility of a bill of rights, at least to some
extent, by the time he first expressed his willingness to support amendments in January of 1789. It is
this author's contention that Madison's perspective regarding the Bill of Rights and the ways it could
legitimate judicial review had begun to shift by October of 1788. See supra notes 285-292 and
accompanying text.
3 William Loughton Smith of South Carolina, in an apparent effort to assuage Madison's
conscience on this point and placate his desire to continue, told Madison that his proposal had satisfied
Madison's "duty" and "if he did not succeed he was not to blame." 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 293, at 804-05, 816.
348 See, e.g., Bowling, supra note 332, at 236-37 (recounting congressmen George Clymer's
description of Madison's proposals as "merely a tub to the whale," in reference to a contemporary
idiom that referred to an effort to distract one's opponents through the offer of an empty gesture).
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efforts by some antifederalists, only two states had petitioned Congress for
a second convention by June of 1789,349 far short of the two-thirds
requirement contained in the Constitution. 3 50 There was no indication,
furthermore, that the antifederalists in Congress were willing or able to
propose a broader set of amendments in 1789. To the contrary, Madison
must have known that his amendments created the very risk that he was
trying to avoid. The evidence taken as a whole suggests that, in the absence
of Madison's proposal for amendments, Congress would not have taken up
the subject at all during its first term.35 ' After Madison proposed his
amendments, however, the antifederalists attempted to interject the very
types of fundamental changes that Madison wished to curtail.352 Insofar as
Madison's goal was to forestall such efforts, surely the easiest and most
effective course of action would have been simply to refrain from creating
the opportunity for the antifederalists to propose their amendments. It is
possible that Madison may have wished to press the issue while the
federalists had strong numbers in the first federal Congress, but this
assumes that Madison feared the composition of Congress was likely to
change (to his detriment) in the near future, a supposition for which there is
little support.
Finally, while Madison desired to engender support for the new
government among those who had opposed ratification (and among those
in North Carolina and Rhode Island who remained opposed to ratification),
this factor alone cannot account for Madison's commitment to his
amendments. 3 53 One of the strongest criticisms of Madison's proposals, for
example, was that it distracted and delayed Congress from fostering
support for the new government through the timely creation of its
institutional structure. 354 The most persuasive evidence that Madison was
349 See LABUNSKI, supra note 333, at 189-90 (noting that on May 5, 1789, Virginia submitted its
petition to Congress, and on May 6, 1789, New York followed suit).35
o See U.S. CONST. art. V.
351 See supra notes 336-341 and accompanying text.
352 See, e.g., Bowling, supra note 332, at 241-46 (summarizing antifederalists' efforts to add more
ambitious amendments to Madison's proposals); see also LABUNSKI, supra note 333, at 213-40 (same).
3 Madison's proposals actually antagonized many of the antifederalists in Congress because they
perceived his proposal as an attempt to undermine antifederalist efforts to propose more pervasive
changes to the Constitution. See Bowling, supra note 332, at 240 - 245 (describing antifederalists'
hostility to Madison's proposals in Congress). Madison apparently hoped that his amendments would
be sufficiently palatable to rank and file antifederalists that they would create a wedge between the
antifederalists in Congress and their constituencies. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Thomas
Jefferson (Mar. 29, 1789), in 12 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 38 (stating Madison's
hope that the amendments would "extinguish opposition to the [federal] system, or at least break the
force of it, by detaching the deluded opponents from their designing leaders").
354 See LABUNSKI, supra note 333, at 203-05, 215, 218 (discussing various criticisms of Madison's
amendments on grounds that they delayed Congress from matters of more immediate importance).
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substantively committed to the Bill of Rights in 1789, furthermore, can be
found in the only rights-based amendment that Congress rejected from his
hand.
Madison's "fifth" resolution would have required that: "No state shall
violate the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the
trial by jury in criminal cases. "'5 This amendment was the only one of
Madison's proposals that would have been applicable to the states.
Although he must have known that such an encroachment on the states'
prerogatives was a dubious proposition in 1789, Madison argued in
Congress that it was "the most valuable amendment on the whole list."356
"[I]t must be admitted, on all hands," Madison stated in his June 1789
address to the House, "that the state governments are as liable to attack
these invaluable privileges as the general government is, and therefore
ought to be as cautiously guarded against."s?
If Madison was motivated purely by tactical considerations, it is
difficult to understand why he would have proposed, and placed such
importance on, this particular amendment.3 58 In terms of engendering
support among antifederalists, who were overwhelmingly apprehensive
about the consolidation of power in federal hands, Madison must have
known that this amendment was likely to have the very opposite effect. It
is also difficult to see how such an amendment fits within the "tub to the
whale" theory. Instead, Madison's fifth resolution more likely represents
what it appears to be: an expression of Madison's frustration with the
Constitution's failure to rein in the states and an attempt to compensate for
the loss of the congressional veto at the Convention. This more
straightforward explanation for Madison's motivations presumes, however,
that he had come to believe in the potential efficacy of judicial review by
June of 1789.
In short, it is the contention of this article that Madison's commitment
to the Bill of Rights in 1789 has been unfairly overshadowed by the
tactical considerations that might also have contributed to his motivations.
A key reason for this mistake is the failure to appreciate the significant
" See 12 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 202. Madison would have had this
amendment inserted into section 10 of Article 1. Id.
356 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 293, at 1292.
35 See 12 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 208. Madison was unsuccessful, however,
and it was not until the Reconstruction Amendments were passed that the states were subject to any
new constitutional limitations. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV; see also Barron v. Baltimore,
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding that none of the Bill of Rights, as originally drafted, were
applicable to the states).
358 See LABUNSKI, supra note 333, at 202-03.
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shift that began to occur in Madison's thinking regarding judicial review
during the fall of 1788. While we can never be absolutely certain that
Madison believed his own statements to Congress in June of 1789
regarding the prospects of judicial review, there are several reasons to
accept his statements at face value. For one, the position he espoused
appeared to naturally flow from the logic of his prior positions and political
philosophy. As early as October 1788, Madison had identified that the
redeeming virtue of a bill of rights was the way in which it could be
incorporated into the national sentiment, specifically, the way in which it
could express and reflect a consensus among the American people
regarding their fundamental norms and values. It stands to reason that
Madison would eventually perceive the connection between that consensus
and the impact it could have on the perceived legitimacy of judicial review.
In fact, he articulated precisely this connection in his later correspondence.
The real question, therefore, seems to be whether Madison made this
connection as early as May (or possibly January) of 1789. In light of how
much Madison devoted himself to this issue during the fall of 1788 and the
winter of 1788-89, the importance of the issue to his overarching political
philosophy, and the alacrity with which he generally constructed
constitutional theory, it seems most likely that these developments in his
thought occurred by the first half of 1789.
CONCLUSION
The Virginia Plan's Council of Revision was narrowly rejected at the
Constitutional Convention in 1787. The addition of two or three individual
votes might have been sufficient to secure its incorporation into the
Constitution. It is interesting to ponder how different our governmental
structure might look today, and perhaps how different our society might
look, if Madison and his allies had succeeded in persuading their
colleagues about the Council's superiority over judicial review.
Despite the Council's rejection at the Convention, however, our
Constitution continues to bear the imprint of the Council by virtue of the
Bill of Rights. This article maintains that the Council's demise at the
Convention provided one of Madison's primary motivations for proposing
the Bill of Rights. In light of Madison's pivotal role in their introduction
and passage, therefore, an understanding of the origins of the Bill of Rights
requires an appreciation for the role the Council of Revision played in
Madison's constitutional structure and the void created in that structure by
the Council's rejection.
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At the Constitutional Convention, Madison attempted to construct a
national structure that assigned primacy to the legislative branch but which
nonetheless subjected the legislative process to a series of restraints that
would interject additional opportunities for deliberation, rationality, and
leadership. As a centerpiece in Madison's system of restraints, the Council
of Revision was of crucial importance to Madison and its rejection at the
Convention helped shatter his constitutional structure.3 5 9 Without the
Council's veto, Madison believed, the federal government was likely to
prove little better than the state analogues it was supposed to correct.360
The executive veto and the prospect of judicial review were little
consolation for Madison, who initially believed that neither mechanism
could be effectively implemented. In particular, Madison was pessimistic
about the unqualified nature of judicial review. Under the Virginia Plan,
Congress's ability to overturn the Council's veto had been a crucial
component of the Council's democratic legitimacy because Madison
believed the American public would not countenance a more pervasive
encroachment into the prerogatives of its favored branch (the House).
The Bill of Rights can best be understood, therefore, as an effort by
Madison to reclaim some of the ground he had lost at the Convention when
both the congressional veto and the Council of Revision had been rejected.
By October of 1788, Madison had begun to focus on the ways in which a
bill of rights could directly influence the American people. In his words, he
was drawn to the possibility that the values and norms reflected in a bill of
rights could become "incorporated with the national sentiment."16t This
realization was a critical step because the capacity of a bill of rights to
foster a consensus among Americans about their fundamental norms and
values had logical repercussions for the ways in which Madison thought
about judicial review. Insofar as a bill of rights could reflect a consensus of
the American people's values, and insofar as the judiciary was perceived as
the "guardians" of those rights, a bill of rights had the capacity to foster
and institutionalize a direct political connection between the people and the
judiciary. By augmenting the indirect connection the judiciary already
enjoyed by virtue of the appointment process, the Bill of Rights could
potentially elevate the judiciary's role beyond the strictly subservient place
3 Rakove, supra note 201, at 1521 (observing that the Council of Revision "occupied a major
place in [Madison's] larger constitutional scheme").
3o As previously discussed, Madison hoped that the newly designed federal government could
correct many of the deficiencies at the state level by virtue of a plenary congressional veto over state
legislation. See supra notes 63-74 and accompanying text.
361 See supra text accompanying note 278.
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it had occupied in the Virginia Plan. The delicate balance to the
constitutional structure that Madison believed had been lost with the
Council's rejection could in the end be restored (at least in part) by virtue
of the Bill of Rights and the process of judicial review which it helped
legitimate and institutionalize.
For Madison, therefore, the Bill of Rights was not intended to create a
set of positivist rights so much as to foster a consensus among Americans
about the fundamental rights that defined their society and to
institutionalize the judiciary as the guardian of those rights. As a result,
Madison probably anticipated that the reach of the judiciary would always
be constrained by the extent to which the American people could identify
with the judiciary. Madison must have hoped that the judiciary would
enjoy sufficient political legitimacy to operate as a meaningful restraint on
Congress but it is unlikely that he envisioned a world where the American
people would ever identify more strongly with the judiciary than with
Congress. Just as with the Council, therefore, Madison probably assumed
that the judiciary would be able to restrain Congress in important cases
where Congress and the American people were closely divided. As with
the Council, however, Madison probably assumed that the judiciary would
be powerless where a determined supermajority was intent on a particular
course of action. It is important to remember that such a result was
perfectly compatible with Madison's overarching constitutional vision. The
Council of Revision had been intended to perform its role through a
qualified veto by interjecting critical opportunities for deliberation,
rationality, and leadership into the majoritarian process. Similarly, from
Madison's perspective, the function of judicial review. under the Bill of
Rights was to refine and improve the majoritarian process rather than
circumvent it.
One benefit of studying the Council of Revision is that it provides a
perspective for the ways in which modem constitutional jurisprudence has
evolved away from Madison's original vision. Modem constitutional
jurisprudence tends to conceptualize judicial review as a
"countermajoritarian" enterprise whose purpose is to remove issues from
the majoritarian process.3 62 Under this model, the Bill of Rights is
362 This conception of judicial review was well summarized by the Supreme Court in 1943. "The
very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the courts." W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638
(1943). The term "countermajoritarian difficulty" was popularized by Alexander Bickel in the early
1960s. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLITICS 16 (1962) ("The root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our
[Vol.27:459550
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conceptualized in terms of a positivist creation of rights whose
interpretation and definition is assigned primarily, if not exclusively, to the
judiciary.363 Rather than serving as a legitimizing link between the
judiciary and the people, the Bill of Rights is conceptualized as a barrier
which seeks to protect the American people from themselves by cutting off
their access to the document's interpretation and definition.364 The Council
of Revision seems foreign to modem eyes because its vetoes could have
been overturned by a supermajority of Congress; a practice wholly inimical
to the concept of judicial supremacy that serves as a fundamental corollary
365to most modem schools of constitutional interpretation.
From a normative point of view, one could argue that Madison's
original vision for the Bill of Rights is no longer compatible with
American democracy. We are more inclined to view the law today in
positivist terms than did those who lived in the eighteenth century.3 6 6 We
live in the world of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins 367 rather than Swift v.
Tyson. 368 Additionally, our governmental structure today would appear to
rely less on the appointment process, calling into question the legitimacy of
conceptualizing the work of the judiciary as representative in nature.369
system."); id. at 17 ("[Judicial review] thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people of the
here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it.").
363 See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE
PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 7 (2007)
("Judicial supremacy requires deference by other government officials to the constitutional dictates of
the Court . . . . Judicial supremacy asserts that the Constitution is what the judges say it is, not because
the Constitution has no objective meaning or that courts could not be wrong but because there is no
alternative interpretive authority beyond the Court."); see also Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in
a Civil-Law System: The Role of the United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and
Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 46 (Gutmann ed. 1997)
("The people will be willing to leave interpretation of the Constitution to lawyers and law courts so
long as the people believe that it is (like the interpretation of a statute) essentially lawyers' work-
requiring a close examination of text, history of the text, traditional understanding of the text, judicial
precedent, and so forth.").
3 See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 363, at 9 (observing that judicial supremacy is premised on
belief that "[s]ome questions - questions of justice and rights - are too important to be left in the hands
of legislative majorities or 'the people themselves'); Scalia, supra note 363, at 47 ("If the courts are
free to write the Constitution anew, they will, by God, write it the way the majority wants; the
appointment and confirmation process will see to that. This, of course, is the end of the Bill of Rights,
whose meaning will be committed to the very body it was meant to protect against: the majority.").
365 See KRAMER, supra note 88, at 224 (arguing that "the principle of judicial supremacy came to
monopolize constitutional theory and discourse" during the second half of the twentieth century).
366 See Sherry, supra note 113, at 1176 ("The formal analysis of modem constitutional law is
pervaded by the legacy of legal positivism, which has all but eradicated notions of any link between
constitutional law and natural law.").
363 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
36641 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
369 In contrast to when the Constitution was first implemented, the Senate and executive are elected
today in a (more or less) majoritarian fashion. Despite modem efforts to democratize the political
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There are, nonetheless, normative problems with abandoning Madison's
original vision, which this article will sketch in only their barest form. The
first problem stems from the fact that Madison drafted the Bill of Rights in
the broad, open-ended language of natural rights. To reconceptualize the
Bill of Rights as a positivist set of rights is to ask the language to perform a
function it was never intended to perform and in many ways is ill-suited to
perform. Terms such as "due process," "unreasonable searches," "cruel and
unusual," and "freedom of speech" simply do not lend them themselves
easily to a positivist approach. Such language was intended to constitute
the beginning, rather than the end, of a discussion within the American
polity.370
The second potential problem with abandoning Madison's original
understanding for the Bill of Rights relates to the legitimacy of judicial
review. Modern scholars and jurists have struggled with this issue since the
conceptual moorings of constitutional interpretation first began to shift in
the twentieth century. 371 For nearly one hundred years, academics have
spent thousands of pages attempting to resolve the "countermajoritarian
difficulty" inherent in the twentieth century approach to constitutional
jurisprudence. 37 2
The Council of Revision reveals two important facets of Madison's
political philosophy that bear on this inquiry. First, Madison's preference
for the Council reveals that his instinct was to refine the majoritarian
process rather than circumvent it. Second, Madison's willingness to entrust
the judiciary with a policy-making role on the Council demonstrates his
faith both in the democratic legitimacy of the appointment process and in
structure, however, the Electoral College has never been abandoned. The result has been four
presidential elections won by candidates who lost the popular vote to a rival, the most recent such event
occurring in the 2000 election of George W. Bush. See, e.g., DAHL, supra note 139, at 79-80. Query,
furthermore, whether our governmental structure actually does rely less on the appointment process, in
light of the fact that so much day-to-day governance and policymaking is conducted by administrative
agencies staffed through appointments.
3o For a normative argument that judicial review should still play this role, see FRIEDMAN, supra
note 131, at 16 ("The value ofjudicial review in the modern era is that it ... serves as a catalyst for the
American people to debate as a polity some of the most difficult and fundamental issues that confront
them.); see also Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REv. 257 (2005); Barry
Friedman, The Importance ofBeing Positive: The Nature and Function ofJudicial Review, 72 U. CtN.
L. REV. 1257 (2004).
n' See, e.g., PERETTI, supra note 150, at 3 ("The primary assumption of conventional constitutional
theorists is that judicial review is fundamentally at odds with democratic values and, thus, is in need of
a special or exceptional source of legitimacy.").
372 See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Dfficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002); Barry Friedman, The History of
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333
(1998).
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the ability of the judiciary to serve in a representative capacity. Madison's
writings after the Convention, furthermore, demonstrate that his attraction
to the Bill of Rights flowed from the ways in which it could reflect (and
perhaps catalyze) a consensus among the American people regarding their
fundamental norms and values. 37 3 In contrast to most modern schools of
constitutional interpretation, therefore, Madison appeared to view the
judicial enforcement of the Bill of Rights as a fundamentally majoritarian
enterprise. The fact that judicial interpretations would occasionally conflict
with congressional legislation was the point of constructing a multi-branch
form of representational democracy. Madison (and many others) hoped
that the tension resulting from an overlapping system of multi-branch
government would create a process that would produce better laws than
one based on a single governing entity comprised of directly elected
officials.
Without conceptualizing judicial review in similarly representational
terms, most modem schools of constitutional interpretation are challenged
to harmonize judicial review with the overarching tenets of democratic
governance. Under some countermajoritarian models, such as originalism,
an effort is made to legitimate judicial review by basing it upon "objective
criteria."374 From a normative point of view, however, it is not clear why
any set of "objective criteria" would be preferable to Madison's original
vision. Insofar as the "objective criteria" cease to reflect a current
American consensus of fundamental freedoms and values, for example,
why should objectivity serve as the society's overriding value? Any
paradigm that assigns lawyers and historians with a privileged position for
the interpretation of the Constitution, furthermore, necessarily relegates the
American people to little or no role in defining the Bill of Rights. 37 5 To
373Although he disagrees that the judiciary originally was intended to function in this manner,
Barry Friedman argues that this is in fact how judicial review operates today. See FRIEDMAN, supra
note 131, at 367-68 ("Judicial review provides a catalyst and method for [the American people to
define the Constitution]. Over time, through a dialogue with the justices, the Constitution comes to
reflect the considered judgment of the American people regarding their most fundamental values.").
374 See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1 (1971), reprinted in INTERPRETING TH4E CONSTITUTION, supra note 139, at 201-02 ("We have been
talking about neutrality in the application of principles. If judges are to avoid imposing their own
values upon the rest of us, however, they must be neutral as well in the definition and the derivation of
principles."); see also PERETTI, supra note 150, at 227 ("Conventional constitutional law scholars see
their central task as 'saving the Court's legitimacy.' . . . [T]hey attempt to present constitutional
interpretation as an objectively determined or at least an objectively constrained process of
decisionmaking.").
3 See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 88, at 233 ("It is not too much to say that [the acceptance of
judicial supremacy] has fundamentally altered the meaning of republican citizenship by, as a
conceptual matter, taking ordinary people out of the process of shaping constitutional law.").
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what extent can a society be characterized as a democracy, if the vast
majority of its citizens are so far removed from the process by which that
society defines its fundamental values? 37 6 How could such a removal,
furthermore, fail to engender the type of widespread passivity and
disengagement that undermines the long-term health of democracies?
As Madison well understood, there are practical ramifications for the
way the work of the judiciary is conceptualized.37 The final arbiter of the
legitimacy of judicial review is not the judiciary but rather the American
public that must ultimately decide whether to abide by its rulings.3 78
Constitutional crises may be relatively rare but history suggests that inter-
branch confrontations are inevitable.379 If the American public comes to
believe that the judiciary is not intended to reflect their own norms and
values, what is the likelihood that it will support the judiciary through such
confrontations? 380 How much respect will the judiciary continue to receive
in the future if its rulings are based principally, if not entirely, on a
deference to someone else's conception of the law? 38 1 The American
judiciary may enjoy more legitimacy today in the eyes of the American
public than it did at the time Madison first proposed the Bill of Rights. It is
376 See, e.g., PERETTI, supra note 150, at 252 ("The idea that we can avoid confronting and
resolving difficult moral and political choices by easy resort to a hallowed document interpreted by
Platonic Guardians undermines democracy.").
3n See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 88, at 233 ("Public acceptance of judicial supremacy pervades
constitutional law and politics. It changes how the Justices conceive their role, how they decide cases
and write opinions. It changes how politicians, the press, and other affected actors internalize the
Court's rulings . . . .").
. See id. at 227 ("[Elvery reaffirmation of popular constitutionalism has predictably been
followed by efforts to restore or enlarge judicial authority. . . . In each instance, the Justices eventually
went too far ... precipitating a confrontation with the political branches that called upon Americans to
decide yet again whether judges should have so much say over their lives."); see also FRIEDMAN, supra
note 131, at 234 ("For all of history's frequent talk about the independence of the judiciary, that
independence exists only at public sufferance.").
" See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 131, at 119-36 (discussing confrontations between judiciary
and other branches in the context of the Civil War and Reconstruction), 167-236 (discussing same in
context of New Deal).
3.0 See NELSON, supra note 138, at 123 (observing that judicial attempts to reflect a consensus
views will necessarily be imperfect but arguing that such attempts are necessary because
"[n]oncoercive democratic societies cannot exist without at least some agreement on values-without at
least some consensus").
311 See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 363, at 26 ("Constitutional maintenance is above all a
political task.... Constitutions are made real by being constantly embraced and reenacted by citizens
and government officials."); see also PERETTI, supra note 150, at 252 ("When constitutional
interpretation is regarded and practiced as a broadly shared democratic exercise, even if Court led, the
values to which the Constitution variously speaks should in the end be more rather than less broadly
and meaningfully felt.").
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not clear, however, whether that legitimacy is in the process of growth or
erosion.382
Despite its rejection over two hundred years ago, therefore, the Council
of Revision continues to offer us several important lessons. Among other
things, it demonstrates that there is nothing inevitable, or intrinsically
correct, about the ways we have come to think about judicial review and
constitutional interpretation. In addition, it sheds light on Madison's initial
doubts about the legitimacy of judicial review and reveals how he sought
ways to ground it within (rather than elevate it above) representational
democracy. And finally, it invites us to consider the continuing merits of
Madison's original approach, not simply because Madison thought it, but
because it might in some respects constitute a normative improvement over
the paradigms that have come to dominate modem constitutional
interpretation.
382 For an argument that the Supreme Court currently enjoys a position of relative prestige and
stability as a result of its practice of rendering judgments that more or less reflect the consensus of
Americans' views and values, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 131, at 15 ("[O]ver time ... the Court and the
public will come into basic alliance with each other. In the course of acting thus, the Supreme Court
has made itself one of the most popular institutions in American democracy.").
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